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gS 0 0 552 730 rC
82 58 :M
f0_22 sf
(Is Cognition an Autonomous Subsystem?)S
231 72 :M
f1_12 sf
(Mark H. Bickhard)S
95 96 :M
1.065 .107(In standard approaches, cognition is assumed to be a distinct functional)J
95 108 :M
.661 .066(module from action and interaction, on the one hand, and motivation, on)J
95 120 :M
4.399 .44(the other hand. I argue that the apparent possibility of such)J
95 132 :M
.053 .005(modularization is itself a consequence of a false underlying presupposition)J
95 144 :M
3.194 .319(concerning the nature of representation. An alternative model of)J
95 156 :M
1.908 .191(representation is outlined, and it is shown that action and motivation)J
95 168 :M
2.05 .205(emerge naturally and necessarily as aspects of one single underlying)J
95 180 :M
(ontology of the interactive agent.)S
95 204 :M
(In standard views, representation consists of elements in correspondence with)S
59 216 :M
(what they represent. Only certain kinds of correspondences will do \321 not all)S
59 228 :M
(correspondences are representational \321 but correspondence is the basic category within)S
59 240 :M
(which representations are differentiated \(B. C. Smith, 1987\). The representational)S
59 252 :M
(elements are taken to encode that which they are in correspondence with. This)S
59 264 :M
(assumption regarding the nature of representation is held in common among those who)S
59 276 :M
(consider such encodings to be transduced \(Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981\) or innate \(Fodor,)S
59 288 :M
(1981\) or designed \(Newell, 1980\) or trained into a net \(Churchland, 1989\) \321 these)S
59 300 :M
(positions differ regarding the presumed )S
f2_12 sf
(origin)S
f1_12 sf
( of encoding correspondences, not)S
59 312 :M
(regarding their basic representational nature.)S
95 328 :M
(In such a view of representation, cognition is taken to consist of various stages of)S
59 340 :M
(the input and processing, and sometimes the output, of such encodings. The fundamental)S
59 352 :M
(backbone of cognition is assumed to be the sequence from perception to cognitive)S
59 364 :M
(processing to the re-encoding into utterances in some language.)S
95 380 :M
(This view lends itself to, if not forces, a strong modularization of models of the)S
59 392 :M
(mind. This modularization is )S
204 392 :M
f2_12 sf
(in addition)S
f1_12 sf
( to the potential modularizations within)S
59 404 :M
(cognition itself \(Fodor, 1983\). Cognition per se is seen as being organized around one or)S
59 416 :M
(more storage banks for encodings. Various processes enter data into such banks, process)S
59 428 :M
(the contents of such banks, and re-encode selected contents into utterances.)S
95 444 :M
(For any model of a real agent, with a real mind, additional modules are required.)S
59 456 :M
(Some subsystem is required to control action. Another subsystem interprets the cognitive)S
59 468 :M
(contents for their relevance to action. Another engages in the motivational selections of)S
59 480 :M
(actions to be performed, again informed by the cognitive contents. Still further)S
59 492 :M
(fragmentations of mentality are common, but I will focus in this paper on these three:)S
59 504 :M
(representation, action, and motivation.)S
95 520 :M
(In particular, I will argue that the standard view of representation as some kind of)S
59 532 :M
(correspondence, as an encoding, is wrong. I outline an alternative model of)S
59 544 :M
(representation that emerges naturally in agents, biological or designed, that actually)S
59 556 :M
(engage the world \(Beer, 1990, 1995, in press; Beer, Chiel, Stirling, 1990; Bickhard, 1980,)S
59 568 :M
(1993; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; Brooks, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Cherian & Troxell, in)S
59 580 :M
(press; Malcolm, Smithers, Hallam, 1989; Smithers, 1994\). One primary consequence of)S
59 592 :M
(this alternative model of representation \321 called interactivism \321 is that functions that)S
59 604 :M
(are standardly taken to reside in separate modules, such as representation, action, and)S
59 616 :M
(motivation, are inherently integrated as separate functional )S
f2_12 sf
(aspects)S
f1_12 sf
( of one single)S
59 628 :M
(underlying ontology. They are not inherently distinct modules. If standard models that)S
59 640 :M
(permit such modularization are in error, then so are such modularizations per se.)S
endp
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485 5 6 12 rC
485 14 :M
f1_12 sf
(2)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
59 50 :M
f0_12 sf
(Encoding Models of Representation.)S
95 66 :M
f1_12 sf
(Encoding models of the nature of representation are wrong. The deepest errors,)S
59 78 :M
(however, are not perspicuous, and attempting to locate them can lead to explorations of)S
59 90 :M
(endless mazes of blind alleys and fruitless pursuit of red herrings. The consequences are)S
59 102 :M
(fatal to any aspirations of understanding mental processes, and can be devastating even to)S
59 114 :M
(some strictly practical design goals in artificial intelligence \(Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\).)S
95 130 :M
(I will not be arguing that encodings do not exist. They clearly do: Morse code is a)S
59 142 :M
(paradigm example. What I do argue, however, is that encodings cannot be the basic)S
59 154 :M
(nature of representation. Genuine encodings must be derivative from some other, more)S
59 166 :M
(fundamental, form of representation. If the assumption is made that the fundamental)S
59 178 :M
