

Fundamental Analysis and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns: A Data-Mining Approach

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We construct a “universe” of over 18,000 fundamental signals from financial statements and use a bootstrap approach to evaluate the impact of data mining on fundamental-based anomalies. We find that many fundamental signals are significant predictors of cross-sectional stock returns even after accounting for data mining. This predictive ability is more pronounced following high-sentiment periods and among stocks with greater limits to arbitrage. Our evidence suggests that fundamental-based anomalies, including those newly discovered in this study, cannot be attributed to random chance, and they are better explained by mispricing. Our approach is general and we also apply it to past return-based anomalies. (*JEL* G12, G14)

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Economists place a premium on the discovery of puzzles, which in the context at hand amounts to finding apparent rejections of a widely accepted theory of stock market behavior.

—Merton (1987, 104)

Finance researchers have devoted a considerable amount of time and effort to searching for stock return patterns that cannot be explained by traditional asset pricing models. As a result of these efforts, there is now a large body of literature documenting hundreds of cross-sectional return anomalies

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(Green, Hand, and Zhang 2013, 2014; Harvey, Liu, and Zhu 2016; McLean and Pontiff 2016). An important debate in the literature is whether the abnormal returns documented in these studies are compensation for systematic risk, evidence of market inefficiency, or simply the result of extensive data mining.

Data-mining concern arises because “the more scrutiny a collection of data is subjected to, the more likely will interesting (spurious) patterns emerge” (Lo and MacKinlay 1990, 432). Intuitively, if enough variables are considered, then by pure chance some of these variables will generate abnormal returns even if they do not genuinely have any predictive ability for future stock returns. Lo and MacKinlay contend that the degree of data mining bias increases with the number of studies published on the topic. The cross-section of stock returns is arguably the most researched and published topic in finance; hence, the potential for spurious findings is also the greatest.

Although researchers have long recognized the potential danger of data mining, few studies have examined its impact on a broad set of cross-sectional stock return anomalies.¹ The lack of research in this area is in part because of the difficulty to account for all the anomaly variables that have been considered by researchers. Although one can easily identify published variables, one cannot observe the numerous variables that have been tried but not published or reported due to the “publication bias.”² In this paper, we overcome this challenge by examining a large and important class of anomaly variables that are derived from financial statements (what we call “fundamental-based variables”), for which a “universe” can be reasonably constructed.

We focus on fundamental-based variables for several reasons. First, many prominent anomalies such as the asset growth anomaly (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill 2008) and the gross profitability anomaly (Novy-Marx 2013) are based on financial statement variables. Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016) report that accounting variables represent the largest group among all the published cross-sectional return predictors. Second, researchers have considerable discretion to the selection and construction of fundamental signals. As such, there is ample opportunity for data snooping. Third and most importantly, although there are hundreds of financial statement variables and numerous ways of combining them, we can construct a “universe” of fundamental signals by using permutational arguments. The ability to construct such a universe is important because in order to account for the effect of data mining, one should not only include variables that were reported, but also variables that were considered but unreported (Sullivan, Timmermann, and White 1999, 2001). Financial statement variables are ideally suited for such an analysis.

We construct a universe of fundamental signals by imitating the search process of a data snooper. We start with all accounting variables in Compustat

¹ The exceptions are Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016) and McLean and Pontiff (2016).

² The publication bias refers to the fact that it is difficult to publish a nonresult (Harvey, Liu, and Zhu 2016).

and then impose a minimum amount of data requirement, which leads to a total of 240 accounting variables. For each variable, we consider 76 financial ratio configurations. By using permutational arguments (i.e., including all combinations of accounting variables and financial ratio configurations), we then construct a universe of over 18,000 fundamental signals.

We form long-short portfolios based on each fundamental signal and assess the significance of long-short returns by using a bootstrap procedure. The bootstrap is a nonparametric method for estimating the distribution of an estimator or test statistic by resampling one's data (Horowitz 2001). The bootstrap approach is desirable in our context for several reasons. First, long-short returns are highly non-normal. Second, long-short returns across fundamental signals exhibit complex cross-sectional dependencies. Third, evaluating the performance of a large number of fundamental signals involves a multiple comparison problem (Harvey, Liu, and Zhu 2016).

We follow Fama and French (2010) and randomly sample time periods with replacement. That is, we draw the entire cross-section of long-short returns for each time period. The simulated returns have the same properties as the actual returns except that we set the true alpha for the simulated returns to zero. We estimate alphas relative to the CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor model, and the Carhart four-factor model. We follow Kosowski et al. (2006) and conduct our bootstrap analysis on both alphas and the t -statistics of alphas. By comparing the cross-sectional distribution of actual alphas (t -statistics) to the distribution of alphas (t -statistics) from the simulated samples, we are able to assess the extent to which the observed performance of top-ranked signals is due to sampling variation (i.e., random chance).

Our results indicate that the top-ranked fundamental signals in our sample exhibit superior long-short performance that is not due to sampling variation. The bootstrapped p -values for the extreme percentiles of alphas are generally less than 5%. For example, the 99th percentile of equal-weighted three-factor alphas is 0.84% per month in the actual data, with a bootstrapped p -value of 1.1%, indicating that only 1.1% of the simulation runs produce a 99th percentile of alphas higher than 0.84%. The results for t -statistics are even more significant. For example, the 99th percentile of t -statistics for equal-weighted three-factor alphas is 4.82 in the actual data. In comparison, none of the simulation runs generate a 99th percentile of t -statistics that is as high as 4.82. In other words, we would not expect to find such extreme t -statistics under the null hypothesis of no predictive ability. The results for value-weighted returns are qualitatively similar. For example, the 99th percentile of three-factor alpha t -statistics is 3.66 in the actual data, with a bootstrapped p -value of 0%. Overall, our bootstrap results suggest that the superior performance of the top fundamental signals cannot be attributed to pure chance.

Our results are robust to alternative universe of fundamental signals, alternative sampling procedure, and alternative benchmark models including the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. In addition, we find qualitatively

the same results whether we exclude or include financial stocks. Finally, our results are unchanged when we use industry-adjusted fundamental signals.

Having shown that fundamental-based anomalies are not due to random chance, we next investigate whether they are consistent with mispricing- or risk-based explanations. We conduct three tests. First, behavioral arguments suggest that if the abnormal returns to fundamental-based trading strategies arise from mispricing, then they should be stronger among stocks with greater limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Consistent with this prediction, we find that the predictive ability of top fundamental signals is more pronounced among small, low-institutional ownership, high-idiosyncratic volatility, and low-analyst coverage stocks. Second, to the extent that fundamental-based anomalies are driven by mispricing, anomaly returns should be significantly higher following high-sentiment periods (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan 2012). We find strong evidence consistent with this prediction. Third, we examine whether anomaly returns vary across the business cycle (Chordia and Shivakumar 2002). If the superior performance of top fundamental signals represents compensation for systematic risk, then we should expect the anomaly returns to be significantly lower during bad times (when the marginal utility of wealth is high) than during good times (Cochrane 2004). Contrary to this prediction, we find that the long-short returns of top fundamental signals are actually higher during recessions than during expansions, although the difference is statistically insignificant. Taken together, although we cannot completely rule out risk-based explanations, our evidence suggests that fundamental-based anomalies are more consistent with mispricing-based explanations.

Our results indicate that a large number of fundamental signals exhibit genuine predictive ability for future stock returns. While some of these signals have been explored by previous studies, many of the top fundamental signals identified in this study are new and have received little direct attention in the prior literature. For example, we find that anomaly variables constructed based on interest expense, tax loss carryforward, and selling, general, and administrative expense are highly correlated with future stock returns. Broadly speaking, these variables may predict future stock returns because they contain value-relevant information about future firm performance and the market fails to incorporate this information into stock prices in a timely manner. Trading cost cannot fully explain the delayed reaction to public accounting information because the trading strategies considered in our study are rebalanced once a year and have low turnover rates. We argue that limited attention is a more plausible reason why investors fail to fully appreciate the information content of the fundamental variables documented in this study.

A key innovation of our paper is to construct a universe of fundamental signals. Although we focus on financial statement variables in this paper, our approach is general and can be applied to other categories of anomaly variables. We demonstrate this generality by applying our methodology to past return-based anomalies. Previous studies have shown that short-, intermediate-, and

long-horizon past returns contain significant information about future stock returns (DeBondt and Thaler 1985; Jegadeesh 1990; and Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). More recently, Novy-Marx (2012) shows that the momentum effect is primarily driven by stock returns during twelve to seven months prior to the portfolio formation date, and Heston and Sadka (2008) document that past stock returns have significant predictive power for future returns of the same calendar month. We evaluate the extent to which these past return–based anomalies arise by pure chance.

Similar to financial statement variables, past return variables are also well suited for our analysis because although researchers have numerous choices on which past returns to use, we can construct a “universe” of past return signals by using permutational arguments. Our bootstrap results based on 4,080 past return signals indicate that the predictive ability of intermediate-horizon returns (i.e., the momentum effect) cannot be explained by random chance. However, the predictability of long-run past returns (i.e., the long-run reversal effect) is sensitive to the benchmark model and the portfolio weighting scheme.

Our study adds to an emerging literature on meta-analysis of market anomalies. The closest paper to ours is Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016), who use standard multiple-testing methods to correct for data mining in 315 published return predictors. Standard multiple-testing methods, however, cannot account for the exact cross-sectional dependency in test statistics. Moreover, because unpublished factors are unobservable Harvey, Liu, and Zhu have to make assumptions about the fraction of the unobserved tests. Our paper differs from Harvey, Liu, and Zhu in that we explicitly construct a universe of anomaly variables and we use a bootstrap procedure to evaluate data mining. Another related paper is McLean and Pontiff (2016), who use an out-of-sample approach to evaluate data-mining bias in market anomalies. They examine the post-publication performance of ninety-seven anomalies and document an average performance decline of 58%. Green, Hand, and Zhang (2013, 2014) examine the behaviors of a large number of return predictors, while Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) and Fama and French (2016) investigate whether their asset pricing models explain the performance of a host of anomalies. A fundamental difference between our paper and the above-mentioned studies is that existing papers focus exclusively on published anomalies, whereas our paper examines both reported and unreported anomaly variables.

Our paper makes two distinct contributions to the anomalies literature. First, we propose a general approach to evaluating data-mining bias in cross-sectional return anomalies. Our approach follows that of Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999, 2001) and has two key elements, that is, the construction of a universe of anomaly variables and the bootstrap. A basic premise of this approach is that individual anomaly variables cannot be viewed in isolation; rather, they should be evaluated in the context of a universe of all anomaly variables. Second, we study an exhaustive list of fundamental signals and show that the predictive ability of top fundamental signals is not due to

random chance. Moreover, we document a number of new fundamental-based anomalies. In short, by studying a sample of over 18,000 fundamental signals, we are able to significantly expand our knowledge of fundamental-based anomalies.

Our paper is inspired by a number of influential studies on data mining including Merton (1987), Lo and Mackinlay (1990), Foster, Smith, and Whaley (1997), and particularly Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999, 2001). Our paper is also related to several studies that investigate the momentum effect using a bootstrap approach (Conrad and Kaul 1998; Jegadeesh and Titman 2002; Karolyi and Kho 2004). These studies provide significant insights into alternative bootstrap procedures. Finally, our paper is related to Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010), who employ a bootstrap approach to separate skill from luck in the mutual fund industry. The use of a survivor bias-free database in these studies is crucial for drawing proper inference about the best-performing funds. The analogy in our study is that in order to account for data mining we need to include all anomaly variables considered by researchers. Examining only the published anomalies is akin to looking for evidence of skill from a sample of surviving mutual funds.

1. Data, Sample, and Methodology

1.1 Data and sample

We obtain monthly stock returns, share price, SIC code, and shares outstanding from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and annual accounting data from Compustat. Our sample consists of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ common stocks (with a CRSP share code of 10 or 11) with data necessary to construct fundamental signals (described in Section 1.2 below) and compute subsequent stock returns. We exclude financial stocks, that is, those with a one-digit SIC code of 6. We also remove stocks with a share price lower than \$1 at the portfolio formation date.³ To mitigate a backfilling bias, we require that a firm be listed on Compustat for two years before it is included in our sample (Fama and French 1993). We obtain Fama and French (1996) three factors and the momentum factor from Kenneth French's website.⁴ Our sample starts in July 1963 and ends in December 2013.

1.2 Fundamental signals

We construct our universe of fundamental signals in several steps. We start with all accounting variables reported in Compustat that have a sufficient amount of data. Specifically, we require that each accounting variable have

³ Our results are qualitatively similar if we exclude stocks with a share price below \$5 or ranked in the smallest NYSE size decile. See Table IA.6 in the Internet Appendix.

⁴ http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.

non-missing values in at least twenty years of our fifty-year sample period. We also require that, for each accounting variable, the average number of firms with non-missing values is at least 1,000 per year. We impose these data requirements to ensure a reasonable sample size and a meaningful asset pricing test. After applying these data screens and removing several redundant variables, we arrive at our list of 240 accounting variables. For brevity, we refer the reader to Appendix A for the complete list and description of these variables.

Next, we scale each accounting variable (X) by fifteen different base variables (Y) such as total assets, sales, and market capitalization to construct financial ratios.⁵ We form financial ratios because financial statement variables are typically more meaningful when they are compared with other accounting variables. Financial ratios are also desirable in cross-sectional settings because they put companies of different sizes on an equal playing field.

In addition to the level of the financial ratio (X/Y), we also compute year-to-year change (Δ in X/Y) and percentage change in financial ratios ($\% \Delta$ in X/Y). Finally, we compute the percentage change in each accounting variable ($\% \Delta$ in X), the difference between the percentage change in each accounting variable, and the percentage change in a base variable ($\% \Delta$ in $X - \% \Delta$ in Y), and the change in each accounting variable scaled by a lagged base variable ($\Delta X/lagY$). The above process results in a total of seventy-six financial ratio configurations for each accounting variable (X).⁶

The functional forms of our signals are selected based on a survey of financial statement analysis textbooks and academic papers. Oh and Penman (1989), for example, consider a list of sixty-eight fundamental signals, many of which are the level of and percentage change in various financial ratios (X/Y and $\% \Delta$ in X/Y). Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) identify several signals of the form $\% \Delta$ in $X - \% \Delta$ in Y . Piotroski's (2000) F -score consists of several variables that are changes in financial ratios (Δ in X/Y). Thomas and Zhang (2002) and Chan et al. (2006) decompose accruals and consider several variables of the form $\Delta X/lagY$. Finally, Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) define asset growth as the percentage change in total assets ($\% \Delta$ in X). It is important to note that although we choose the functional forms of our signals based on prior literature, we do not select any specific signals based on what has been documented in the literature because doing so would introduce a selection bias.

There are 240 accounting variables in our sample, and for each of these variables we construct seventy-six fundamental signals. Using permutational arguments, we should have a total of 18,240 (240×76) signals. The final number of fundamental signals included in our analysis is 18,113, which is slightly smaller than 18,240 because not all the combinations of accounting

⁵ Appendix B contains the full list of the fifteen base variables.