(nature of representation is encodings \(Palmer, 1978; cf. Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\) \321)S
59 190 :M
(whether as an explicit assumption or a deeply buried implicit assumption \321 an)S
59 202 :M
(incoherence results.)S
95 218 :M
(There is a large family of corollary arguments showing the incoherence of)S
59 230 :M
(encodingism \321 of the assumption or presupposition that representation is encoding. I)S
59 242 :M
(will outline only a few.)S
95 258 :M
(External forms of representation, such as Morse code or a statue or a blueprint,)S
59 270 :M
(require interpretation and understanding. The dots and dashes of Morse code must be)S
59 282 :M
(understood and interpreted into characters; the statue must be understood as a statue, and)S
59 294 :M
(relevant resemblances noted and interpreted. This is unexceptional so long as the)S
59 306 :M
(requirement for such an interpreter is unproblematic.)S
95 322 :M
(When attempting to account for the inner representations of such an interpreter,)S
59 334 :M
(however \321 the inner mental representations of any real mind \321 presupposition of still)S
59 346 :M
(another interpreter is lethal. The assumption that internal representations are of the same)S
59 358 :M
(nature as external representations yields infamous regresses of interpretations requiring)S
59 370 :M
(interpretations which require further interpretations, and so on, with the corresponding)S
59 382 :M
(regress of interpretive homunculi to perform these feats. Whatever internal)S
59 394 :M
(representation is, it cannot be the same kind of thing as external representation \(Bickhard)S
59 406 :M
(& Terveen, 1995; Clancey, 1991\).)S
95 422 :M
(Considering Morse code in a different respect, we note that the dot and dash)S
59 434 :M
(patterns of the code are stand-ins for the characters that they encode. They stand-in for)S
59 446 :M
(those characters in the sense that we define them and use them and interpret them that)S
59 458 :M
(way. It is useful to do so because, for example, dots and dashes can be sent over)S
59 470 :M
(telegraph wires while characters cannot.)S
95 486 :M
(Such stand-in relationships are what constitute the Morse encodings as)S
59 498 :M
(representations at all. The dot and dash patterns borrow their representational content \321)S
59 510 :M
(the specification of what they represent \321 from what they stand-in for. \322Dot dot dot\323)S
59 522 :M
(represents the same thing as does \322s\323. Again, this is not problematic so long as there is)S
59 534 :M
(something to borrow representational content from.)S
95 550 :M
(But if we assume that all representations are encodings, are stand-ins, then we)S
59 562 :M
(encounter an incoherence. The stand-in relationship can be iterated. )S
393 562 :M
f0_12 sf
(X)S
402 562 :M
f1_12 sf
( can be defined in)S
59 574 :M
(terms of )S
102 574 :M
f0_12 sf
(Y,)S
114 574 :M
f1_12 sf
( which can be defined in terms of )S
f0_12 sf
(Z)S
f1_12 sf
(, but this iteration must be finite, so long)S
59 586 :M
(as we are considering finite systems. Therefore, there must be a bottom level \321 a level)S
59 598 :M
(of representations that do not stand-in for some other level.)S
95 614 :M
(If we assume that this level is constituted as encodings, however, we encounter)S
59 626 :M
(the incoherence. Consider some presumed element, say \322)S
f0_12 sf
(X)S
345 626 :M
f1_12 sf
(\323, of this presumed grounding)S
59 638 :M
(level of encodings. It cannot be defined in terms of any other representation by)S
59 650 :M
(assumption. The only alternative is to define it in terms of itself, but that yields)S
59 662 :M
(something like \322 \322)S
147 662 :M
f0_12 sf
(X)S
156 662 :M
f1_12 sf
(\323 represents )S
216 662 :M
f0_12 sf
(X)S
225 662 :M
f1_12 sf
S
260 662 :M
f0_12 sf
(X)S
269 662 :M
f1_12 sf
(\323 stands-in for \322)S
346 662 :M
f0_12 sf
(X)S
355 662 :M
f1_12 sf
(\323 \323. This does not succeed)S
59 674 :M
(in providing \322)S
f0_12 sf
(X)S
135 674 :M
f1_12 sf
(\323 with any representational content at all, and, therefore, does not succeed)S
59 686 :M
(in constituting \322)S
f0_12 sf
(X)S
145 686 :M
f1_12 sf
(\323 as a representation at all. But there are, by the encodingism)S
endp
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gS 0 0 552 730 rC
485 5 6 12 rC
485 14 :M
f1_12 sf
(3)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
59 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(assumption and the assumption that \322)S
239 50 :M
f0_12 sf
(X)S
248 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(\323 is an element of the grounding level of)S
59 62 :M
(encodings, no further resources available for making \322)S
f0_12 sf
(X)S
329 62 :M
f1_12 sf
(\323 an encoding. Encodingism)S
59 74 :M
(requires such a grounding level of encodings, so the encodingism assumption per se has)S
59 86 :M
(yielded an incoherence: it assumes a grounding level of encoding elements, which cannot)S
59 98 :M
(exist.)S
95 114 :M
(There are many other corollary arguments against encodingism \(Bickhard, 1993;)S
59 126 :M
(Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\), but I will not pursue them here. The incoherence argument)S
59 138 :M
(per se logically suffices to refute encodingism, but all I require for current purposes is a)S
59 150 :M
(prima facie case that encodingism has serious problems \321 all I require is a motivation)S
59 162 :M
(for considering an alternative model of representation.)S
95 178 :M
f2_12 sf
(Representation as Isomorphism)S
247 178 :M
f1_12 sf
(. There are not only many corollary arguments)S
59 190 :M
(against encodingism, which I will not pursue here, there are also many apparent)S
59 202 :M
(rejoinders to the general critique of encodingism. For similar reasons of space, I cannot)S
59 214 :M
(pursue most of those either \(see Bickhard, 1993; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\), but there is)S
59 226 :M
(one rejoinder that is inherent in one of the foundational frameworks for Artificial)S
59 238 :M
(Intelligence \321 specifically, the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis \321 that I will)S
59 250 :M
(address briefly.)S
95 266 :M
(Within the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis, symbols are defined in terms of)S
59 278 :M
(pointers \()S
105 278 :M
f2_12 sf
(access)S
f1_12 sf
(\) to some other entity in the system \(Newell, 1980; Bickhard & Terveen,)S
59 290 :M
(1995\). This a strictly functional notion, strictly internal to a machine, and, as such, is)S
59 302 :M
(unobjectionable. Problems emerge, however, when the attempt is made to extend the)S
59 314 :M
(model to representation \321 in particular, to representation of external entities. The)S
59 326 :M
(relationship between a symbol and what it is supposed to designate is fundamentally)S
59 338 :M
(different in this external case \321 to construe that relationship in terms of pointer access is)S
59 350 :M
(to presuppose what is to be explained. In particular, access is a primitive function built)S
59 362 :M
(into a machine, but it is not primitive in the relationships between machine and the world.)S
59 374 :M
(Representation )S
134 374 :M
f2_12 sf
(is)S
f1_12 sf
(, in some sense, epistemic access, so access cannot be simply)S
59 386 :M
(presupposed in a model of representation.)S
95 402 :M
(The alternative that is proposed is a relationship of the isomorphism of patterns:)S
59 414 :M
(patterns in the world are what is designated, and they are designated by patterns in the)S
59 426 :M
(system that are isomorphic to the designated external patterns \(Newell, 1980; Vera &)S
59 438 :M
(Simon, 1993\). This is a richer concept than simple correspondence, but it, nevertheless,)S
59 450 :M
(is still a version of encodingism, and is still logically unworkable.)S
95 466 :M
(Pattern isomorphy is still a version of correspondence \321 isomorphic, or)S
59 478 :M
(structural, correspondence as well as single point to point correspondence. As such, it is)S
59 490 :M
(subject to all of the problematics of encodingism:)S
95 508 :M
f3_12 sf
S
100 508 :M
( )S
100 508 :M
f1_12 sf
( There is nothing about the internal pattern that carries knowledge of the)S
104 520 :M
(fact of any such isomorphy, nor about what any such isomorphy might be)S
104 532 :M
(with. There is no representational content specifying what the isomorphy is)S
104 544 :M
(with \321 about the other end, the presumed represented end, of the)S
104 556 :M
(isomorphic relationship.)S
95 574 :M
f3_12 sf
S
100 574 :M
( )S
100 574 :M
f1_12 sf
( Isomorphy is multifarious: isomorphic correspondences can be defined)S
104 586 :M
(ubiquitously, with almost anything. Which of these is the)S
104 598 :M
(\322representational\323 isomorphy?)S
95 616 :M
f3_12 sf
S
100 616 :M
( )S
100 616 :M
f1_12 sf
( Isomorphy is transitively unbounded: any isomorphy with one pattern will)S
104 628 :M
(also constitute an isomorphy with patterns causally prior to that one \(as)S
104 640 :M
(well as noncausal accidental isomorphisms all over the universe\), and prior)S
104 652 :M
(again, and so on. Which of )S
239 652 :M
f2_12 sf
(these)S
264 652 :M
f1_12 sf
( is the \322representational\323 isomorphy?)S
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100 54 :M
( )S
100 54 :M
f1_12 sf
( Isomorphy is transitive, but representation is )S
323 54 :M
f2_12 sf
(not)S
f1_12 sf
( transitive: merely)S
104 66 :M
(knowing the label of a map will not permit you to travel in the mapped)S
104 78 :M
(territory \321 the label of the map does not represent the territory.)S
95 96 :M
f3_12 sf
S
100 96 :M
( )S
100 96 :M
f1_12 sf
( Isomorphy is symmetric, but representation is not symmetric: the table)S
104 108 :M
(does not represent your mental representation of the table.)S
95 126 :M
f3_12 sf
S
100 126 :M
( )S
100 126 :M
f1_12 sf
( If representation is constituted as isomorphy, then, if the isomorphy exists,)S
104 138 :M
(the representation exists, and it is correct. But if the isomorphy does not)S
104 150 :M
(exist, then the representation does not exist, )S
317 150 :M
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(and it cannot be incorrect)S
442 150 :M
f1_12 sf
(!)S
104 162 :M
(Correspondence models, including isomorphy models, cannot account for)S
104 174 :M
(representational error \(Dretske, 1988; Fodor, 1987, 1990; Loewer & Rey,)S
104 186 :M
(1991; Millikan, 1984; B. C. Smith, 1987\).)S
95 204 :M
f3_12 sf
S
100 204 :M
( )S
100 204 :M
f1_12 sf
( Still more deeply, correspondence models, including isomorphy models,)S
104 216 :M
(cannot account for the possibility of representational error \(error of such)S
104 228 :M
(correspondence\) that is )S
f2_12 sf
(detectable by the system itself)S
361 228 :M
f1_12 sf
(. But, without system)S
104 240 :M
(detectable representational error, representational learning, among other)S
104 252 :M
(error guided processes, is not possible \(Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\).)S
95 268 :M
(Isomorphy models of representation are versions of informational approaches to)S
59 280 :M
(representation, of the assumption that the representational relationship is a version of the)S
59 292 :M
(informational relationship \(Fodor, 1987, 1990; Loewer & Rey, 1991; Hanson, 1990; B.)S