⁶ We refer the reader to Appendix B for the complete list of the seventy-six financial ratios and configurations.

variables result in meaningful signals (e.g., when X and Y are the same) and some of the combinations are redundant.

Despite the large number of fundamental signals included in our sample, we acknowledge that our “universe” is incomplete for at least four reasons. First, we do not consider all accounting variables (because we require a minimum amount of data). Second, we consider only fifteen base variables. Third, in constructing fundamental signals, we use at most two years of data (the current year and previous year). Fourth, we do not consider more complex transformations of the data such as those used in the construction of the organizational capital (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 2013).

As a result, one might argue that our universe may be too “small” and that we may have overlooked some fundamental signals that were considered by researchers. This, in turn, may bias our estimated p -values toward zero since the data-mining adjustment would not account for the full set of signals from which the successful ones are drawn. On the other hand, since we use permutational arguments, we may include signals that were not actually considered by researchers. This may lead to a loss of power so that even genuinely significant signals will appear to be insignificant. This is not a serious issue because it would bias against us finding evidence of significant predictive ability.

1.3 Long-short strategies

We sort all sample stocks into deciles based on each fundamental signal and construct equal-weighted as well as value-weighted portfolios. Following Fama and French (1996, 2008) and many previous studies, we form decile portfolios at the end of June in year t by using accounting data from the fiscal year ending in calendar year $t-1$ and compute returns from July in year t to June in year $t+1$. We examine the strategy that buys stocks in the top decile and shorts stocks in the bottom decile.

We estimate CAPM one-factor alpha, Fama-French three-factor alpha, and Carhart four-factor alpha of long-short returns by running the following time-series regressions:

$$r_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i MKT_t + e_{i,t}$$

$$r_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i MKT_t + s_i SMB_t + h_i HML_t + e_{i,t}$$

$$r_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i MKT_t + s_i SMB_t + h_i HML_t + u_i UMD_t + e_{i,t}$$

where $r_{i,t}$ is the long-short hedge return for fundamental signal i in month t ; MKT , SMB , HML , and UMD are market, size, value, and momentum factors (Fama and French 1996; Carhart 1997); and $e_{i,t}$ is the regression residual.

1.4 The Bootstrap

1.4.1 Rationale. The standard approach to evaluating the significance of a cross-sectional return predictor is to use the single-test t -statistic. A t -statistic above 2 is typically considered significant. This conventional inference

can be misleading in our context. First, long-short returns often do not follow normal distributions. In untabulated analysis, we conduct a Jarque-Bera normality test on the long-short returns of 18,113 fundamental signals and find that normality is rejected for over 98% of the signals. Second, accounting variables are highly correlated with each other (some even exhibit perfect multicollinearity). As a result, the long-short returns to fundamental-based trading strategies may display complex cross-sectional dependencies.⁷ Third, when we simultaneously evaluate the performance of a large number of signals, it involves a multiple comparison problem (Harvey, Liu, and Zhu 2016). By random chance, some of the 18,113 signals will appear to have significant t -statistics under conventional levels even if none of the variables has genuine predictive ability. As such, individual signals cannot be viewed in isolation; rather they should be evaluated relative to all other signals in the universe (Sullivan, Timmermann, and White 1999, 2001).

Given the non-normal returns, the complex cross-sectional dependencies, and the multiple comparison issue, it is very difficult to use a parametric test to evaluate the significance of the observed performance of fundamental signals. The bootstrap approach allows for general distributional characteristics (including fat tails) and is robust to any form of cross-sectional dependencies. In addition, the bootstrap automatically takes sampling uncertainty into account and provides inferences that does not rely on asymptotic approximations.

1.4.2 Procedure. We randomly resample data to generate hypothetical long-short returns that, by construction, have the same properties as actual long-short returns except that we set true alpha to zero in the return population from which simulation samples are drawn. We follow Kosowski et al. (2006) and conduct our bootstrap on both alphas and their t -statistics. Alpha better measures the economic magnitude of the abnormal performance, while $t(\alpha)$ is a pivotal statistic with better sampling properties (Horowitz 2001).⁸

We illustrate below how we implement our bootstrap procedure for the Fama and French three-factor alphas. The application of the bootstrap procedure to the CAPM alpha or Carhart four-factor alpha is similar. Our bootstrap procedure involves the following steps:

1. Estimate the Fama and French three-factor model for the long-short returns associated with each fundamental signal and store the estimated alpha, the estimated regression coefficients, and the time series of regression residuals.

⁷ The correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to 1 , with the 1st percentile being -0.53 and the 99th percentile being 0.58 . Figure IA.1 in the Internet Appendix plots the estimated probability density function of these pairwise correlations.

⁸ Alpha, however, suffers from a potential lack of precision and tends to exhibit spurious outliers (e.g., Kosowski et al. 2006; Fama and French 2010). The $t(\alpha)$ provides a correction for the spurious outliers by normalizing the estimated alpha by the estimated variance of the alpha estimate.

2. Draw the regression residuals with replacement to create a time series of resampled residuals. In this step, rather than drawing sequences of time periods that are unique to each fundamental signal, we follow [Fama and French \(2010\)](#) and randomly sample the time periods jointly for all signals. That is, a simulation run is a random sample of 606 months, drawn (with replacements) from the 606 calendar months of July 1963 to December 2013. When we bootstrap a particular time period (e.g., October 1998), we draw the entire cross-section of residuals as well as Fama-French factors at that point in time (i.e., October 1998) in order to preserve the cross-correlations of long-short returns. This sampling procedure is referred to as the “cross-sectional bootstrap” by [Kosowski et al. \(2006\)](#).
3. Next, we construct a time series of simulated monthly long-short returns for each fundamental signal, imposing the null hypothesis of zero alpha.
4. Estimate the Fama and French three-factor model using simulated long-short returns and factors. Store the estimated alphas as well as their t -statistics. Compute the various cross-sectional percentiles of the alphas and t -statistics.
5. Repeat steps 2–4 for 10,000 iterations to generate the empirical distribution for cross-sectional percentiles of alphas and t -statistics for the simulated data.

2. Empirical Results

2.1 Bootstrap results

We report our main bootstrap results in [Table 1](#) and [Table 2](#). To draw inferences, we compare the cross-sectional distribution of alphas (or t -statistics) in the actual data with that in the simulated data. As stated earlier, the simulated data have a true alpha of zero by construction. However, a positive (negative) alpha may still arise because of sampling variation. If we find that very few of the bootstrap iterations generate alpha (or $t(\alpha)$) that is as extreme as those in the actual data, this would indicate that sampling variation is not the source of the superior performance.

2.1.1 Bootstrap t -statistics. [Table 1](#) reports the cross-sectional percentiles of $t(\alpha)$ along with their bootstrapped p -values. Because we are interested in whether the performance of the best-performing signals is due to data mining, we focus on the extreme percentiles of the cross-sectional distribution. Specifically, we report the results from the 0th percentile (i.e., the minimum) to the 10th percentile and also from the 90th percentile to the 100th percentile (i.e., the maximum). We report results for both tails of the distribution because

Table 1
Percentiles of t -statistics of actual and simulated long-short alphas

Percentiles	EW (t -statistic)						VW (t -statistic)					
	1-factor α		3-factor α		4-factor α		1-factor α		3-factor α		4-factor α	
	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value
100	10.67	0.00%	9.70	0.00%	8.46	0.04%	4.95	1.35%	5.24	0.67%	5.03	2.45%
99	4.86	0.00%	4.82	0.00%	4.35	0.00%	3.40	0.03%	3.66	0.00%	3.02	0.64%
98	4.21	0.00%	4.23	0.00%	3.82	0.01%	2.98	0.04%	3.23	0.00%	2.67	0.63%
97	3.74	0.00%	3.79	0.00%	3.42	0.04%	2.71	0.06%	2.96	0.00%	2.42	0.92%
96	3.42	0.00%	3.50	0.00%	3.11	0.06%	2.54	0.07%	2.74	0.00%	2.22	1.55%
95	3.19	0.00%	3.25	0.00%	2.90	0.16%	2.41	0.09%	2.55	0.00%	2.07	1.90%
90	2.41	0.05%	2.49	0.01%	2.12	0.48%	1.93	0.11%	1.94	0.00%	1.58	3.97%
10	-3.48	0.00%	-3.42	0.00%	-3.17	0.00%	-1.87	0.14%	-1.78	0.06%	-1.62	2.46%
5	-5.15	0.00%	-4.77	0.00%	-4.13	0.00%	-2.58	0.00%	-2.37	0.00%	-2.05	2.58%
4	-5.68	0.00%	-5.13	0.00%	-4.43	0.00%	-2.81	0.00%	-2.54	0.00%	-2.21	1.81%
3	-6.08	0.00%	-5.55	0.00%	-4.84	0.00%	-3.07	0.00%	-2.77	0.00%	-2.38	1.68%
2	-6.57	0.00%	-6.13	0.00%	-5.39	0.00%	-3.46	0.00%	-3.08	0.00%	-2.59	1.62%
1	-7.65	0.00%	-6.99	0.00%	-6.13	0.00%	-4.10	0.00%	-3.53	0.00%	-2.96	1.07%
0	-11.08	0.00%	-10.02	0.00%	-8.91	0.00%	-6.57	0.01%	-5.55	0.22%	-5.31	0.86%

Table 1 presents selected percentiles of the t -statistics for long-short portfolio alphas of 18,113 fundamental signals constructed from the combination of 240 accounting variables and seventy-six financial ratios and configurations. The table also presents the bootstrapped p -values for each percentile based on 10,000 simulation runs. Our sample period is 1963–2013. The list of 240 accounting variables and seventy-six financial ratios and configurations are given in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. At the end of June of year t , we form decile portfolios based on the value of each fundamental signal at the end of year $t-1$. We form the long-short portfolio based on the two extreme decile portfolios and hold them for twelve months. A simulation run is a random sample of 606 months, drawn (with replacement) from the 606 calendar months between July 1963 and December 2013. We estimate one-, three-, and four-factor alphas based on the market model, Fama and French (1996) model, and the Carhart (1997) model.

large positive and negative alphas are both indicative of superior predictive ability.⁹

We consider three benchmark models, the CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor model, and the Carhart four-factor model, and present the results for both equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios. For each cross-sectional percentile, we report the actual t -statistics (column “Actual”) and the bootstrapped p -value (column “ p -value”). For the 90th to 100th percentiles, the bootstrapped p -value is the percentage of simulation runs in which the t -statistics in the simulated data is greater than the corresponding t -statistics in the actual data. For the 0th to 10th percentiles, the bootstrapped p -value is the percentage of simulation runs in which the t -statistics in the simulated data are lower (i.e., more negative) than the corresponding t -statistics in the actual data.

We begin by examining the results for the t -statistics of equal-weighted one-factor alphas. We find that the long-short performance of fundamental-based strategies exhibit large t -statistics. For example, the 99th percentile of t -statistics (across 18,113 signals) is 4.86 and the 1st percentile is -7.65 . To assess whether we would expect such extreme t -statistics under the null hypothesis of no predictive ability, we compare them to the distribution of t -statistics in the simulated data. We find that the bootstrapped p -values for the 99th and 1st

⁹ Gross profitability, for example, is a positive predictor of future stock returns, whereas asset growth is a negative predictor of future stock returns.

Table 2
Percentiles of actual and simulated long-short alphas

Percentiles	EW (α)						VW (α)					
	1-factor α		3-factor α		4-factor α		1-factor α		3-factor α		4-factor α	
	Actual	<i>p</i> -value	Actual	<i>p</i> -value	Actual	<i>p</i> -value	Actual	<i>p</i> -value	Actual	<i>p</i> -value	Actual	<i>p</i> -value
100	1.87	59.31%	2.04	90.49%	2.09	90.91%	2.47	47.68%	2.54	73.74%	2.52	78.45%
99	0.90	0.36%	0.84	1.10%	0.79	6.11%	0.89	1.97%	0.83	8.11%	0.78	27.16%
98	0.73	0.07%	0.69	0.00%	0.64	0.32%	0.75	0.23%	0.71	0.24%	0.63	7.50%
97	0.65	0.03%	0.60	0.00%	0.55	0.19%	0.66	0.15%	0.64	0.06%	0.56	2.11%
96	0.58	0.03%	0.54	0.00%	0.49	0.16%	0.60	0.09%	0.59	0.00%	0.51	1.10%
95	0.52	0.02%	0.50	0.00%	0.44	0.14%	0.56	0.06%	0.55	0.00%	0.47	0.72%
90	0.36	0.02%	0.36	0.00%	0.30	0.26%	0.41	0.05%	0.40	0.00%	0.33	0.86%
10	-0.42	0.00%	-0.39	0.00%	-0.37	0.02%	-0.34	0.82%	-0.32	0.70%	-0.29	11.53%
5	-0.61	0.00%	-0.53	0.00%	-0.49	0.01%	-0.49	0.44%	-0.44	1.01%	-0.40	16.59%
4	-0.65	0.01%	-0.57	0.01%	-0.52	0.08%	-0.54	0.41%	-0.48	1.42%	-0.44	17.98%
3	-0.72	0.02%	-0.62	0.01%	-0.57	0.15%	-0.60	0.40%	-0.53	2.85%	-0.48	30.64%
2	-0.82	0.03%	-0.70	0.04%	-0.65	0.32%	-0.69	0.65%	-0.62	5.64%	-0.55	46.63%
1	-0.97	0.17%	-0.84	1.74%	-0.80	5.38%	-0.85	4.32%	-0.74	36.31%	-0.69	69.73%
0	-2.91	26.05%	-2.94	41.27%	-2.63	63.66%	-2.91	32.49%	-2.73	66.96%	-2.62	76.60%

Table 2 presents selected percentiles of long-short portfolio alphas of 18,113 fundamental signals constructed from the combination of 240 accounting variables and seventy-six financial ratios and configurations. The table also presents the bootstrapped *p*-values for each percentile based on 10,000 simulation runs. Our sample period is 1963–2013. The list of 240 accounting variables and seventy-six financial ratios and configurations are given in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. At the end of June of year *t*, we form decile portfolios based on the value of each fundamental signal at the end of year *t*-1. We form the long-short portfolio based on the two extreme decile portfolios and hold them for twelve months. A simulation run is a random sample of 606 months, drawn (with replacement) from the 606 calendar months between July 1963 and December 2013. We estimate one-, three-, and four-factor alphas based on the market model, Fama and French (1996) model, and the Carhart (1997) model. Alphas are expressed in percent per month.

percentiles are both 0%; that is, none of the 10,000 simulations produce a 99th (or 1st) percentile of *t*-statistics as extreme as the corresponding *t*-statistics in the actual data. These results indicate that the large actual *t*-statistics at the extreme percentiles cannot be explained by sampling variation.

The results for the *t*-statistics of value-weighted one-factor alphas are qualitatively similar. For example, the 99th percentile of *t*-statistics across the 18,113 signals is 3.4, with a bootstrapped *p*-value of 0.03%. This means that, under the null hypothesis that all strategies are generating zero abnormal returns, the chance for us to observe a 99th percentile of *t*-statistics that is at least 3.4 is only 0.03%. We therefore reject the null. The 1st percentile of *t*-statistics is -4.10, with a bootstrapped *p*-value of 0%. Again, we would not expect to find such an extreme *t*-statistic under the null hypothesis of no predictive ability.

Because the HML factor in the Fama and French (1996) three-factor model is constructed using financial statement information, one might expect the predictive ability of our fundamental signals to weaken after we control for the HML factor. The results reported in Table 1 indicate that this is not the case. For example, the 99th (1st) percentile of *t*-statistics of equal-weighted three-factor alphas is 4.82 (-6.99). The 99th (1st) percentile of *t*-statistics of value-weighted three-factor alphas is 3.66 (-3.53). These *t*-values are quite similar to their counterparts for one-factor alphas. More importantly, the bootstrapped *p*-values continue to be less than 1% for all extreme percentiles.

We note that the magnitudes of the four-factor alpha t -statistics are slightly lower than those of one- and three-factor alphas. For example, the 99th (1st) percentile of equal-weighted four-factor alpha t -statistics is 4.35 (−6.13), compared to 4.82 (−6.99) for three-factor alpha t -statistics. Nevertheless, the bootstrapped p -values for the extreme percentiles of four-factor alpha t -statistics are all less than 1% for equal-weighted portfolios and less than 5% for value-weighted portfolios, so our inferences are unchanged. Overall, the evidence in Table 1 strongly indicates that the superior performance of top-ranked signals cannot be attributed to random chance.

2.1.2 Bootstrap alphas. In Table 2, we apply the bootstrap procedure to alphas. Although t -statistics have better sampling properties and are less prone to the outlier problem, alphas better measure the economic magnitude of the abnormal performance. Therefore, the results for alphas will be of significant interest to practitioners and investors. The format of Table 2 is identical to that of Table 1 except that the numbers reported in column “Actual” are alphas rather than t -statistics.

The equal-weighted results show that the extreme percentiles of alphas are economically large and not attributable to sampling variation. For example, the 99th percentile of equal-weighted one-factor alphas is 0.9% per month and is greater than its counterpart in all but 0.36% of the simulation runs. Similarly, the 1st percentile of equal-weighted one-factor alphas is −0.97% per month, with a bootstrapped p -value of 0.17%. The maximum and minimum alphas, that is, the 100th percentile and the 0th percentile are generally insignificant in part because of the outlier problem associated with alpha estimates.¹⁰ The results for three-factor and four-factor alphas are qualitatively similar. All extreme percentiles except the minimum and the maximum are significant.

The right panel of Table 2 presents the value-weighted results. The one- and three-factor alpha results are generally significant. For example, the 99th percentile of one-factor alphas is 0.89% per month, with a bootstrapped p -value of 1.97%. The 99th percentile of three-factor alphas is 0.83% per month, with a bootstrapped p -value of 8.11%. The four-factor alpha results are somewhat weaker. For example, the 99th percentile of four-factor alphas is 0.78% per month, with a bootstrapped p -value of 27.16%. However, for the 90th through 98th percentiles, we find the bootstrapped value to be less than 10%, and in most cases less than 5%. Overall, despite the relatively poor sampling properties of alpha estimates, we find evidence that the extreme alphas of the best performing signals are not due to sampling variation.

¹⁰ If a fundamental signal has a short sample period or exhibits high residual variance, its alpha estimates will tend to be spurious outliers in the cross-section (Kosowski et al. 2006). This outlier problem is more severe in the simulated samples. As a result, the bootstrapped p -values for the most extreme percentiles of alphas tend to be large.

2.2 Performance persistence

We next examine the stability and persistence of the long-short performance of fundamental signals over time. This analysis is important because previous studies (e.g., Sullivan, Timmermann, and White 2001) argue that the analysis of subperiod stability is a remedy against data mining.

2.2.1 Transition matrix. To measure stability, we divide our sample period into two halves of roughly equal length (1963–87 and 1988–2013) and then construct a transition matrix for the t -statistics between the two subperiods. Specifically, we sort signals into quintiles (Q1 through Q5) based on their four-factor alpha t -statistics during each subperiod and report the percentage of signals in a given quintile during the first half of the sample period moving to a particular quintile in the second half. If the predictive ability of fundamental signals is due to chance, then we should expect all numbers in the transition matrix to be around 20% (the unconditional average). On the other hand, if the predictive ability is real and stable, then we should expect the probabilities of Q1 \rightarrow Q1 and Q5 \rightarrow Q5 to be significantly greater than 20%, and the probabilities of Q1 \rightarrow Q5 and Q5 \rightarrow Q1 to be significantly less than 20%.

Panel A of Table 3 reports the results. Focusing on equal-weighted returns in the left panel, we find strong evidence of cross-period stability. More than 50% of the signals ranked in Q1 (signals with the largest negative t -statistics) during the first half of the sample period continue to be ranked in Q1 during the second half, while less than 8% of these signals move to Q5 (signals with the largest positive t -statistics). Similarly, more than 30% of the signals ranked in Q5 continue to stay in Q5 during the second half of the sample period, while only 3.1% of the signals switch to Q1.¹¹ Unreported tests indicate that these percentages are significantly different from 20%.

The results for value-weighted returns are reported in the right panel. We find that about 33% of the signals ranked in the bottom quintile during the first subperiod continue to be ranked in the bottom quintile during the second subperiod, while less than 11% of these signals move to the top quintile. Similarly, nearly 35% of the signals ranked in the top quintile continue to stay in the same quintile during the second half of the sample period, while about 11% of the signals switch to the bottom quintile. More importantly, these percentages are statistically different from 20%.

2.2.2 Performance persistence. Another way to evaluate whether the predictive ability of fundamental signals is stable is to look at the performance persistence of fundamental-based trading strategies. This is a common approach in the mutual fund and hedge fund literature to separate skill from luck. As in

¹¹ We note that the persistence is stronger for Q5 than for Q1. This is due to the asymmetry in the distribution of t -statistics of equal-weighted four-factor alphas. Table 1 reports that the 90th percentile of equal-weighted four-factor alpha t -statistic is 2.12, whereas the 10th percentile is -3.17 .

Table 3
Transition matrix and performance persistence between 1963–87 and 1988–2013

Panel A: Transition matrix

1963-1987	Equal weight					1963-1987	Value weight				
	1988–2013						1988–2013				
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Q1	50.65%	18.16%	14.10%	9.62%	7.47%	Q1	32.84%	23.07%	17.32%	15.90%	10.88%
Q2	25.52%	24.25%	17.78%	16.32%	16.13%	Q2	21.38%	21.07%	21.42%	19.69%	16.44%
Q3	11.49%	22.03%	21.57%	23.03%	21.88%	Q3	19.12%	20.08%	21.88%	21.76%	17.16%
Q4	9.23%	19.16%	24.10%	23.49%	24.02%	Q4	16.25%	19.35%	21.99%	21.84%	20.57%
Q5	3.10%	16.40%	22.45%	27.55%	30.50%	Q5	10.42%	16.44%	17.39%	20.80%	34.94%

Panel B: Performance persistence

	Equal weight				Value weight		
	1-factor α	3-factor α	4-factor α		1-factor α	3-factor α	4-factor α
D1	−0.52 (−9.49)	−0.39 (−9.63)	−0.33 (−8.75)	D1	−0.32 (−4.54)	−0.16 (−4.36)	−0.12 (−3.54)
D10	0.23 (4.86)	0.23 (2.43)	0.14 (1.60)	D10	0.23 (3.92)	0.27 (3.11)	0.19 (2.60)
D10-D1	0.75 (9.22)	0.62 (5.20)	0.47 (4.18)	D10-D1	0.54 (4.56)	0.43 (3.88)	0.31 (3.31)

Table 3 presents the transition matrix of t -statistics for four-factor alphas from the first subperiod (1963–87) to the second subperiod (1988–2013) and performance persistence between the two subperiods. We construct 18,113 fundamental signals by combining 240 accounting variables and seventy-six financial ratios and configurations. The list of 240 accounting variables and seventy-six financial ratios and configurations are given in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. At the end of June of year t , we form decile portfolios based on the value of each fundamental signal at the end of year $t-1$. We form the long-short portfolio based on the two extreme decile portfolios and hold them for twelve months. A simulation run is a random sample of 606 months, drawn (with replacement) from the 606 calendar months between July 1963 and December 2013. We estimate four-factor alphas based on the Carhart (1997) model. We require that each fundamental signal have at least ten years of data during each subperiod, which leaves us with 13,050 valid fundamental signals. Alphas in panel B are in percent.

our previous analysis, we divide our sample period into two halves. We estimate the alpha for each signal during the first half of our sample period. We then sort all signals into decile portfolios based on the t -statistics of the estimated alpha. We form equal-weighted portfolios of these anomalies and hold the portfolios during the second half of our sample period. We report the performance of the two extreme deciles as well as their difference in panel B of Table 3.

We find strong evidence of performance persistence. Looking at the equal-weighted one-factor alphas, we find that those signals ranked in the bottom decile (D1) during the first subperiod continue to exhibit a negative and significant long-short return of -0.52% per month (t -statistic = -9.49) during the second subperiod. In the meantime, those signals ranked in the top decile (D10) during the first half of our sample period exhibit a positive and significant long-short return of 0.23% per month (t -statistic = 4.86) during the second half.¹² The difference between D10 and D1 is 0.75% per month and highly

¹² We note that the results are weaker for D10 than D1. This is again due to the asymmetry in the distribution of t -statistics of equal-weighted four-factor alphas.

statistically significant. The result is robust whether we use three- or four-factor alphas and whether we examine equal-weighted or value-weighted long-short returns. The difference between D10 and D1 is economically meaningful and statistically significant across all specifications.

Overall, our analysis of the performance persistence of fundamental-based signals across subperiods provides further evidence that the predictive ability of fundamental signals is unlikely to be driven by random chance. It also suggests that investors could have adopted a recursive decision rule to identify the best performing signals and have used this information to produce genuinely superior out-of-sample performance.

2.3 Evidence on mispricing- and risk-based explanations

Having shown that the superior performance of top-ranked fundamental signals is not due to random chance, we next investigate whether it is consistent with mispricing- or risk-based explanations.

2.3.1 Limits to arbitrage. Behavioral arguments suggest that if anomaly returns are due to mispricing, then the predictability should be more pronounced among stocks that are more costly to trade, held by unsophisticated investors, covered by fewer analysts, and have greater arbitrage risk. To test this hypothesis, we partition our sample stocks into two groups by size, idiosyncratic volatility, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage, respectively, and then independently sort all sample stocks into deciles based on each fundamental signal. We conduct our bootstrap analysis for each subgroup of stocks.¹³ For each firm characteristic, we also test for the difference between the two subgroups of stocks, for example, small versus large stocks. To conserve space, we only report the results for the t -statistics of four-factor alphas.

Panel A of Table 4 presents the results for firm size. Small stocks typically have higher transactions costs, greater information asymmetry, and more limited arbitrage. If the abnormal returns to fundamental-based trading strategies represent mispricing, then we would expect the predictability to be stronger among small stocks. We find evidence consistent with this prediction. For example, the 99th percentile of t -statistics for equal-weighted four-factor alphas is 4.37 for small stocks and only 2.84 for large stocks, and the difference is statistically significant.¹⁴ Similarly, the 1st percentile of t -statistics is -6.12 for small stocks and -2.93 for large stocks, and the difference is also statistically significant. These results suggest that the predictive ability of fundamental signals is more pronounced among small stocks. In spite of the significant difference between small and large stocks, our main results hold for both groups.

¹³ For computational reasons, our bootstrap analysis in this section is based on 1,000 simulation runs.

¹⁴ We evaluate the statistical significance of the difference between small and large stocks by using the standard deviation of this difference across 1,000 simulations as the standard error.

Table 4
Percentiles of t -statistics of actual and simulated long-short alphas by firm characteristics

Panel A: Firm size										
Percentiles	EW (t -statistic)					VW (t -statistic)				
	Small stocks		Large stocks		Difference	Small stocks		Large stocks		Difference
	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value		Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	
100	8.87	0.0%	4.33	18.7%	4.54***	6.65	0.0%	3.93	49.5%	2.73***
99	4.37	0.0%	2.84	3.5%	1.53***	3.59	0.3%	2.75	5.0%	0.84***
98	3.76	0.0%	2.51	3.7%	1.25***	3.16	0.3%	2.38	7.7%	0.79***
97	3.41	0.0%	2.27	5.1%	1.14***	2.87	0.4%	2.13	12.0%	0.75***
96	3.06	0.1%	2.09	6.9%	0.98***	2.70	0.4%	1.99	11.4%	0.71***
95	2.83	0.2%	1.97	6.6%	0.86***	2.52	0.5%	1.86	13.4%	0.66***
90	2.06	0.7%	1.52	9.8%	0.54***	1.92	0.6%	1.40	25.9%	0.52***
10	-3.13	0.0%	-1.61	3.4%	-1.52***	-2.18	0.1%	-1.52	6.3%	-0.65***
5	-4.09	0.0%	-2.05	2.8%	-2.05***	-2.89	0.1%	-1.91	7.9%	-0.99***
4	-4.46	0.0%	-2.16	3.3%	-2.30***	-3.11	0.0%	-2.01	9.8%	-1.10***
3	-4.84	0.0%	-2.31	3.2%	-2.53***	-3.36	0.0%	-2.17	8.0%	-1.19***
2	-5.34	0.0%	-2.54	2.8%	-2.80***	-3.72	0.0%	-2.36	8.4%	-1.36***
1	-6.12	0.0%	-2.93	1.9%	-3.19***	-4.30	0.0%	-2.64	10.8%	-1.67***
0	-9.09	0.0%	-4.51	11.5%	-4.58***	-6.77	0.0%	-4.72	5.8%	-2.06***

Panel B: <i>IVOL</i>										
Percentiles	EW (t -statistic)					VW (t -statistic)				
	High <i>IVOL</i>		Low <i>IVOL</i>		Difference	High <i>IVOL</i>		Low <i>IVOL</i>		Difference
	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value		Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	
100	8.98	0.0%	5.60	1.4%	3.38***	4.90	15.5%	4.08	35.0%	0.82
99	4.17	0.0%	3.69	0.0%	0.49**	2.90	4.3%	2.73	5.9%	0.17
98	3.60	0.0%	3.21	0.0%	0.39*	2.55	4.7%	2.37	8.1%	0.18
97	3.24	0.0%	2.93	0.0%	0.31	2.35	4.6%	2.15	9.7%	0.20
96	2.96	0.0%	2.69	0.0%	0.27	2.21	4.0%	2.00	9.8%	0.21
95	2.73	0.0%	2.52	0.0%	0.21	2.09	3.6%	1.88	10.4%	0.21
90	1.96	0.3%	1.95	0.0%	0.01	1.66	3.2%	1.43	17.6%	0.23
10	-3.21	0.0%	-2.10	0.0%	-1.10***	-1.48	19.2%	-1.54	4.2%	0.06
5	-4.19	0.0%	-2.68	0.0%	-1.51***	-1.99	10.4%	-1.92	6.2%	-0.07
4	-4.55	0.0%	-2.85	0.0%	-1.70***	-2.15	7.9%	-2.02	7.2%	-0.13
3	-4.98	0.0%	-3.06	0.0%	-1.92***	-2.32	7.6%	-2.14	9.6%	-0.18
2	-5.57	0.0%	-3.39	0.0%	-2.18***	-2.58	5.7%	-2.33	10.5%	-0.24
1	-6.35	0.0%	-3.87	0.0%	-2.48***	-2.96	4.1%	-2.63	10.5%	-0.33
0	-9.70	0.0%	-6.73	0.0%	-2.98***	-4.77	10.0%	-4.96	3.4%	0.19

(continued)

In particular, the bootstrapped p -values for extreme percentiles of t -statistics are less than 1% for small stocks and generally less than 10% for large stocks. The value-weighted results presented in the right panel paint a similar picture.