59 304 :M
(C. Smith, 1987\). An informational relationship, in turn, is just one version of a)S
59 316 :M
(correspondence relationship. Informational approaches to representation are certainly the)S
59 328 :M
(dominant approaches today, but, if the arguments against encodingism are correct, they)S
59 340 :M
(are ultimately unworkable. It is clear that no one knows today how to make such an)S
59 352 :M
(approach work: \322we haven\325t got a ghost of a Naturalistic theory about [encoding]\323)S
59 364 :M
(\(Fodor, 1987b, p. 81\) \322The project of constructing a representational theory of the mind)S
59 376 :M
(is among the most interesting that empirical science has ever proposed. But I\325m afraid)S
59 388 :M
(we\325ve gone about it all wrong.\323 \(Fodor, 1994, p. 113\). The Physical Symbol System)S
59 400 :M
(Hypothesis, then, does not provide a solution to the problems of encodingism. More)S
59 412 :M
(generally, isomorphic correspondences are no improvement over correspondences per se)S
59 424 :M
(in attempting to model representation.)S
242 419 :M
f1_7 sf
(1)S
59 440 :M
f0_12 sf
(Interactivism.)S
95 456 :M
f1_12 sf
(For an agent interacting with its world, the ability to anticipate what interactions)S
59 468 :M
(might be possible next would be a useful resource \(Bickhard, 1993\). Anticipations would)S
59 480 :M
(permit the agent to select among those possibilities those that are most suited to its)S
59 492 :M
(current internal conditions, or to select those that are most to be avoided. Such)S
59 504 :M
(possibilities for further interaction will vary as the situation of the agent varies, so some)S
59 516 :M
(process for constructing and updating the anticipations would be required.)S
95 532 :M
(The critical property of such anticipations for my current purposes is that they)S
59 544 :M
(might be wrong, and might be discoverable to be wrong by the system itself: if the)S
59 556 :M
(system engages in an indicated possible interaction, and the interaction fails \321 fails to)S
59 568 :M
(proceed as indicated \321 then the anticipation was in error. Anticipations \321 indications of)S
59 580 :M
(possible interactions \321 can be false, and can be discovered to be false by the system.)S
59 592 :M
(Anticipations have truth values, for the system. Possessing truth values is at least one)S
59 604 :M
(fundamental property of representations.)S
59 638 :M
( )S
59 635.48 -.48 .48 203.48 635 .48 59 635 @a
59 647 :M
f1_6 sf
(1)S
62 651 :M
f1_10 sf
( I should point out that, although there are many important and useful properties of connectionist nets, the)S
59 663 :M
(trained correspondences that are supposed to constitute representations in standard connectionism are no)S
59 675 :M
(improvement over the designed or isomorphic correspondences that are supposed to constitute)S
59 687 :M
(representations in GOFAI \(Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\).)S
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(I argue that these primitive truth values are in fact foundational to all)S
59 62 :M
(representation. Indications of potential system interactions are the most primitive, the)S
59 74 :M
(foundational, form of representation, out of which all other representation is constructed.)S
95 90 :M
(There are many aspects and promissory notes involved in this claim. I will)S
59 102 :M
(address only two here:)S
95 118 :M
(1)S
101 118 :M
(.)S
104 118 :M
( )S
104 118 :M
( Can this notion of anticipation be explicated in purely functional terms?)S
95 134 :M
(2)S
101 134 :M
(.)S
104 134 :M
( )S
104 134 :M
( How could interactive anticipations account for such representations as)S
104 146 :M
(those of objects?)S
95 162 :M
(Examples of other issues that I will )S
f2_12 sf
(not)S
f1_12 sf
( address here include: How could this)S
59 174 :M
(notion of representation account for abstract representations, such as number? How)S
59 186 :M
(could such a model of representation account for perception, for language? How could it)S
59 198 :M
(be consistent with rational thought? And so on. These are all addressed elsewhere)S
59 210 :M
(\(Bickhard, 1980, 1993; Bickhard & Richie, 1983; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995: Hooker,)S
59 222 :M
(1995\). For my current purposes, I need only a prima facie plausibility of interactive)S
59 234 :M
(representation, not a demonstrated adequacy in all senses, because I am primarily aiming)S
59 246 :M
(at the implications of such an interactive model of representation for issues of modularity.)S
59 258 :M
(In particular, I will argue that, in the interactive model, issues of action and of motivation)S
59 270 :M
(as action selection are most fundamentally intrinsic aspects of anticipatory interactive)S
59 282 :M
(systems, not separate modules.)S
59 298 :M
f0_12 sf
(Functional Anticipations.)S
95 314 :M
f1_12 sf
(Rendering the necessary notion of anticipation in functional terms is not difficult:)S
59 326 :M
(pointers and subroutines suffice. In particular, a pointer to a subroutine can indicate the)S
59 338 :M
(potentiality of the interactions that would be engaged in by that subroutine, while further)S
59 350 :M
(pointers to internal outcomes should that subroutine be in fact executed constitute the)S
59 362 :M
(anticipations that are detectable by the system. If the system does engage that subroutine)S
59 374 :M
(and the internal outcome of the interaction is not one of those indicated, then the)S
59 386 :M
(indications have been falsified \321 and falsified for the system itself. There are other)S
59 398 :M