Panel B reports the results for idiosyncratic volatility (*IVOL*). Previous studies (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Pontiff 2006) suggest that *IVOL* is a primary limit to arbitrage. To the extent that the abnormal returns of fundamental signals reflect market inefficiency, we expect the results to be more pronounced among high-*IVOL* stocks. The results in panel B reveal that the t -statistics for equal-weighted alphas are significantly larger among high-*IVOL* stocks than low-*IVOL* stocks, particularly in the left tail of the distribution. For example, the 1st percentile of t -statistics is -6.35 for high-*IVOL* stocks and -3.87 for low-*IVOL* stocks, and the difference is statistically significant at

Table 4
Continued

Panel C: *IO*

Percentiles	EW (<i>t</i> -statistic)					VW (<i>t</i> -statistic)				
	Low <i>IO</i>		High <i>IO</i>		Difference	Low <i>IO</i>		High <i>IO</i>		Difference
	Actual	<i>p</i> -value	Actual	<i>p</i> -value		Actual	<i>p</i> -value	Actual	<i>p</i> -value	
100	8.74	0.0%	4.94	7.7%	3.80***	5.03	7.0%	3.62	79.1%	1.41*
99	4.15	0.0%	3.31	0.7%	0.83***	3.11	1.0%	2.55	25.1%	0.56***
98	3.55	0.0%	2.89	1.3%	0.66***	2.67	2.1%	2.27	22.7%	0.40***
97	3.17	0.1%	2.65	1.2%	0.53***	2.39	4.3%	2.04	28.7%	0.35*
96	2.93	0.1%	2.46	1.4%	0.46***	2.23	4.2%	1.89	30.2%	0.35**
95	2.70	0.3%	2.33	1.2%	0.38**	2.08	5.1%	1.77	31.6%	0.32*
90	2.00	0.5%	1.79	2.2%	0.21	1.60	7.2%	1.37	35.3%	0.23
10	-3.07	0.0%	-2.08	0.0%	-0.99***	-1.54	10.6%	-1.50	13.0%	-0.04
5	-4.09	0.0%	-2.67	0.0%	-1.41***	-2.01	7.6%	-1.91	12.7%	-0.11
4	-4.39	0.0%	-2.86	0.0%	-1.53***	-2.16	6.6%	-2.02	12.8%	-0.13
3	-4.81	0.0%	-3.08	0.0%	-1.73***	-2.34	5.4%	-2.17	12.6%	-0.17
2	-5.32	0.0%	-3.31	0.0%	-2.00***	-2.58	4.1%	-2.37	12.1%	-0.21
1	-5.95	0.0%	-3.65	0.1%	-2.30***	-2.94	3.6%	-2.73	9.4%	-0.22
0	-10.05	0.0%	-5.49	2.6%	-4.56***	-5.19	2.1%	-4.46	15.1%	-0.73

Panel D: Analyst coverage

Percentiles	EW (<i>t</i> -statistic)					VW (<i>t</i> -statistic)				
	Low coverage		High coverage		Difference	Low coverage		High coverage		Difference
	Actual	<i>p</i> -value	Actual	<i>p</i> -value		Actual	<i>p</i> -value	Actual	<i>p</i> -value	
100	9.96	0.0%	5.20	4.3%	4.76***	5.84	0.9%	4.03	46.9%	1.80***
99	4.51	0.0%	3.30	0.7%	1.21***	3.49	0.0%	2.75	5.6%	0.74***
98	3.76	0.0%	2.92	0.7%	0.84***	3.05	0.0%	2.43	6.7%	0.62***
97	3.32	0.0%	2.69	0.7%	0.63***	2.70	0.0%	2.20	9.7%	0.50***
96	3.02	0.1%	2.50	0.9%	0.52***	2.50	0.0%	2.04	11.6%	0.46***
95	2.80	0.0%	2.35	1.0%	0.45***	2.35	0.0%	1.91	12.4%	0.44***
90	2.15	0.0%	1.83	1.7%	0.32*	1.75	0.6%	1.44	21.3%	0.31***
10	-3.32	0.0%	-2.07	0.2%	-1.25***	-1.82	0.7%	-1.51	12.0%	-0.31**
5	-4.36	0.0%	-2.66	0.1%	-1.71***	-2.37	0.1%	-1.95	10.0%	-0.43***
4	-4.67	0.0%	-2.81	0.1%	-1.85***	-2.57	0.1%	-2.08	9.0%	-0.49***
3	-5.07	0.0%	-3.00	0.1%	-2.08***	-2.79	0.1%	-2.23	9.1%	-0.56***
2	-5.68	0.0%	-3.25	0.1%	-2.43***	-3.04	0.1%	-2.44	7.7%	-0.60***
1	-6.62	0.0%	-3.71	0.1%	-2.91***	-3.47	0.0%	-2.74	8.4%	-0.73***
0	-9.22	0.4%	-6.40	0.1%	-2.82***	-5.40	2.0%	-4.38	20.8%	-1.02

Table 4 presents selected percentiles of the *t*-statistics for long-short portfolio alphas of 18,113 fundamental signals constructed from the combination of 240 accounting variables and seventy-six financial ratios and configurations. The table also presents the bootstrapped *p*-values for each percentile based on 1,000 simulation runs. Our sample period is 1963–2013. The list of 240 accounting variables and seventy-six financial ratios and configurations are given in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. At the end of June of year *t*, we form decile portfolios based on the value of each fundamental signal at the end of year *t*-1. We also independently sort all sample firms into two groups based on firm size, B/M, idiosyncratic volatility, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage, respectively. For each subsample of firms by characteristics, we compute long-short hedge returns and the associated alphas based on the two extreme decile portfolios. A simulation run is a random sample of 606 months, drawn (with replacement) from the 606 calendar months between July 1963 and December 2013. To ensure a sufficiently large sample, we require a minimum of five years of observation for a signal to be included in the analysis. We estimate four-factor alphas based on the Carhart (1997) model. Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

the 1% level. For value-weighted returns, although the *t*-statistics are generally larger (in absolute value) for high-*IVOL* stocks than for low-*IVOL* stocks, their differences are insignificant.

Panel C presents the results for institutional ownership (*IO*).¹⁵ Institutional investors are more sophisticated than individual investors. To the extent that the predictive ability of fundamental signals represent misreaction to public accounting information by unsophisticated investors, we would expect this predictability to be stronger among low-institutional ownership stocks. Our results confirm this conjecture. For equal-weighted returns, we find large and statistically significant differences in *t*-statistics between high- and low-*IO* stocks. For example, the 99th percentile of *t*-statistics is 4.15 for low-*IO* stocks and 3.31 for high-*IO* stocks, with the difference being statistically significant at the 1% level. The value-weighted results continue to suggest that the predictability is stronger among low-*IO* stocks than high-*IO* stocks.

In panel D, we focus on analyst coverage.¹⁶ Financial analysts play an important role in interpreting and disseminating financial information. If the predictive ability of fundamental signals is due to the market's failing to fully incorporate public financial statement information, we would expect this predictability to be attenuated among stocks with more extensive analyst coverage. The results contained in panel D of Table 4 lend strong support to this prediction. We find statistically significant difference in *t*-statistics between low- and high-analyst coverage stocks, whether we examine equal-weighted or value-weighted returns. Overall, consistent with behavioral explanations, we find that the predictive ability of fundamental signals is more pronounced among small stocks and stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility, lower institutional ownership, and fewer analysts.¹⁷

2.3.2 Investor sentiment. To the extent that mispricing exists, overpricing should be more prevalent than underpricing because shorting is more costly. As such, anomaly returns should be significantly higher following high-sentiment periods than low-sentiment periods (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan 2012). We test this prediction for our sample of fundamental signals. We obtain the investor sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) from Jeffrey Wurgler's website.¹⁸ Following Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), we divide our sample into high- and low-sentiment periods based on the median sentiment index level over our sample period. We then compute anomaly returns separately for the periods following high- and low-sentiment levels. We perform this analysis for the top 10%, 5%, and 1% of fundamental signals (ranked based on the absolute value of the *t*-statistics of four-factor alphas).

¹⁵ We obtain institutional ownership data from the Thomson Reuters 13F database. Due to data availability, the sample period for this analysis is from 1979 to 2013.

¹⁶ We obtain the analyst coverage data from IBES. The sample period for this analysis is from 1976 to 2013.

¹⁷ We also conduct a bootstrap analysis on alphas. We find qualitatively similar results to those in Table 4. To conserve space, we report the results of this analysis in Table IA.4 of the Internet Appendix.

¹⁸ We thank Jeffery Wurgler for making this data available on his website, <http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/>.

Table 5
Investor sentiment, business cycle, and anomaly returns

Panel A: Investor sentiment							
Signals	EW (α)			Signals	VW (α)		
	High sentiment	Low sentiment	Difference		High sentiment	Low sentiment	Difference
Top 10%	0.56 (11.25)	0.36 (9.02)	0.20 (3.15)	Top 10%	0.62 (10.61)	0.29 (6.40)	0.33 (4.47)
Top 5%	0.63 (10.82)	0.41 (8.67)	0.22 (2.97)	Top 5%	0.70 (10.38)	0.31 (5.73)	0.39 (4.55)
Top 1%	0.76 (10.53)	0.49 (8.57)	0.26 (2.84)	Top 1%	0.88 (10.45)	0.35 (4.91)	0.53 (4.83)

Panel B: Business cycle							
Signals	EW (α)			Signals	VW (α)		
	Recession	Expansion	Difference		Recession	Expansion	Difference
Top 10%	0.48 (5.42)	0.44 (14.09)	0.04 (0.46)	Top 10%	0.57 (4.58)	0.41 (11.83)	0.17 (1.30)
Top 5%	0.55 (5.14)	0.50 (13.69)	0.05 (0.48)	Top 5%	0.67 (4.45)	0.45 (11.16)	0.22 (1.43)
Top 1%	0.72 (5.19)	0.59 (12.97)	0.13 (0.89)	Top 1%	0.73 (3.99)	0.55 (11.00)	0.19 (0.97)

Panel A of Table 5 compares the Carhart four-factor alphas of fundamental signals following high-sentiment periods and low-sentiment periods, and panel B compares the Carhart four-factor alphas of fundamental signals during recession periods and expansion periods. Our sample period is 1963–2013. At the end of June of year t , we form decile portfolios based on the value of each fundamental signal at the end of year $t-1$. We form the long-short portfolio based on the two extreme decile portfolios and hold them for twelve months. In panel A, we split the sample into high-sentiment periods and low-sentiment periods using the median sentiment level of the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index. In panel B, we split the sample into recession periods and expansion periods based on the NBER recession indicators. Top 10%, 5%, and 1% signals are ranked based on four-factor alpha t -statistics. We estimate four-factor alphas based on the Carhart (1997) model. Alphas are expressed in percent per month. Numbers in parentheses are t -statistics.

Panel A of Table 5 presents the results. Consistent with Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), we find that the long-short returns of top-ranked fundamental signals are significantly higher following high-sentiment periods than following low-sentiment periods. For example, the average long-short return for the top 10% signals is 0.56% per month following high-sentiment periods, and 0.36% per month following low-sentiment periods.¹⁹ The difference of 0.2% is statistically significant with a t -statistic of 3.15. The results for the top 5% and 1% signals are qualitatively similar. The difference in long-short returns between high- and low-sentiment periods is 0.22% (t -statistic = 2.97) and 0.26% (t -statistic = 2.84) for the top 5% and top 1% signals, respectively, both statistically significant. The value-weighted results are even more pronounced than equal-weighted results. For example, the average anomaly return among the top 1% signals is 0.88% per month following high-sentiment periods, and only 0.35% per month following low-sentiment periods. The difference of 0.53% (t -statistic = 4.83) per month is economically large and statistically significant. Overall, our findings support the mispricing-based explanations.

¹⁹ In this analysis, we take the absolute value of the long-short alpha because we are pooling all top signals and examine whether on average the magnitude of the anomaly returns is higher following high-sentiment periods.

2.3.3 Business cycle. In this section, we examine whether anomaly returns vary across the business cycle (Chordia and Shivakumar 2002). If the superior performance of top fundamental signals represents compensation for systematic risk, then we should expect the long-short returns to be significantly lower during bad times (e.g., recessions) than during good times (e.g., expansions). Cochrane (2004, 3) explains the basic intuition of this test:

Other things equal, an asset that does badly in states of nature like a recession, in which the investor feels poor and is consuming little, is less desirable than an asset does badly in states of nature like a boom in which the investor feels wealthy and is consuming a great deal. The former asset will sell for a lower price; its price will reflect a discount for its riskiness.

We obtain NBER recession dates from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' website.²⁰ Similar to our investor sentiment analysis, we focus on the top 10%, top 5%, and top 1% fundamental signals ranked based on the t -statistics of four-factor alphas. Panel B of Table 5 presents the results for this analysis. Contrary to the prediction of risk-based explanations, we find that the long-short returns of top fundamental signals are actually higher during recession periods than during expansion periods, although the difference is statistically insignificant. For example, the average equal-weighted four-factor alpha for the top 1% signals is 0.72% per month during recessions and is 0.59% per month during expansions, both of which are highly statistically significant. Similarly, the average value-weighted four-factor alpha is 0.73% during recessions and 0.55% during expansions. Overall, our evidence is inconsistent with the idea that fundamental anomalies are driven by exposure to macroeconomic risks related to the business cycle.

In summary, we have presented evidence that the predictive ability of fundamental signals varies predictably across subgroups of stocks sorted by proxies for limits to arbitrage. We have also shown that fundamental anomalies are more pronounced following high-sentiment periods. In addition, the anomaly returns are unrelated to the business cycle. Although we cannot rule out risk-based explanations, our results suggest that fundamental-based anomalies are more consistent with mispricing-based explanations.