(architectural frameworks in which the requisite anticipations can be modeled \(Bickhard)S
59 410 :M
(& Terveen, 1995\), but demonstrating the adequacy of pointers and subroutines suffices to)S
59 422 :M
(demonstrate that no non-functional notions are necessary.)S
95 438 :M
(Interactive anticipation yields the possibility of system detectable error. System)S
59 450 :M
(detectable error, in turn, is necessary for error guided activities, such as goal directedness)S
59 462 :M
(or learning. System detectable error, then, is a necessity for any but the most simple and)S
59 474 :M
(primitive forms of life or artificial agents.)S
59 490 :M
f0_12 sf
(Representing Objects.)S
95 506 :M
f1_12 sf
(Primitive interactive anticipations have truth values, and, thus, constitute)S
59 518 :M
(primitive forms of representation. They implicitly predicate to the environment whatever)S
59 530 :M
(interactive properties would support the indications of internal outcomes \(Bickhard,)S
59 542 :M
(1993\). Such primitive representation, however, is appropriate primarily to simple)S
59 554 :M
(organisms and simple artificial agents. More complex agents involve more complex)S
59 566 :M
(representations, and that complexity must be accounted for.)S
95 582 :M
(There are two primary resources in the interactive model of representation that)S
59 594 :M
(permit it to model complex representations, such as objects. These resources are)S
59 606 :M
(conditional indications, and iterated indications.)S
95 622 :M
(All indications are conditional at least in the sense that they are evoked in certain)S
59 634 :M
(internal system conditions, and not in others. That is, they are conditional on particular)S
59 646 :M
(internal states of the system. In turn, interactions actually engaged in yield subsequent)S
59 658 :M
(internal conditions as the internal outcomes of those interactions. This yields the)S
59 670 :M
(possibility of iterated indications: interaction I)S
f1_7 sf
0 3 rm
(7)S
0 -3 rm
285 670 :M
f1_12 sf
( is possible given current system states)S
59 682 :M
(and will yield outcomes O)S
186 685 :M
f1_7 sf
(1)S
190 682 :M
f1_12 sf
(, O)S
205 685 :M
f1_7 sf
(2)S
209 682 :M
f1_12 sf
(, or O)S
237 685 :M
f1_7 sf
(3)S
241 682 :M
f1_12 sf
(, while, if O)S
299 685 :M
f1_7 sf
(1)S
303 682 :M
f1_12 sf
( is reached, then interactions I)S
447 685 :M
f1_7 sf
(1)S
451 685 :M
(0)S
455 682 :M
f1_12 sf
(, I)S
465 685 :M
f1_7 sf
(23)S
f1_12 sf
0 -3 rm
(, and)S
0 3 rm
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( will be possible, which would yield outcomes O)S
0 3 rm
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(, ... and so on. Indications can)S
0 3 rm
59 62 :M
(branch and iterate, forming potentially complex webs of indicated interactive potentiality.)S
95 78 :M
(One possibility for such webs is that they might close into loops and other)S
59 90 :M
(reciprocal indication relationships. A subweb might even exhibit the property of closure:)S
59 102 :M
(all states in the web are reachable from all other states via some class of interactions that)S
59 114 :M
(relate those states. With one additional property, I claim that we now have the necessary)S
59 126 :M
(resources for modeling simple object representation. That additional property is)S
59 138 :M
(invariance.)S
95 154 :M
(In particular, a typical object, say a child\325s toy block, offers many possible)S
59 166 :M
(interactions \321 visual scans from various perspectives, multiple manipulations, dropping,)S
59 178 :M
(chewing, and so on. Furthermore, every one of these possibilities indicates all the others,)S
59 190 :M
(perhaps with necessary intervening interactions \(for example, turning the object around to)S
59 202 :M
(create the possibility of the visual scan from that angle\). That is, the organization of the)S
59 214 :M
(possibilities is closed. Still further, that overall pattern of possibilities, together with its)S
59 226 :M
(closure, is invariant with respect to a large class of interactions. Clearly it is invariant)S
59 238 :M
(with respect to each interaction in the web itself, but the interactive pattern of the block,)S
59 250 :M
(for example, is also invariant under various throwings, locomotions of the infant, storing)S
59 262 :M
(in the toy chest, and so on. It is )S
f2_12 sf
(not)S
f1_12 sf
( invariant, however, under burning, crushing,)S
59 274 :M
(dissolving in acid, and so on.)S
95 290 :M
(Epistemically, objects just )S
f2_12 sf
(are)S
240 290 :M
f1_12 sf
( closed invariant patterns of physical interaction.)S
59 302 :M
(That\325s all they can be to infants and monkeys. Accounting for objects in terms of)S
59 314 :M
(theories about objects, in terms of earth, air, fire, and water, for example, or in terms of)S
59 326 :M
(atoms and molecules, is a much higher order accomplishment. Accounting for those)S
59 338 :M
(higher order possibilities requires, among other things, addressing the representation of)S
59 350 :M
(abstractions \321 something I will not undertake here.)S
95 366 :M
(The claim is that interactive representation is capable of accounting for)S
59 378 :M
(representations of physical objects, in the generally Piagetian manner just outlined)S
59 390 :M
(\(Piaget, 1954\). The concluding claims of this section, then, are that interactive)S
59 402 :M
(representation is renderable in strictly functional terms, and that it has at least a prima)S
59 414 :M
(facie initial plausibility of serving as an adequate approach to all representation.)S
59 430 :M
f0_12 sf
(Pragmatics and Representation.)S
95 446 :M
f1_12 sf
(Interactivism is a version of the general pragmatic approach to representation)S
59 458 :M
(\(Hookway, 1985; Houser & Kloesel, 1992; Rosenthal, 1983, 1990; Thayer, 1973\). Such)S
59 470 :M
(approaches share the assumption that representation is an emergent of action, and that)S
59 482 :M
(classical correspondence, or \322spectator\323, models of representation are inadequate \(J. E.)S
59 494 :M
(Smith, 1987\). Although pragmatism has to date had relatively little influence on studies)S
59 506 :M
(of cognition and artificial intelligence, there are exceptions. Most of these derive their)S
59 518 :M
(pragmatist influences from Jean Piaget \(influenced by James Baldwin, who, in turn, was)S
59 530 :M
(influenced by Peirce and James\). Interactivism shares a general pragmatism with such)S
59 542 :M
(approaches, and shares a more specific influence from Piaget. The differences,)S
59 554 :M
(consequently, are more subtle than they are with encoding models \321 all genuine)S
59 566 :M
(pragmatist approaches )S
170 566 :M
f2_12 sf
(share)S
197 566 :M
f1_12 sf
( a rejection of correspondence models of representation \(or)S
59 578 :M
(at least an attempted rejection. In a number of cases, I claim that the attempt to avoid)S
59 590 :M
(encodingist presuppositions has in fact not been fully successful\). Within Artificial)S
59 602 :M
(Intelligence, perhaps the best known of pragmatist approaches is the work of Drescher)S
59 614 :M
(\(1986, 1991\), so I turn now to a brief comparison between interactivism and Drescher\325s)S
59 626 :M
(model.)S
95 642 :M
f2_12 sf
(Drescher)S
140 642 :M
f1_12 sf
(. Drescher\325s model of representation is essentially that of Piaget. There)S
59 654 :M
(are strong commonalities between the interactive model and Piaget\325s model \(Bickhard &)S
59 666 :M
(Campbell, 1989\), and, therefore, there are strong commonalities between the interactive)S
59 678 :M
(model \(Bickhard, 1980, 1993; Bickhard & Richie, 1983; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\) and)S
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(Drescher\325s \(1986, 1991\). Most of these commonalities follow from the basic framework)S
59 62 :M
(of modeling representation as an emergent of action systems.)S
95 78 :M
(For example, if representation is construed as correspondence, there is a)S
59 90 :M
(temptation to think that the world could impress itself into a passive but receptive mind,)S
59 102 :M
(leaving behind representational correspondences. This is essentially Aristotle\325s model of)S
59 114 :M
(perception, and is still with us in the technologically more sophisticated, but logically no)S
59 126 :M
(better, notions of passive transduction and induction \(Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981; Bickhard)S
59 138 :M
(& Richie, 1983\). On the other hand, if representation is an emergent of action systems,)S
59 150 :M
(there is no such temptation to think that action systems \321 interactively competent control)S
59 162 :M
(structures \321 could possibly be impressed by the environment into a passive mind. If)S
59 174 :M
(representation is emergent out of action, then perception and learning and development)S
59 186 :M
(must all be active constructive processes \(Bickhard, 1992\). Furthermore, since such)S
59 198 :M
(knowledge constructions cannot be assured of being correct \321 if they could, then the)S
59 210 :M
(knowledge would already be present \321 they must be subject to being tried out and)S
59 222 :M
(eliminated if they fail. That is, an action framework for understanding representation)S
59 234 :M
(forces a variation and selection constructivism, an evolutionary epistemology \(D. T.)S
59 246 :M
(Campbell, 1974\).)S
95 262 :M
(For another example, consider again just what it is that is most fundamentally)S
59 274 :M
(being represented in an action based model. Representation is most fundamentally of)S
59 286 :M
(future potentialities for further action and interaction. Pragmatic representation is future)S
59 298 :M
(looking instead being backward looking down the stream of inputs coming into the)S
59 310 :M
(organism \321 pragmatic models are not models of a spectator looking into the past of that)S
59 322 :M
(input stream. In particular, pragmatic representation is intrinsically representation of)S
59 334 :M
f2_12 sf
(possibilities)S
f1_12 sf
(. Pragmatic representation is intrinsically )S
319 334 :M
f2_12 sf
(modal)S
349 334 :M
f1_12 sf
(. This is one of many)S
59 346 :M
(fundamental differences between pragmatic models and correspondence models)S
59 358 :M
(\(correspondence models, in fact, have in principle difficulties handling modal)S
59 370 :M
(representation\). It is worth noting that representation in children does not begin with)S
59 382 :M
(strictly \322actual\323 representation and then later add a layer of modality, as standard logic)S
59 394 :M
(and encoding frameworks would suggest. Instead, children begin with representation that)S
59 406 :M
(is intrinsically undifferentiated between various aspects of modality, and actuality,)S
59 418 :M
(possibility, and necessity must be progressively differentiated in development over the)S
59 430 :M
(course of some years \(Bickhard, 1988; Piaget, 1986, 1987\).)S
95 446 :M
(There are many more commonalities between interactivism and Piaget\325s genetic)S
59 458 :M
(epistemology, and, therefore, with Drescher\325s model \321 striking commonalities,)S
59 470 :M
(especially in the context of the contrary but dominant encoding orientations. There are)S
59 482 :M
(also, however, important differences \(Bickhard, 1992, 1988b; Bickhard & Campbell,)S
59 494 :M