2.4 Top fundamental anomalies

2.4.1 What are the top signals? Our bootstrap results indicate that a large number of fundamental signals exhibit genuine predictive ability for future stock returns. In Table 6, we report the top 100 fundamental signals ranked based

²⁰ <https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/>.

on the absolute value of the t -statistics of equal-weighted four-factor alphas. For each fundamental signal on this list, we also report its corresponding alpha and t -statistic. For example, the top-ranked signal is $\Delta\text{LT}/\text{LAGAT}$ (change in total liabilities divided by lagged total assets), with a monthly alpha of -0.74% and a t -statistic of -8.91 .

Broadly speaking, the top signals reported in Table 6 can be classified into three groups. The first group contains those that have been documented in the prior literature, for example, the book-to-market ratio ($\text{CEQ}/\text{MKT CAP}$ and $\text{SEQ}/\text{MKT CAP}$) and inventory change ($\Delta\text{INVT}/\text{LAGAT}$). The second group contains fundamental signals that are closely related to those that have been documented in the literature, for example, $\Delta\text{LT}/\text{LAGAT}$ (total liability change) and $\% \Delta$ in LT (growth in total liability). Both of these signals are closely related to the asset growth measure of Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008). A large number of the fundamental signals on this list, however, belong to the third group, which have not been directly examined by prior studies, for example, $\Delta\text{XINT}/\text{LAGAT}$ (change in interest expense divided by lagged total assets), $\text{DPACT}/\text{PPENT}$ (accumulated depreciation divided by total net property, plant, and equipment), and DLC/EMP (short-term debt per employee).

Similarly, Table 7 presents the top 100 signals based on the absolute value of the t -statistics of value-weighted four-factor alphas. The top-ranked signal on this list is $\Delta\text{ICAPT}/\text{LAGMKT CAP}$ (change in total invested capital divided by lagged market cap), with a t -statistic of -5.31 . Again, many signals on this list are new and have not been directly examined by prior studies, for example, $\Delta\text{XINT}/\text{LAGSEQ}$ (change in interest expense divided by lagged stockholders' equity), $\Delta\text{TLCF}/\text{LAGCEQ}$ (changes in tax loss carryforward divided by lagged common equity), and XSGA/AT (selling, general, and administrative expense divided by total assets).

Taken together, Tables 6 and 7 reveal a number of new predictors for the cross-section of stock returns that cannot be explained by the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. We note that many significant fundamental signals are not included in Table 6 and Table 7 because of space constraints. For example, a total of 549 signals have an equal-weighted four-factor alpha t -statistic that is greater than 5 (in absolute value), while 362 signals have a value-weighted four-factor alpha t -statistic greater than 3.

2.4.2 Economic drivers. What drives the predictive ability of the new fundamental signals identified in this study? We argue that these signals have predictive ability for future returns because they contain value-relevant information about future firm performance and the market fails to impound this information into stock prices in a timely manner.

One possible explanation for the delayed reaction to public accounting information is that transactions costs create an impediment to trading and therefore prevent a complete and immediate response to accounting information. However, trading costs alone cannot explain the predictive ability

Table 6
List of top fundamental signals based on *t*-statistic of equal-weighted four-factor alphas

#	Signal	<i>t</i> -statistic	alpha	#	Signal	<i>t</i> -statistic	alpha
1	ΔLT/LAGAT	-8.91	-0.74	26	CEQ/MKTCAP	7.71	0.82
2	ΔLT/LAGICAPT	-8.76	-0.74	27	ΔLT/LAGXSGA	-7.68	-0.67
3	ΔLCT/LAGAT	-8.75	-0.67	28	ΔXINT/LAGPPENT	-7.67	-0.57
4	ΔLT/LAGCEQ	-8.72	-0.74	29	ΔDCVT/LAGXSGA	-7.65	-0.69
5	DLC/SALE	-8.58	-0.66	30	AQS/SALE	-7.65	-0.47
6	ΔXINT/LAGAT	-8.57	-0.65	31	%Δ in XINT	-7.63	-0.50
7	CEQ/MKTCAP	8.46	0.85	32	DLC/EMP	-7.62	-0.54
8	DPACT/PPENT	8.38	0.89	33	ΔDLTT/LAGAT	-7.62	-0.53
9	PPEGT/PPENT	8.38	0.89	34	ΔINVT/LAGCOGS	-7.61	-0.70
10	%Δ in PPENT	-8.36	-0.83	35	DLC/COGS	-7.61	-0.57
11	DPVIBB/PPENT	8.34	1.03	36	NP/EMP	-7.58	-0.45
12	ΔLT/LAGSEQ	-8.17	-0.72	37	ΔXINT/LAGCEQ	-7.57	-0.61
13	ΔINVT/LAGSALE	-8.16	-0.74	38	AQS/XSGA	-7.54	-0.52
14	AQS/INVT	-8.14	-0.51	39	APPENT/LAGLT	-7.54	-0.72
15	ΔXINT/LAGXSGA	-8.09	-0.63	40	CEQ/MKTCAP	7.54	0.81
16	ΔLCT/LAGICAPT	-8.07	-0.62	41	ΔDLTT/LAGPPENT	-7.53	-0.49
17	ΔXINT/LAGLT	-8.01	-0.57	42	ΔAP/LAGACT	-7.53	-0.82
18	ΔLCT/LAGCEQ	-7.95	-0.61	43	ΔAP/LAGCEQ	-7.53	-0.80
19	PPEVED/PPENT	7.92	0.84	44	ΔLCT/LAGSEQ	-7.50	-0.58
20	%Δ in LT	-7.91	-0.66	45	ΔINVT/LAGPPENT	-7.49	-0.66
21	DLTIS/PPENT	-7.83	-0.65	46	ΔLT/LAGLCT	-7.49	-0.64
22	ΔCSTK/LAGXSGA	-7.78	-0.53	47	ΔLCT/LAGXSGA	-7.48	-0.61
23	ΔLT/LAGPPENT	-7.77	-0.67	48	ΔXINT/LAGICAPT	-7.46	-0.59
24	ΔLCT/LAGACT	-7.76	-0.58	49	SFO/MKTCAP	7.46	0.78
25	NP/SALE	-7.76	-0.52	50	ΔINVT/LAGACT	-7.46	-0.67

(continued)

Table 6
Continued

#	Signal	t-statistic	alpha	#	Signal	t-statistic	alpha
51	DLTIS/SALE	-7.43	-0.73	76	Δ AP/LAGSEQ	-7.08	-0.76
52	DLC/ACT	-7.41	-0.54	77	AQS/COGS	-7.06	-0.43
53	Δ PPENT/LAGAT	-7.40	-0.77	78	Δ XINT/LAGACT	-7.06	-0.57
54	Δ INVT/LAGAT	-7.39	-0.67	79	Δ AP/LAGAT	-7.06	-0.74
55	Δ DLC/LAGAT	-7.38	-0.44	80	Δ INVT/LAGCEQ	-7.05	-0.64
56	Δ CSTK/LAGCEQ	-7.34	-0.47	81	DLTIS/CEO	-7.05	-0.72
57	DLTIS/AT	-7.32	-0.71	82	Δ AT/LAGCEQ	-7.04	-0.85
58	Δ XINT/LAGSEQ	-7.31	-0.58	83	AQS/ICAPT	-7.04	-0.44
59	DLTIS/ICAPT	-7.31	-0.71	84	Δ CSTK/LAGICAPT	-7.02	-0.45
60	Δ DLT/LAGICAPT	-7.31	-0.51	85	% Δ LCT	-7.02	-0.56
61	Δ AP/LAGSALE	-7.28	-0.82	86	Δ CSTK/LAGICAPT	-7.00	-0.48
62	Δ DLC/LAGPPENT	-7.25	-0.43	87	DLTIS/SEQ	-7.00	-0.72
63	Δ INVT/LAGXSGA	-7.23	-0.65	88	Δ XINT/LAGLCT	-6.99	-0.52
64	Δ AP/LAGCOGS	-7.22	-0.81	89	Δ LCT/LAGPPENT	-6.98	-0.58
65	Δ PPENT/LAGICAPT	-7.19	-0.74	90	% Δ INVT	-6.98	-0.68
66	Δ PPENT/LAGXSGA	-7.18	-0.75	91	Δ LCT/LAGSALE	-6.98	-0.57
67	Δ PPENT/LAGCEQ	-7.18	-0.75	92	AQS/LCT	-6.98	-0.46
68	Δ INVT/LAGLCT	-7.17	-0.62	93	Δ CSTK/LAGSEQ	-6.94	-0.45
69	AQS/AT	-7.17	-0.44	94	Δ LCT/LAGACT	-6.94	-0.64
70	% Δ PEPBT	-7.13	-0.66	95	SSTK/XSGA	-6.94	-0.80
71	Δ DLC/LAGLCT	-7.13	-0.40	96	DVPIBB/MKTCAP	6.92	1.01
72	Δ DLT/LAGSEQ	-7.12	-0.52	97	Δ DLT/LAGCEQ	-6.91	-0.51
73	Δ CSTK/LAGACT	-7.09	-0.50	98	DVPIBB/PPENT	6.91	0.94
74	NP/COGS	-7.08	-0.44	99	% Δ CSTK	-6.91	-0.56
75	DVPIBB/LT	7.08	0.99	100	Δ INVT/LAGLT	-6.90	-0.59

Table 6 lists the top 100 fundamental signals ranked based on the absolute value of t-statistics of equal-weighted Carhart four-factor alphas. Our sample period is 1963–2013. Our sample consists of 18,113 fundamental signals constructed from the combination of 240 accounting variables and seventy-six financial ratios and configurations. At the end of June of year t , we form decile portfolios based on the value of each fundamental signal at the end of year $t-1$. We form the long-short portfolio based on the two extreme decile portfolios and hold them for twelve months. We estimate four-factor alphas based on the Carhart (1997) model. Alphas are expressed in percent per month.

Table 7
List of top fundamental signals based on t -statistic of value-weighted four-factor alphas

#	Signal	t -statistic	alpha	#	Signal	t -statistic	alpha
1	Δ ICAPT/LAGMKTCAP	-5.31	-0.75	26	Δ DLTT/LAGMKTCAP	-4.01	-0.46
2	FOPT/ACT	5.03	1.29	27	CAPS/XSGA	-4.01	-0.62
3	Δ XINT/LAGSEQ	-4.77	-0.63	28	RE/INVT	3.99	0.60
4	FOPT/INVT	4.63	1.07	29	% Δ in TSTK/SEQ	3.97	0.88
5	Δ TLCF/LAGCEQ	-4.43	-0.79	30	DS/XSGA	-3.95	-0.36
6	Δ XINT/LAGCEQ	-4.37	-0.57	31	FOPT/LT	3.95	1.05
7	FOPT/LCT	4.34	1.10	32	% Δ in TSTK/CEQ	3.95	0.86
8	AT/MKTCAP	-4.28	-0.74	33	% Δ in TSTK/AT	3.94	0.91
9	XSGA/AT	4.28	0.74	34	% Δ in APALCH - % Δ in SEQ	3.94	0.99
10	Δ ICAPT/LAGLCT	-4.23	-0.63	35	COGS/XSGA	-3.91	-0.68
11	Δ TLCF/LAGSEQ	-4.21	-0.75	36	XOPR/XSGA	-3.91	-0.68
12	Δ CEQ/LAGMKTCAP	-4.20	-0.66	37	DLTIS/CEQ	-3.90	-0.56
13	FOPT/ICAPT	4.12	1.05	38	Δ DS/LAGEMP	-3.90	-0.53
14	Δ FATC/LAGMKTCAP	-4.10	-0.68	39	Δ CAPS/LAGCEQ	-3.89	-0.51
15	Δ XINT/LAGICAPT	-4.10	-0.52	40	XSGA/EMP	3.89	0.53
16	Δ CAPS/LAGXSGA	-4.09	-0.58	41	Δ RECT/LAGCEQ	-3.87	-0.54
17	% Δ in TSTK/ICAPT	4.07	0.91	42	FOPT/SALE	3.87	0.93
18	% Δ in TSTK/MKTCAP	4.07	0.96	43	Δ CAPS/LAGAT	-3.85	-0.55
19	Δ AT/LAGMKTCAP	-4.05	-0.55	44	Δ CAPS/LAGSEQ	-3.83	-0.50
20	EBITD/ALT	4.05	0.77	45	% Δ in TXC - % Δ in SALE	3.82	0.51
21	Δ INVT/LAGMKTCAP	-4.04	-0.54	46	% Δ in TSTK/LT	3.80	0.89
22	FOPT/COGS	4.04	0.97	47	% Δ in TSTK/ACT	3.80	0.88
23	DLTIS/MKTCAP	-4.04	-0.56	48	% Δ in APALCH - % Δ in ICAPT	3.79	0.96
24	Δ CEQ/LAGMKTCAP	-4.03	-0.64	49	DDI/XSGA	-3.79	-0.59
25	Δ PPE/LAGSEQ	-4.01	-0.47	50	OANCE/DLTT	3.78	0.97

(continued)

Table 7
Continued

#	Signal	t-statistic	alpha	#	Signal	t-statistic	alpha
51	FOPT/AT	3.77	0.96	76	Δ ICAPT/LAGXSGA	-3.62	-0.54
52	XSGA/COGS	3.76	0.64	77	% Δ in TSTK - % Δ in CEQ	3.62	0.80
53	Δ in CEQ/SALE	-3.75	-0.46	78	% Δ in TXC/CEQ	3.61	0.54
54	% Δ in TXC - % Δ in ICAPT	3.74	0.52	79	Δ DS/LAGAT	-3.61	-0.48
55	% Δ in TSTK/PPENT	3.73	0.83	80	Δ DS/LAGLGT	-3.61	-0.48
56	Δ RECT/LAGSEQ	-3.73	-0.53	81	RE/SALE	3.61	0.59
57	DCVT/ACT	-3.72	-0.28	82	Δ DS/LAGSALE	-3.60	-0.48
58	Δ LT/LAGMKT CAP	-3.72	-0.46	83	Δ DS/LAGCOGS	-3.60	-0.48
59	% Δ in TSTK/SALE	3.71	0.83	84	Δ DS/LAGICAPT	-3.59	-0.48
60	Δ CAPS/LAGICAPT	-3.71	-0.50	85	% Δ in TSTK - % Δ in SALE	3.58	0.81
61	Δ CAPS/LAGMKT CAP	-3.71	-0.47	86	% Δ in APALCH - % Δ in ACT	3.57	0.81
62	Δ SEQ/LAGMKT CAP	-3.70	-0.58	87	Δ DS/LAGPPENT	-3.57	-0.48
63	Δ TLCF/LAGICAPT	-3.70	-0.66	88	Δ PPENT/LAGCEQ	-3.56	-0.42
64	% Δ in APALCH - % Δ in CEQ	3.69	0.91	89	% Δ in TSTK	3.56	0.78
65	DLTIS/SEQ	-3.68	-0.54	90	% Δ in TSTK/SEQ	3.56	0.59
66	XINT/LT	-3.67	-0.58	91	% Δ in TXC - % Δ in EMP	3.55	0.52
67	% Δ in TSTK - % Δ in ACT	3.66	0.81	92	% Δ in IVST/ACT	3.55	0.67
68	% Δ in APALCH - % Δ MKT CAP	3.65	0.94	93	Δ TLCF/LAGLCT	-3.55	-0.62
69	Δ RECT/LAGMKT CAP	-3.65	-0.51	94	Δ in INVT/SALE	-3.54	-0.44
70	% Δ in TXPD - % Δ in SEQ	3.65	0.64	95	% Δ in IVST/CEQ	3.54	0.67
71	Δ INVT/LAGPPENT	-3.65	-0.55	96	% Δ in TSTK/INVT	3.54	0.69
72	% Δ in APALCH - % Δ in AT	3.64	0.91	97	% Δ in TXT/MKT CAP	3.54	0.54
73	Δ DLTIS/LAGSEQ	-3.63	-0.45	98	IVST/DLTT	3.54	0.65
74	OANCF/XSGA	3.63	0.91	99	Δ in TLCF/COGS	-3.54	-0.54
75	% Δ in TSTK/COGS	3.63	0.83	100	Δ DS/LAGMKT CAP	-3.53	-0.48