(1989; Campbell & Bickhard, 1986\). Piaget\325s notion of representation is action based and)S
59 506 :M
(modal, but it is still subtly a correspondence model. For Piaget, concepts are structures of)S
59 518 :M
(potential actions that are isomorphic with structures of potentialities in the environment)S
59 530 :M
(\321 a kind of modal isomorphism of patterns \(Bickhard, 1988b; Bickhard & Campbell,)S
59 542 :M
(1989; Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Chapman, 1988\) \321 and Piaget\325s model of perception)S
59 554 :M
(is straightforwardly an encoding model \(Piaget, 1969\). This is action based, constructive,)S
59 566 :M
(and modal \321 all different from standard approaches \321 but it is still a correspondence)S
59 578 :M
(notion. There is still no way for those mental structures to pick out or to specify what)S
59 590 :M
(they are supposed to represent \321 to provide or constitute knowledge that they are in)S
59 602 :M
(isomorphism or what they are in isomorphism with. There is still no way for these)S
59 614 :M
(mental structures to avoid the problems of encodingism.)S
95 630 :M
(These problematics carry over into Drescher\325s model. His is similarly action)S
59 642 :M
(based, constructive, and modal. He recognizes the necessity of action feedback for the)S
59 654 :M
(construction of representation, for learning \321 in particular, pragmatic error feedback of)S
59 666 :M
(when an action does not work as anticipated. But he still construes representation itself)S
59 678 :M
(\321 that which is learned \321 in terms of correspondences between \322items\323 in the system)S
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(and conditions in the world \(cf. Dretske, 1988\). \322Drescher has recognized the importance)S
59 62 :M
(of pragmatic error for learning, but has not recognized the emergence of representational)S
59 74 :M
(error, thus representational content, out of pragmatic error. In the interactive model, in)S
59 86 :M
(contrast, representational error is )S
220 86 :M
f2_12 sf
(constituted)S
273 86 :M
f1_12 sf
( as a special kind of pragmatic error.\323)S
59 98 :M
(\(Bickhard & Terveen, 1995, p. 281\). Drescher\325s model is a momentous advance over)S
59 110 :M
(standard approaches in the literature of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. I)S
59 122 :M
(suggest, however, that there remain residual problems \321 problems that are avoided in the)S
59 134 :M
(interactive model.)S
95 150 :M
(In presenting and discussing the interactive model, I have presented brief but)S
59 162 :M
(focused contrastive discussions with the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis and with)S
59 174 :M
(Drescher\325s model. Clearly there are innumerable additional models and approaches that)S
59 186 :M
(could be examined, and deserve to be examined, such as Cyc, SOAR, PDP, machine)S
59 198 :M
(learning, autonomous agents, dynamic systems approaches, and so on, as well as further)S
59 210 :M
(cognitive issues that deserve attention, such perception, learning, language, rationality,)S
59 222 :M
(instantiations in the central nervous system, and so on. I cannot address these here, but)S
59 234 :M
(would suggest alternative sources to the interested reader \(Bickhard, 1991, 1995, in)S
59 246 :M
(preparation; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; Hooker, 1995\). I will turn now from the)S
59 258 :M
(interactive model of representation per se to one of its interesting consequences: an)S
59 270 :M
(inherent integration of issues of representation, action, and motivation.)S
59 286 :M
f0_12 sf
(Representation, Action, and Motivation.)S
95 302 :M
f1_12 sf
(Encoding representations represent in virtue of some correspondence between)S
59 314 :M
(them and that which they represent. Typically, those correspondences are assumed to be)S
59 326 :M
(constructed or invoked via some sort of processing of inputs \(Fodor, 1990; Newell,)S
59 338 :M
(1980\), but even that is not logically necessary: Representational correspondences are)S
59 350 :M
(intrinsically atemporal. In particular, encodings do not require any agent in order to)S
59 362 :M
(exist; they are not dependent on action \321 however much it may be that action is taken to)S
59 374 :M
(be dependent on \(interpreting\) them.)S
95 390 :M
(Interactive representation, in contrast, is an emergent of certain forms of)S
59 402 :M
(organization of an interactive agent. Interactive representation cannot exist in a passive)S
59 414 :M
(system \321 a system with no outputs. Interactive representation is the anticipatory, the)S
59 426 :M
(implicit predicational, aspect of interactive systems. Representation and interaction are)S
59 438 :M
(differing functional aspects of one underlying system organization similarly to the sense)S
59 450 :M
(in which a circle and a rectangle are differing visual aspects of one underlying cylinder.)S
59 462 :M
(Action and representation are not, and cannot be, distinct modules.)S
95 478 :M
(A similar point holds for motivation too, but to see this requires a brief digression)S
59 490 :M
(on motivation per se. Encoding representations are consistent with models of completely)S
59 502 :M
(passive systems; correspondingly, the typical assumption is that the default condition of)S
59 514 :M
(the system is inactivity. In such a view, the basic question of motivation is \322What makes)S
59 526 :M
(the system do something rather than nothing?\323 Motivation is a matter of pushing or)S
59 538 :M
(pulling the system out of its default inactivity.)S
95 554 :M
(Living systems, however, are not passive. They are constantly in activity of some)S
59 566 :M
(sort: to cease activity is to become dead. For living systems, then, the question of)S
59 578 :M
(motivation is mis-stated: instead of \322What makes the system do something rather than)S
59 590 :M
(nothing?\323 the proper question of motivation is \322What makes the system do this rather)S
59 602 :M
(than that?\323 That is, the question of motivation is a question of action and interaction)S
59 614 :M
f2_12 sf
(selection)S
102 614 :M
f1_12 sf
(, not of action and interaction activation or stimulation. The system is always)S
59 626 :M
(doing something, the question is what determines what it does \(Bickhard & Terveen,)S
59 638 :M
(1995\).)S
95 654 :M
(In this form, however, motivation becomes a functional matter \321 the function of)S
59 666 :M
(interaction selection. That function, in turn, is precisely what interaction indications are)S
59 678 :M
(useful for. Indicated interactions with their indicated potential internal outcomes form a)S
endp
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(primary resource for the system to select what interactions to engage in next. That is,)S
59 62 :M
(interactive indications and their associated internal outcomes not only implicitly predicate)S
59 74 :M
(interactive properties of the environment, they also serve the motivational function of)S
59 86 :M
(interaction selection. Motivation and representation are both aspects, along with)S
59 98 :M
(interactive competency per se, of one underlying ontology of interactive system)S
59 110 :M
(organization \(Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; Cherian & Troxell, 1995\).)S
95 126 :M
(In complex organisms, and other complex systems, it is possible for relatively)S
59 138 :M
(specialized and dedicated subsystems to develop that subserve complex functions of)S
59 150 :M
(representation or of motivation. But, if the interactive model is correct, such)S
59 162 :M
(specializations must arise out of, and on the foundation of, the basic interactive)S
59 174 :M
(competence, interactive representation, and interactive motivational selection aspects of)S
59 186 :M
(underlying interactive system organization. Certainly we do not find specialized such)S
59 198 :M
(subsystems in simple organisms, only in complex organisms.)S
59 214 :M
f0_12 sf
(Conclusions.)S
95 230 :M
f1_12 sf
(The three phenomena of action and interaction, representation, and motivation,)S
59 242 :M
(then, do not form separate functional modules that can simply be pasted together in a)S
59 254 :M
(more complicated system if a more complex design is desired, or if modeling those)S
59 266 :M
(additional complexities in a natural agent is desired. To the contrary, neither interaction)S
59 278 :M
(nor representation nor motivation can be correctly modeled without, at least implicitly,)S
59 290 :M
(modeling all three.)S
95 306 :M
(Conversely, if such modularization )S
267 306 :M
f2_12 sf
(is)S
f1_12 sf
( possible within some modeling approach,)S
59 318 :M
(then that approach is almost certainly assuming or presupposing an encodingism toward)S
59 330 :M
(representation. That is, if such modularization is possible in a modeling approach, then)S
59 342 :M
(that approach is almost certainly founded on a logical incoherence.)S
95 358 :M
(Cognition, then, is )S
187 358 :M
f2_12 sf
(not)S
f1_12 sf
( an autonomous subsystem \321 and any approach or)S
59 370 :M
(programme that permits cognition to seem autonomous is foundationally flawed. Such a)S
59 382 :M
(foundational incoherence, in turn, can have myriad and ramified pernicious consequences)S
59 394 :M
(throughout the programme or programmes involved \321 and programmatic errors can be)S
59 406 :M
(extremely difficult to diagnose and to avoid \(Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\). Nevertheless,)S
59 418 :M
(encodingism and its associated modularizations dominate contemporary artificial)S
59 430 :M
(intelligence and cognitive science. It will not be possible to understand or to design)S
59 442 :M
(beings with minds within such an approach \321 artificial intelligence and cognitive science)S
59 454 :M
(are dominated by programmatic assumptions that make their own highest level)S
59 466 :M
(programmatic aspirations impossible \(Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\).)S
59 490 :M
(Mark H. Bickhard)S
59 502 :M
(Department of Psychology)S
59 514 :M
(17 Memorial Drive East)S
59 526 :M
(Lehigh University)S
59 538 :M
(Bethlehem, PA 18015)S
59 550 :M
(mhb0@lehigh.edu)S
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(References)S
59 66 :M
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256 530 :M
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95 542 :M
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59 558 :M
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246 558 :M
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f2_12 sf
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95 62 :M
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f2_12 sf
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f1_12 sf
(, 139-196.)S
59 438 :M
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171 438 :M
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184 150 :M
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301 150 :M
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95 282 :M
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95 294 :M
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59 310 :M
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(\(1\), 7-48.)S
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end
%%EOF