Table 7 lists the top 100 fundamental signals ranked based on the absolute value of t-statistics of value-weighted Carhart four-factor alphas. Our sample period is 1963–2013. Our sample consists of 18,113 fundamental signals constructed from the combination of 240 accounting variables and seventy-six financial ratios and configurations. At the end of June of year t , we form decile portfolios based on the value of each fundamental signal at the end of year $t-1$. We form the long-short portfolio based on the two extreme decile portfolios and hold them for twelve months. We estimate four-factor alphas based on the Carhart (1997) model. Alphas are expressed in percent per month.

of our fundamental signals. This is due to the fact the fundamental-based trading strategies considered in our study are rebalanced once a year and therefore have very low turnover rates. Untabulated results indicate that the average turnover rate for our top fundamental signals is approximately 66% per year for both long and short portfolios. Using Novy-Marx and Velikov's (2016) estimates of round-trip trading costs, that is, between 0.76% and 1.63%,²¹ we find that the total trading costs for our strategies are between 1.01% and 2.15% per year. Tables 6 and 7 show that the alphas for most of our top fundamental signals range from 6% to 12% per year, far exceeding the estimated trading costs.

We contend that limited attention is a possible reason why investors fail to fully appreciate the information content of our fundamental signals. Investors have limited attention and cognitive processing power. In the meantime, financial statement information is vast. Investors face a continuing stream of financial reports for thousands of firms that contain hundreds of accounting variables. Behavioral theory suggests that in the presence of limited attention investors will not make full use of the available accounting information (Hirshleifer et al. 2004). In particular, investors who face limited attention will tend to focus on more salient information while overlooking relatively obscure variables such as interest expense and tax loss carryforward, thereby leading to subsequent predictable returns associated with these accounting variables.

Having discussed at a general level why the new fundamental signals may be systematically related to mispricing, we next provide a discussion on the specific mechanisms why several prominent anomaly variables identified in this study may predict future stock returns.

Interest expense. We find that changes in interest expense (XINT) scaled by several accounting variables including lagged total assets, common equity, and total invested capital are significant negative predictors of future stock returns. An increase in interest expense may be due to either an increase in the amount of debt or an increase in the interest rate paid on the debt, or both. Debt issuance, to the extent that it is used to finance asset growth that is motivated by "empire building," will tend to correlate negatively with future firm performance. An unexpected increase in the interest rate may indicate a deteriorating credit environment and potential financial distress. If investors do not fully understand the information content of interest expense, a large increase in interest expense will tend to be associated with low future stock returns.

Short-term debt. We find that the level of short-term debt (DLC) scaled by total sales, number of employees, and cost of goods sold are negative

²¹ These estimates are based on the implied round-trip trading costs of "low-turnover strategies" in Table 3 of Novy-Marx and Velikov (2016). Their estimates are likely upper bounds. Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz (2015) report that the round-trip trading costs for a large institutional investor are a small fraction of those estimated by Novy-Marx and Velikov (2016).

predictors of future stock returns. A disproportionately large amount of short-term debt may indicate a liquidity problem. Moreover, firms face a rollover risk in short-term debt, particularly during financial crises. If investors underestimate this rollover risk and the cost of financial distress, the market will temporarily overvalue firms with a disproportionately large amount of short-term debt. When more public information is released to the market in subsequent periods, these firms will experience low/negative future stock returns.

Tax loss carryforward. We find that changes in tax loss carryforward (TLCF) scaled by various accounting variables negatively predict future stock returns. The corporate income tax in the United States provides tax relief to firms that report losses. Firms that have paid positive taxes during the past three years may “carry back” their losses and receive a tax refund. Firms that exhaust their potential carrybacks must carry their losses forward. A firm with a large increase in tax loss carryforward most likely has experienced persistent losses in past years. If investors do not fully understand the persistent nature of the firm’s losses, then a negative relation between changes in tax loss carryforward and future stock returns may arise.

Selling, general, and administrative expense. Selling, general, and administrative expense (XSGA) scaled by total assets, number of employees, and cost of goods sold are positive predictors of future stock returns. Although XSGA is an expense, it generates current and future economic benefits that may be underestimated by investors. For example, XSGA includes marketing expense, which may correlate positively with future sales. The XSGA also includes labor expense, which may be positively correlated with labor productivity. If the market fails to impound such information into prices, then a high XSGA will tend to predict high future stock returns.

2.5 Robustness tests

In this section, we perform a number of robustness tests to ensure that our results are not sensitive to various sample and methodological choices.

2.5.1 Financial stocks. In our main analysis, we follow many previous studies in the anomalies literature (e.g., Fama and French 2008) and exclude financial stocks. To gauge the robustness of our results, we repeat our main analysis by including financial stocks in our sample. To conserve space, we report the results of this analysis in [Table IA.5](#) of the [Internet Appendix](#). Overall, our results are similar to those reported in [Table 1](#) and [Table 2](#). That is, we find that the superior performance of top-ranked fundamental signals cannot be explained by random chance.

2.5.2 Fama and French five-factor alphas. Fama and French (2015) propose a new five-factor model by adding a profitability factor and an investment factor to their workhorse three-factor model. We repeat our bootstrap analysis on the t -statistics of Fama and French five-factor alphas and present the results in Table IA.7 in the Internet Appendix. Our results are qualitatively unchanged.

2.5.3 Alternative universe of signals. We repeat our analyses on several alternative universes of fundamental signals. In particular, we find that our results are qualitatively similar when we impose more (or less) stringent data requirements on the accounting variables (e.g., when we require a minimum of 500 or 2,000 average observations per year as opposed to 1,000). Moreover, because the number of listed firms changes over time, we also implement a time-varying minimum number of firms' rule. Specifically, we require that the percentage of firms with nonmissing data on an accounting variable be at least 30% per year. Our results based on this alternative variable selection rule are very similar to those contained in Table 1. We present the results of these robustness tests in Table IA.8 of the Internet Appendix.

2.5.4 Industry-adjusted signals. One might argue that financial ratios are industry specific, so it may be more meaningful to compare a firm's financial ratios to its industry peers. In Table IA.9 of the Internet Appendix, we subtract the industry median from each firm's fundamental signal before forming portfolios. We find essentially the same results when we use industry-adjusted signals.

2.5.5 Sampling without replacement. In our main bootstrap analysis, we follow the standard approach and draw simulated data with replacement. An alternative approach is to sample without replacement, which can be used when drawing subsamples of size $m < n$ from the original data (Horowitz 2001, 3169).²² We perform a robustness test using this alternative sampling procedure and report the results in Table IA.10 of the Internet Appendix. Overall, our main findings are qualitatively unchanged.

2.5.6 International evidence. We also extend our analysis to international markets. We follow Novy-Marx (2013) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and include the following nineteen developed countries in our sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. We obtain annual

²² Drawing samples of the same size as the original data without replacement would imply that each observation is drawn exactly once, resulting in simulated samples that differ from the original data only in the order of each observation. As a result, there would be no variation in the mean return or alpha across simulated samples. Our results are based on drawing subsamples of thirty years (out of fifty years) without replacement.

accounting variables from Compustat North America (for Canadian firms) and Compustat Global. Our analysis is based on 125 accounting variables and 8,143 fundamental signals. This universe is smaller than that of the United States because of data availability. Our sample excludes financial firms, noncommon stocks, and low-priced stocks and covers the period from 1990 to 2013. We remove extreme return observations by following the standard procedure of [Ince and Porter \(2003\)](#). We follow [Hou, Karolyi, and Kho \(2011\)](#) and sort stocks based on each signal in two ways, across all countries (global) and within each country (local). We compute returns in both U.S. dollar and local currency. Finally, we estimate alphas using global Fama-French factors downloaded from Kenneth French's website. We report our results in [Table IA.13](#) of the [Internet Appendix](#). Overall, we find similar results to those in the United States when looking at equal-weighted portfolios. That is, the extreme percentiles of alphas and their t -statistics are too large to be explained by chance. The value-weighted results, however, are much weaker than those for the United States. This is likely due to three reasons. First, the sample period for the international data is shorter. Second, there is a lot of noise in the international data including the market capitalization data. Third, accounting variables across different countries may not be completely comparable due to differences in accounting rules and standards.

2.6 Past return-based anomalies

Although we focus on financial statement variables in this paper, our approach is general and can be applied to other categories of anomaly variables. To demonstrate this generality, we apply our methodology to past return-based anomalies.²³ Similar to financial statement variables, past returns are also well suited for our analysis because although researchers have numerous choices on which past returns to use, we can construct a "universe" of past return signals by using permutational arguments.

Previous studies have shown that past returns contain information about future stock returns. Both short- (one month) and long-term (three to five years) past returns are negatively associated with future returns, while intermediate-term (three to twelve months) past returns are positively related to future returns ([DeBondt and Thaler 1985](#); [Jegadeesh 1990](#); [Jegadeesh and Titman 1993](#)). More recently, [Novy-Marx \(2012\)](#) shows that the intermediate momentum effect is primarily driven by stock returns during twelve to seven months prior to the portfolio formation date, and [Heston and Sadka \(2008\)](#) document that past stock returns have significant predictive power for future returns during the same calendar month. We evaluate the extent to which these past return-based anomalies are due to random chance.

2.6.1 Construction of a universe. For ease of exposition, we denote each past return variable as the cumulative return between month $t - k - j$ and month

²³ We thank the referee for suggesting this analysis.

$t - k - 1$, where t is the current month, j is the number of months in the formation period, and k is the number of months we skip between the end of the formation period and the start of the holding period. In our study, the possible values for j are from 1 to 240 (i.e., one month to twenty years). The possible values of k are from 0 to 12 and then 24, 36, 48, and 60. Positive values of k allow us (i) to mitigate the effect of bid-ask bounce; (ii) to examine the predictive ability of short-, intermediate-, and long-term returns independent of each other; and (iii) more generally, to consider any past return that is not adjacent to the holding period. Using all combinations of j and k , we are able to construct a “universe” of 4,080 past return-based anomaly variables. This “universe” includes the past return signals documented in prior literature, for example, $RET_{t-1:t-1}$ (Jegadeesh 1990), $RET_{t-6:t-1}$ (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993, 2001), $RET_{t-12:t-2}$ (Fama and French 1996), $RET_{t-60:t-13}$ (DeBondt and Thaler 1985), $RET_{t-12:t-7}$ (Novy-Marx 2012), $RET_{t-12:t-12}$ (Heston and Sadka 2008), as well as numerous unreported and unpublished past return signals.

At each month t , we sort all stocks based on their past returns and form decile portfolios.²⁴ We buy stocks in the highest past return decile and short stocks in the lowest past return decile. We rebalance our portfolios each month and hold them for one month. We compute long-short returns and then estimate the CAPM one-factor alphas and the Fama and French three-factor alphas of the long-short returns. We focus on one- and three-factor alphas in this analysis because the Carhart four-factor model includes a momentum factor.

2.6.1 Top past return signals. In panel A of Table 8, we list the top signals ranked based on equal-weighted three-factor alpha t -statistics, separately for positive and negative alphas. The left half of panel A, which reports the top 25 positive predictors, indicates that most of these past return signals are over the three- to twelve-month horizon, suggesting the intermediate-term momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is pervasive. The top-ranked signal is $RET_{t-12:t-3}$, which has an alpha of 1.72% per month and a t -statistic of 6.27. We note that the past return variable examined by Novy-Marx (2012) is ranked #3 on this list, with an alpha of 1.32% per month and a t -statistic of 6.2.

The right half of panel A lists the top 25 past return signals that are negatively related to future stock returns. Although all of these signals are long-term returns, they are not necessarily within the time frame that prior studies have examined. Specifically, prior studies of long-run reversals have focused on the past one- to five-year returns, that is, up to month $t-60$. However, most of the signals on this list extend beyond the past five years. For example, the top-ranked past return variable is $RET_{t-136:t-37}$, which is the cumulative return over a 100-month period from month $t-136$ to month $t-37$. We dub this new finding “long long-run reversal.”

²⁴ We remove those stocks with a share price below \$1 or in the smallest NYSE size decile at the portfolio formation date.

Table 8
List of top past return signals

Panel A: Ranked based on t -statistics of EW 3-factor alphas

Positive alpha				Negative alpha			
#	Past return signal	t -statistic	alpha	#	Past return signal	t -statistic	alpha
1	$t-12:t-3$	6.27	1.72	1	$t-136:t-37$	-7.98	-0.92
2	$t-12:t-2$	6.20	1.80	2	$t-92:t-37$	-7.81	-0.91
3	$t-12:t-7$	6.20	1.32	3	$t-70:t-49$	-7.72	-0.88
4	$t-12:t-6$	6.17	1.41	4	$t-114:t-37$	-7.71	-0.89
5	$t-12:t-5$	6.01	1.46	5	$t-70:t-37$	-7.69	-0.96
6	$t-13:t-3$	6.01	1.62	6	$t-91:t-37$	-7.68	-0.89
7	$t-12:t-4$	5.95	1.54	7	$t-115:t-37$	-7.66	-0.88
8	$t-11:t-2$	5.85	1.72	8	$t-94:t-37$	-7.55	-0.91
9	$t-13:t-4$	5.81	1.45	9	$t-117:t-37$	-7.55	-0.87
10	$t-12:t-8$	5.72	1.17	10	$t-93:t-37$	-7.52	-0.89
11	$t-13:t-2$	5.72	1.65	11	$t-90:t-25$	-7.50	-1.02
12	$t-13:t-5$	5.71	1.36	12	$t-90:t-37$	-7.44	-0.86
13	$t-11:t-3$	5.69	1.60	13	$t-91:t-25$	-7.41	-1.00
14	$t-9:t-3$	5.62	1.55	14	$t-116:t-13$	-7.34	-0.92
15	$t-10:t-3$	5.62	1.57	15	$t-115:t-13$	-7.34	-0.93
16	$t-13:t-7$	5.58	1.15	16	$t-92:t-25$	-7.33	-0.99
17	$t-12:t-9$	5.58	1.09	17	$t-91:t-49$	-7.31	-0.83
18	$t-13:t-6$	5.57	1.25	18	$t-127:t-37$	-7.31	-0.87
19	$t-11:t-4$	5.57	1.46	19	$t-68:t-49$	-7.30	-0.85
20	$t-10:t-2$	5.57	1.65	20	$t-89:t-25$	-7.28	-0.97
21	$t-7:t-2$	5.56	1.58	21	$t-118:t-37$	-7.28	-0.85
22	$t-12:t-11$	5.56	0.94	22	$t-69:t-37$	-7.27	-0.90
23	$t-9:t-2$	5.54	1.62	23	$t-104:t-37$	-7.27	-0.86
24	$t-13:t-9$	5.46	1.00	24	$t-117:t-13$	-7.25	-0.90
25	$t-6:t-2$	5.43	1.25	25	$t-119:t-37$	-7.25	-0.84

Panel B: Ranked based on t -statistics of VW 3-factor alphas

Positive alpha				Negative alpha			
#	Past return signal	t -statistic	alpha	#	Past return signal	t -statistic	alpha
1	$t-12:t-6$	6.44	1.57	1	$t-70:t-61$	-4.60	-0.71
2	$t-12:t-7$	6.36	1.52	2	$t-69:t-61$	-4.19	-0.65
3	$t-12:t-3$	5.78	1.68	3	$t-70:t-49$	-4.12	-0.59
4	$t-12:t-5$	5.61	1.47	4	$t-68:t-61$	-3.86	-0.61
5	$t-13:t-7$	5.59	1.34	5	$t-71:t-61$	-3.78	-0.59
6	$t-12:t-4$	5.57	1.51	6	$t-71:t-49$	-3.64	-0.53
7	$t-13:t-5$	5.56	1.43	7	$t-69:t-49$	-3.56	-0.51
8	$t-12:t-8$	5.53	1.32	8	$t-31:t-25$	-3.32	-0.63
9	$t-11:t-7$	5.49	1.31	9	$t-68:t-49$	-3.25	-0.48
10	$t-12:t-9$	5.47	1.28	10	$t-32:t-25$	-3.12	-0.60
11	$t-13:t-6$	5.44	1.33	11	$t-33:t-25$	-3.08	-0.57
12	$t-12:t-2$	5.44	1.65	12	$t-30:t-25$	-3.07	-0.59
13	$t-11:t-6$	5.38	1.31	13	$t-29:t-25$	-2.97	-0.56
14	$t-13:t-9$	5.34	1.19	14	$t-34:t-25$	-2.67	-0.48
15	$t-11:t-5$	5.29	1.39	15	$t-237:t-61$	-2.67	-0.45
16	$t-13:t-3$	5.21	1.52	16	$t-70:t-49$	-2.60	-0.37
17	$t-13:t-4$	5.16	1.39	17	$t-70:t-13$	-2.59	-0.43
18	$t-11:t-3$	5.15	1.51	18	$t-229:t-37$	-2.55	-0.42
19	$t-12:t-10$	5.14	1.11	19	$t-70:t-37$	-2.54	-0.39
20	$t-11:t-9$	5.13	1.11	20	$t-116:t-37$	-2.51	-0.35
21	$t-13:t-8$	5.12	1.12	21	$t-28:t-25$	-2.49	-0.48
22	$t-11:t-2$	5.11	1.54	22	$t-116:t-37$	-2.48	-0.36
23	$t-11:t-8$	5.02	1.18	23	$t-104:t-13$	-2.48	-0.38
24	$t-14:t-5$	5.00	1.27	24	$t-64:t-49$	-2.46	-0.36
25	$t-12:t-11$	4.92	1.03	25	$t-67:t-49$	-2.44	-0.35

Table 8 lists the top past return signals ranked based on the t -statistics of equal-weighted or value-weighted Fama and French three-factor alphas. Our sample period is 1963–2013. Our sample consists of 4,080 past return signals. Each past return is denoted as the cumulative return between month $t - j - k$ and month $t - k - 1$. At the beginning of month t , we form decile portfolios based on the value of each past return signal. We form the long-short portfolio based on the two extreme decile portfolios and hold them for one month. We estimate three-factor alphas based on the Fama and French (1996) three-factor model. Alphas are expressed in percent per month.

The value-weighted results reported in panel B reveal essentially the same pattern. Return continuation signals concentrate on the three- to twelve-month horizon, while return reversal signals concentrate on much longer horizons, often beyond five years. We also note that although the momentum effect exhibits similar alphas and t -statistics between equal- and value-weighted returns, the long-run reversal effect is significantly weaker when we examine value-weighted portfolios.

2.6.2 Bootstrap results. We conduct our bootstrap analysis on both alphas and t -statistics of alphas for our universe of past return signals. Table 9 presents the results. Panel A reports the results for t -statistics. Examining the t -statistics of equal-weighted one-factor alphas, we find that the long-short performance of past return signals exhibit large t -statistics. For example, the 99th percentile of t -statistics is 4.34 and the 1st percentile is -7.87 . The bootstrapped p -values for most extreme percentiles are less than 1%, indicating that the large t -statistics at the extreme percentiles cannot be explained by sampling variation.²⁵

The same qualitative results extend to the t -statistics of equal-weighted three-factor alphas and value-weighted one-factor alphas. However, the results for the t -statistics of value-weighted three-factor alphas are somewhat different. We find that the distribution of t -statistics appears to have shifted upward after controlling for the Fama and French factors. That is, the t -statistics at the 90th to 100th percentiles have become more positive, while the t -statistics at the 0th to 10th percentiles have become less negative. In fact, the bootstrapped p -values corresponding to the 1st to 10th percentiles are no longer below 5%. These findings are consistent with Fama and French (1996), who find that their three-factor model helps explain the long-run reversal effect, and with Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), who show that the Fama and French three-factor model exacerbates the momentum effect.

Panel B of Table 9 presents the bootstrap results for alphas. The results basically mirror those contained in panel A. For example, the 99th percentile of equal-weighted one-factor alphas is 1.06% per month and the 1st percentile is -1.31% per month, both of which have a bootstrapped p -value of 0%. The value-weighted one-factor alpha results are similar. The 99th percentile of value-weighted one-factor alphas is 0.94% with a bootstrapped p -value of 0.05%, and the 1st percentile is -0.81% with a bootstrapped p -value of 0.36%. These p -values indicate that, under the null hypothesis that all past return strategies are generating zero long-short returns, it is highly unlikely for us to observe a 99th (1st) percentile of one-factor alpha that is more extreme than

²⁵ We note that the p -values for the 90th to 97th percentiles are quite large (i.e., insignificant). This is because our universe of past return signals, by construction, is dominated by long-run past returns, which tend to have a negative relation with future stock returns. Table IA.14 of the Internet Appendix presents bootstrap results for a universe of past return signals that are all within the past sixty months. The positive and negative extreme values of this alternative sample are much more symmetric. In particular, the 90th through 100th percentiles of t -statistics are all significant.

Table 9
Percentiles of t -statistics and alphas for actual and simulated long-short returns of past return signals

Panel A: t -statistics

Percentiles	EW (t -statistic)						VW (t -statistic)					
	Raw return		1-factor α		3-factor α		Raw return		1-factor α		3-factor α	
	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value
100	5.57	0.01%	5.48	0.01%	6.27	0.01%	5.60	0.00%	5.46	0.00%	6.44	0.00%
99	4.22	0.08%	4.34	0.04%	5.08	0.02%	3.35	0.83%	3.46	0.46%	4.45	0.01%
98	3.21	1.08%	3.39	0.38%	4.21	0.10%	2.45	6.91%	2.51	4.92%	3.73	0.21%
97	1.88	18.93%	1.95	14.58%	3.29	0.97%	1.69	26.27%	1.84	18.18%	3.30	0.64%
96	0.81	66.30%	0.89	60.42%	2.59	4.99%	1.13	50.71%	1.25	41.77%	2.91	1.66%
95	-0.19	96.71%	-0.13	96.08%	1.78	25.50%	0.65	72.43%	0.69	69.06%	2.55	3.93%
90	-2.83	100.00%	-2.69	100.00%	-0.72	99.85%	-0.97	99.59%	-0.85	99.20%	1.60	21.24%
10	-7.14	0.00%	-6.91	0.00%	-6.05	0.00%	-3.68	0.01%	-3.41	0.05%	-1.39	21.99%
5	-7.51	0.00%	-7.34	0.00%	-6.52	0.00%	-3.90	0.01%	-3.64	0.03%	-1.71	19.76%
4	-7.60	0.00%	-7.46	0.00%	-6.64	0.00%	-3.99	0.00%	-3.72	0.03%	-1.81	18.83%
3	-7.73	0.00%	-7.55	0.00%	-6.77	0.00%	-4.07	0.00%	-3.83	0.03%	-1.91	18.60%
2	-7.84	0.00%	-7.67	0.00%	-6.92	0.00%	-4.18	0.00%	-3.96	0.02%	-2.04	18.30%
1	-8.03	0.00%	-7.87	0.00%	-7.12	0.00%	-4.33	0.00%	-4.17	0.00%	-2.26	16.91%
0	-8.77	0.00%	-8.71	0.00%	-7.98	0.00%	-5.27	0.00%	-5.53	0.00%	-4.60	0.08%

Panel B: Alphas

Percentiles	EW (α)						VW (α)					
	Raw return		1-factor α		3-factor α		Raw return		1-factor α		3-factor α	
	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value	Actual	p -value
100	1.48	0.00%	1.56	0.00%	1.80	0.00%	1.38	0.00%	1.46	0.00%	1.68	0.00%
99	1.01	0.00%	1.06	0.00%	1.27	0.00%	0.87	0.13%	0.94	0.05%	1.17	0.00%
98	0.71	0.15%	0.76	0.02%	1.00	0.00%	0.61	2.41%	0.66	1.06%	0.97	0.00%
97	0.44	6.20%	0.48	2.76%	0.76	0.00%	0.45	10.57%	0.50	5.55%	0.83	0.02%
96	0.19	49.18%	0.21	41.47%	0.58	0.20%	0.29	34.55%	0.32	26.01%	0.72	0.04%
95	-0.05	98.05%	-0.03	96.79%	0.37	6.47%	0.17	62.34%	0.18	58.41%	0.61	0.31%
90	-0.57	100.00%	-0.53	100.00%	-0.14	99.98%	-0.23	99.83%	-0.20	99.61%	0.34	9.04%
10	-1.17	0.00%	-1.14	0.00%	-0.79	0.00%	-0.73	0.06%	-0.67	0.20%	-0.22	27.21%
5	-1.22	0.00%	-1.21	0.00%	-0.85	0.00%	-0.77	0.11%	-0.72	0.24%	-0.28	24.58%
4	-1.24	0.00%	-1.23	0.00%	-0.86	0.00%	-0.78	0.12%	-0.73	0.27%	-0.29	26.10%
3	-1.25	0.00%	-1.24	0.00%	-0.88	0.00%	-0.80	0.14%	-0.75	0.28%	-0.30	28.37%
2	-1.28	0.00%	-1.27	0.00%	-0.91	0.00%	-0.82	0.21%	-0.77	0.35%	-0.32	29.44%
1	-1.32	0.00%	-1.31	0.00%	-0.95	0.01%	-0.84	0.35%	-0.81	0.36%	-0.35	31.82%
0	-1.45	0.00%	-1.44	0.00%	-1.04	0.18%	-0.94	0.97%	-0.97	0.58%	-0.71	6.95%

Panel A of Table 9 presents selected percentiles of the t -statistics for long-short returns of 4,080 past return signals. Panel B presents selected percentiles of long-short returns of 4,080 past return signals. The table also presents the bootstrapped p -value for each percentile based on 10,000 simulation runs. Our sample period is 1963–2013. Each past return is denoted as the cumulative return between month $t - j - k$ and month $t - k - 1$. At the beginning of month t , we form decile portfolios based on the value of each past return signal. We form the long-short portfolio based on the two extreme decile portfolios and hold them for one month. A simulation run is a random sample of 606 months, drawn (with replacement) from the 606 calendar months between July 1963 and December 2013. We estimate one- and three-factor alphas based on the CAPM and the [Fama and French \(1996\)](#) three-factor model. Alphas are expressed in percent per month.

0.94% (−0.81%). As in panel A, the results are different for value-weighted three-factor alphas. We find that although the positive alphas at the 95th to 100th percentiles are highly significant, the negative alphas at the 1st to 10th percentiles are no longer significant at conventional levels.

Overall, our bootstrap results indicate that the predictive ability of intermediate-horizon returns (i.e., the momentum effect) is not due to random chance, whether we examine equal- or value-weighted returns and whether we use a one- or three-factor model as the benchmark model. The predictive ability of long-term returns, on the other hand, is sensitive to the portfolio weighting

scheme and benchmark model. When we use the CAPM one-factor model or examine equal-weighted returns, this predictive ability is highly significant and robust to sampling variation. However, when we use the Fama and French three-factor model combined with value-weighted returns, we cannot reject the hypothesis the predictive ability of long-term returns is attributed to random chance for most extreme percentiles.

3. Conclusions

Previous studies have documented hundreds of cross-sectional return anomalies. These anomalies have largely been evaluated without accounting for the extensive search leading up to their discoveries. In this paper, we examine the data-mining bias in cross-sectional return anomalies by constructing a “universe” of over 18,000 fundamental signals from financial statements and by using a bootstrap procedure.

We find that a large number of fundamental signals are significant predictors of cross-sectional stock returns even after accounting for data mining. This predictive ability is more pronounced among small, low-institutional ownership, low-analyst coverage, and high-idiosyncratic volatility stocks. We also find that the long-short returns associated with fundamental signals are significantly higher following high-sentiment periods. These results suggest that fundamental-based anomalies are more likely to result from mispricing. We demonstrate the generality of our approach by applying it to past return-based anomaly variables. We show that the intermediate-term momentum effect is extremely robust to sampling variation, while the long-run reversal is somewhat sensitive to portfolio weighting schemes and benchmark models. Although we examine both fundamental signals and past return signals, we acknowledge that our analysis does not account for all the anomaly variables documented in the literature (e.g., analyst forecast dispersion, governance index, breadth of ownership, political contribution, and media coverage). Future research can extend our framework and conduct a more comprehensive data-mining exercise.

Table A.1
Appendix A. List of Accounting Variables

#	Variable	Description	#	Variable	Description
1	ACCHG	Accounting changes – cumulative effect	29	COGS	Cost of goods sold
2	ACO	Current assets other total	30	CSTK	Common/ordinary stock (capital)
3	ACOX	Current assets other sundry	31	CSTKCV	Common stock-carrying value
4	ACT	Current assets – total	32	CSTKE	Common stock equivalents – dollar savings
5	AM	Amortization of intangibles	33	DC	Deferred charges
6	AO	Assets – other	34	DCLO	Debt capitalized lease obligations
7	AOLOCH	Assets and liabilities other net change	35	DCOM	Deferred compensation
8	AOX	Assets – other – sundry	36	DCFSTK	Convertible debt and stock
9	AP	Accounts payable – trade	37	DCVSR	Debt senior convertible
10	APALCH	Accounts payable & accrued liabilities increase/decrease	38	DCV/SUB	Debt subordinated convertible
11	AQC	Acquisitions	39	DCVT	Debt – convertible
12	AQI	Acquisitions income contribution	40	DD	Debt debentures
13	AQS	Acquisitions sales contribution	41	DD1	Long-term debt due in one year
14	AT	Assets – total	42	DD2	Debt due in 2nd year
15	BAST	Average short-term borrowing	43	DD3	Debt due in 3rd year
16	CAPS	Capital surplus/share premium reserve	44	DD4	Debt due in 4th year
17	CAPX	Capital expenditure	45	DD5	Debt due in 5th year
18	CAPXV	Capital expenditure PPE schedule V	46	DFS	Debt finance subsidiary
19	CEQ	Common/ordinary equity – total	47	DFXA	Depreciation of tangible fixed assets
20	CEQL	Common equity liquidation value	48	DILADJ	Dilution adjustment
21	CEQT	Common equity tangible	49	DILAVX	Dilution available excluding extraordinary items
22	CH	Cash	50	DLC	Debt in current liabilities – total
23	CHE	Cash and short-term investments	51	DLCCH	Current debt changes
24	CHECH	Cash and cash equivalents increase/decrease	52	DLTIS	Long-term debt issuance
25	CLD2	Capitalized leases – due in 2nd year	53	DLTO	Other long-term debt
26	CLD3	Capitalized leases – due in 3rd year	54	DLTP	Long-term debt tied to prime
27	CLD4	Capitalized leases – due in 4th year	55	DLTR	Long-term debt reduction
28	CLD5	Capitalized leases – due in 5th year	56	DLTT	Long-term debt – total

(continued)

Table A.1
Continued

#	Variable	Description	#	Variable	Description
57	DM	Debt mortgages & other secured	91	FATL	Property, plant, and equipment leases
58	DN	Debt notes	92	FATN	Property, plant, equipment, and natural resources
59	DO	Income (loss) from discontinued operations	93	FATO	Property, plant, and equipment other
60	DONR	Nonrecurring discontinued operations	94	FATP	Property, plant, equipment, and land improvements
61	DP	Depreciation and amortization	95	FIAO	Financing activities other
62	DPACT	Depreciation, depletion, and amortization	96	FINCF	Financing activities net cash flow
63	DPC	Depreciation and amortization (cash flow)	97	FOFO	Funds from operations other
64	DPVIEB	Depreciation ending balance (schedule VI)	98	FOPOX	Funds from operations – other excl option tax benefit
65	DPVIO	Depreciation other changes (schedule VI)	99	FOPT	Funds from operations total
66	DPVIR	Depreciation retirements (schedule VI)	100	FSRCO	Sources of funds other
67	DRC	Deferred revenue current	101	FSRCT	Sources of funds total
68	DS	Debt-subordinated	102	FUSEO	Uses of funds other
69	DUDD	Debt unamortized debt discount and other	103	FUSET	Uses of funds total
70	DV	Cash dividends (cash flow)	104	GDWL	Goodwill
71	DVC	Dividends common/ordinary	105	GP	Gross profit (loss)
72	DVP	Dividends – preferred/preference	106	IB	Income before extraordinary items
73	DVPA	Preferred dividends in arrears	107	IBADJ	IB adjusted for common stock equivalents
74	DVPIBB	Depreciation beginning balance (schedule VI)	108	IBC	Income before extraordinary items (cash flow)
75	DVT	Dividends – total	109	IBCOM	Income before extraordinary items available for common
76	DXD2	Debt (excl capitalized leases) due in 2nd year	110	ICAPT	Invested capital – total
77	DXD3	Debt (excl capitalized leases) due in 3rd year	111	IDIT	Interest and related income – total
78	DXD4	Debt (excl capitalized leases) due in 4th year	112	INTAN	Intangible assets – total
79	DXD5	Debt (excl capitalized leases) due in 5th year	113	INTC	Interest capitalized
80	EBIT	Earnings before interest and taxes	114	INTPN	Interest paid net
81	EBITDA	Earnings before interest	115	INVCH	Inventory decrease (increase)
82	ESOPCT	ESOP obligation (common) – total	116	INVFG	Inventories finished goods
83	ESOPDLT	ESOP debt – long term	117	INVO	Inventories other
84	ESOPT	Preferred ESOP obligation – total	118	INVRM	Inventories raw materials
85	ESUB	Equity in earnings – unconsolidated subsidiaries	119	INVT	Inventories – total
86	ESUBC	Equity in net loss earnings	120	INWVIP	Inventories work in progress
87	EXRE	Exchange rate effect	121	ITCB	Investment tax credit (balance sheet)
88	FATB	Property, plant, and equipment buildings	122	ITCI	Investment tax credit (income account)
89	FATC	Property, plant, and equipment construction in progress	123	IVACO	Investing activities other
90	FATE	Property, plant, equipment and machinery equipment	124	IVAEQ	Investment and advances – equity

(continued)

Table A.1
Continued

#	Variable	Description	#	Variable	Description
125	IVAO	Investment and advances other	160	PPENC	Property, plant, equipment, construction in progress (net)
126	IVCH	Increase in investments	161	PPENLI	Property, plant, equipment, land, and improvements (net)
127	IVNCF	Investing activities net cash flow	162	PPENME	Property, plant, equipment, machinery, and equipment (net)
128	IVST	Short-term investments – total	163	PPENNR	Property, plant, equipment, natural resources (net)
129	IVSTCH	Short-term investments change	164	PPENO	Property, plant, and equipment, other (net)
130	LCO	Current liabilities other total	165	PPENT	Property, plant, and equipment – total (net)
131	LCOX	Current liabilities other sundry	166	PPEVBB	Property, plant, equipment, beginning balance (schedule V)
132	LCOXDR	Current liabilities-other-excl deferred revenue	167	PPEVEB	Property, plant, and equipment, ending balance
133	LCT	Current liabilities – total	168	PPEVO	Property, plant, and equipment, other changes (schedule V)
134	LIFR	LIFO reserve	169	PPEVR	Property, plant, and equipment, retirements (schedule V)
135	LO	Liabilities – other – total	170	PRSTKC	Purchase of common and preferred stock
136	LT	Liabilities – total	171	PSTK	Preferred/preference stock (capital) – total
137	MIB	Minority interest (balance sheet)	172	PSTKC	Preferred stock convertible
138	MII	Minority interest (income account)	173	PSTKL	Preferred stock liquidating value
139	MRC1	Rental commitments minimum 1st year	174	PSTKN	Preferred/preference stock – nonredeemable
140	MRC2	Rental commitments minimum 2nd year	175	PSTKR	Preferred/preference stock – redeemable
141	MRC3	Rental commitments minimum 3rd year	176	PSTKRV	Preferred stock redemption value
142	MRC4	Rental commitments minimum 4th year	177	RDIP	In process R&D expense
143	MRC5	Rental commitments minimum 5th year	178	RE	Retained earnings
144	MRCT	Rental commitments minimum 5-year total	179	REA	Retained earnings, restatement
145	MSA	Marketable securities adjustment	180	REAJO	Retained earnings, other adjustments
146	NI	Net income (loss)	181	RECCH	Accounts receivable decrease (increase)
147	NIADJ	Net income adjusted for common stock equiv.	182	RECCO	Receivables – current – other
148	NIECI	Net income effect capitalized interest	183	RECD	Receivables – estimated doubtful
149	NOPI	Nonoperating income (expense)	184	RECT	Receivables – total
150	NOPIO	Nonoperating income (expense) other	185	RECTA	Retained earnings, cumulative translation adjustment
151	NP	Notes payable short-term borrowings	186	RECTR	Receivables – trade
152	OANCF	Operating activities net cash flow	187	REUNA	Retained earnings, unadjusted
153	OB	Order backlog	188	SALE	Sales/turnover (net)
154	OIADP	Operating income after depreciation	189	SEQ	Stockholders' equity – total
155	PI	Pretax income	190	SIV	Sale of investments
156	PIDOM	Pretax income domestic	191	SPI	Special items
157	PIFO	Pretax income foreign	192	SPPE	Sale of property
158	PPEGT	Property, plant, and equipment – total (gross)	193	SPPIV	Sale of property, plant, equipment, investments gain (loss)
159	PPENB	Property, plant, and equipment buildings (net)	194	SSTK	Sale of common and preferred stock

(continued)

Table A.1
Continued

#	Variable	Description	#	Variable	Description
195	TLCF	Tax loss carry forward	218	TXO	Income taxes – other
196	TSTK	Treasury stock – total (all capital)	219	TXP	Income tax payable
197	TSTKC	Treasury stock – common	220	TXPD	Income taxes paid
198	TSTKP	Treasury stock – preferred	221	TXR	Income tax refund
199	TXACH	Income taxes accrued increase/decrease	222	TXS	Income tax state
200	TXBCO	Excess tax benefit stock options – cash flow	223	TXT	Income tax total
201	TXC	Income tax – current	224	TXW	Excise taxes
202	TXDB	Deferred taxes (balance sheet)	225	WCAP	Working capital (balance sheet)
203	TXDBA	Deferred tax asset – long term	226	WCAPC	Working capital change, other increase/decrease
204	TXDBCA	Deferred tax asset – current	227	WCAPCH	Working capital change, total
205	TXDBCL	Deferred tax liability – current	228	XACC	Accrued expenses
206	TXDC	Deferred taxes (cash flow)	229	XAD	Advertising expense
207	TXDFED	Deferred taxes – federal	230	XDEPL	Depletion expense (schedule VI)
208	TXDFO	Deferred taxes – foreign	231	XI	Extraordinary items
209	TXDI	Income tax – deferred	232	XIDO	Extra. items and discontinued operations
210	TXDJTC	Deferred taxes and investment tax credit	233	XIDOC	Extra. items and disc. operations (cash flow)
211	TXDS	Deferred taxes – state	234	XINT	Interest and related expenses – total
212	TXFED	Income tax federal	235	XOPR	Operating expenses – total
213	TXFO	Income tax foreign	236	XPP	Prepaid expenses
214	TXNDB	Net deferred tax asset (liab) – total	237	XPR	Pension and retirement expense
215	TXNDBA	Net deferred tax asset	238	XRD	Research and development expense
216	TXNDBL	Net deferred tax liability	239	XRENT	Rental expense
217	TXNDBR	Deferred tax residual	240	XSGA	Selling, general and administrative expense

This table lists the 240 accounting variables used in this study and their descriptions. Our sample period is 1963–2013. We begin with all accounting variables on the balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement included in the annual Compustat database. We exclude all variables with fewer than twenty years of data or fewer than 1,000 firms with nonmissing data on average per year. We exclude per-share-based variables such as book value per share and earnings per share. We remove LSE (total liabilities and equity), REVT (total revenue), OIBDP (operating income before depreciation), and XDP (depreciation expense) because they are identical to TA (total assets), SALE (total sale), EBITDA (earnings before interest), and DFXA (depreciation of tangible fixed assets), respectively.

Table B.1
Appendix B. List of Financial Ratios and Configurations

#	Description	#	Description	#	Description	#	Description
1	X/AT	16	Δ in X/AT	31	$\% \Delta$ in X/AT	46	$\Delta X/LAGAT$
2	X/ACT	17	Δ in X/ACT	32	$\% \Delta$ in X/ACT	47	$\Delta X/LAGACT$
3	X/INVT	18	Δ in X/INVT	33	$\% \Delta$ in X/INVT	48	$\Delta X/LAGINVT$
4	X/PPENT	19	Δ in X/PPENT	34	$\% \Delta$ in X/PPENT	49	$\Delta X/LAGPPENT$
5	X/LT	20	Δ in X/LT	35	$\% \Delta$ in X/LT	50	$\Delta X/LAGLT$
6	X/LCT	21	Δ in X/LCT	36	$\% \Delta$ in X/LCT	51	$\Delta X/LAGLCT$
7	X/DLTT	22	Δ in X/DLTT	37	$\% \Delta$ in X/DLTT	52	$\Delta X/LAGDLTT$
8	X/CEQ	23	Δ in X/CEQ	38	$\% \Delta$ in X/CEQ	53	$\Delta X/LAGCEQ$
9	X/SEQ	24	Δ in X/SEQ	39	$\% \Delta$ in X/SEQ	54	$\Delta X/LAGSEQ$
10	X/ICAPT	25	Δ in X/ICAPT	40	$\% \Delta$ in X/ICAPT	55	$\Delta X/LAGICAPT$
11	X/SALE	26	Δ in X/SALE	41	$\% \Delta$ in X/SALE	56	$\Delta X/LAGSALE$
12	X/COGS	27	Δ in X/COGS	42	$\% \Delta$ in X/COGS	57	$\Delta X/LAGCOGS$
13	X/XSGA	28	Δ in X/XSGA	43	$\% \Delta$ in X/XSGA	58	$\Delta X/LAGXSGA$
14	X/EMP	29	Δ in X/EMP	44	$\% \Delta$ in X/EMP	59	$\Delta X/LAGEMP$
15	X/MKTCAP	30	Δ in X/MKTCAP	45	$\% \Delta$ in X/MKTCAP	60	$\Delta X/LAGMKTCAP$
						61	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in AT
						62	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in ACT
						63	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in INVT
						64	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in PPENT
						65	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in LT
						66	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in LCT
						67	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in DLTT
						68	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in CEQ
						69	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in SEQ
						70	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in ICAPT
						71	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in SALE
						72	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in COGS
						73	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in XSGA
						74	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in EMP
						75	$\% \Delta$ in X - $\% \Delta$ in MKTCAP
						76	$\% \Delta$ in X

This table lists the seventy-six financial ratios and configurations used in this study. Our sample period is 1963–2013. We begin with all accounting variables on the balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement included in the annual Compustat database. We exclude all variables with fewer than twenty years of data or fewer than 1,000 firms with nonmissing data on average per year. We exclude per-share-based variables such as book value per share and earnings per share. X represents the 240 accounting variables listed in Appendix A. Y represents the fifteen base variables. They are AT (total assets), ACT (total current assets), INVT (inventory), PPENT (property, plant, and equipment), LT (total liabilities), LCT (total current liabilities), DLTT (long-term debt), CEQ (total common equity), SEQ (stockholders' equity), ICAPT (total invested capital), SALE (total sale), COGS (cost of goods sold), XSGA (selling, general, and administrative cost), EMP (number of employees), and MKTCAP (market capitalization).

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