Japan’s Army and Navy: 
Are they ready for the 21st Century?

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The Japanese Self-Defense Force is a capable military. It possesses a formidable array of weaponry, despite its diminutive size. The volunteer force is comprised of approximately 240,000 men and women and possesses some of the finest armament available in the world. However, with the end of the Cold War and the potential for Japanese involvement in international and regional peacekeeping efforts, the Self Defense Force (SDF) is under increasing scrutiny. Japan is uncertain of the SDF’s future missions. First, Japan must honestly examine how capable the SDF is currently. In assessing the qualities of the SDF, it is also necessary to inspect its operational environment and security outlook. What unique problems confront Japan and how is the SDF prepared to meet them? Moreover, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) must also be evaluated.

The SDF has a unique limitation. Clause 9 of the Japanese Constitution strictly forbids Japan having a military for anything other than defensive use, hence the name Self-Defense Force. General Douglas McArthur imposed this clause during the allied occupation following World War II. The purpose was to allay fears throughout the Pacific Rim about Japanese imperialism. Japan was quite brutal in several occupied territories and to this day, many countries have not forgotten the atrocities. These countries fear any resurgence in Japanese military might. At the same time, it is necessary for Japan to have a sufficient military to defend itself. If the SDF could not fulfil this task, a power vacuum would result, which could destabilize the region.
The GSDF and MSDF are integral to defending the homeland. Japan is an island without an abundance of natural resources. Therefore, the MSDF is essential in providing security for maritime trade and protecting the Japanese ports. Moreover, the current operational requirement for the MSDF calls for defense of sea routes critical to trade and national security. The “Suzuki Sea-Lane Doctrine” was first initiated in 1981, and used to politically defend an increase in defense spending.\(^1\) Defending sea-lanes instead of convoys requires a more powerful military. Furthermore, it must be a true sea-going navy versus a coastal defense navy.

The GSDF has a more ambiguous mission. It is obvious that a ground force is needed, but a definition of its mission is more difficult. This confusion has continually been a problem for the GSDF command structure. The usual definition is a ground force able to defend the homeland and protect Japanese nationals abroad, of which there are approximately 90,000. It is important to note that the SDF has a very large budget, approximately 45 billion dollars. While this is only one percent of Japan’s gross domestic product, it is a very large sum.\(^2\) Accordingly, all branches of the SDF have excellent equipment with which to carry out their mission objectives.

**General Security Outlook**

Japan faces a dangerous and fluid security environment. China, a close neighbor, is home to the largest military in the world. Russia, once one of the world’s pre-eminent powers, is crumbling and taking its still potent military with it. North Korea is unstable and another trouble spot for the region. While this may sound bleak, the true nature of the region’s security is shifting. Ten years from now the situation could be much worse
or relatively stable. It is difficult to predict the courses of countries with historic rivalries and ethnic tensions. Even more so when essential nations in the region are undergoing fundamental social, economic, and political transformations. However, there are several obvious factors to the security of the region. Undeniably, China is among them.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is an enormous force. Over 2 million strong, it is a dangerous adversary. However, throughout the Cold War it was not considered an overly large threat due to its outdated equipment and poor training. This is changing. China has pledged to reduce its force by 500,000. The premise is to reduce the size of the military and increase effectiveness. By spending less money on a better-equipped and trained force, China is learning to raise and field a modern, professional army. Concurrently, the Chinese command and control structure has improved. In the spring of 1997 the National Defense Law was passed. It is a legal framework for the military and party to interact. The law enables closer party control over the huge Chinese military. It also signals an increasing cohesion within the Chinese chain of command, which has a noticeable effect upon readiness.

The Chinese Navy is also improving by building ships that are more capable and training realistically. The Chinese Navy is attempting to develop deep-ocean capabilities that would greatly extend its military power. While it is no match for the United States Navy, it appears China learned a valuable lesson during the Taiwan Strait's Incident of March 1996. China, in an attempt to influence Taiwanese politics, rattled its naval saber and tested ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Straits.

Unfortunately for China, the US Navy had a substantial force in the area and was able to intimidate the Chinese with its Carrier Battle Group and numerous, virtually
undetectable, nuclear submarines (SSN’s). This incident galvanized the Chinese Navy, which pushed up orders for diesel and nuclear submarines and began examining existing designs for a naval aircraft platform. Both of these pose a serious threat to Japan. With a powerful and at times belligerent Chinese Navy, Japanese security could easily be threatened.

Another clear threat to the security of the East-Asian region is the Russian military. As the Russian economy collapsed, the military began a decay that shows no signs of ending. Soldiers went without pay and needed equipment maintenance and security was not provided. Russian internal politics are unstable, and therefore Russian foreign policy has suffered. Another danger is a return to a totalitarian Russian government, which would clearly effect Asia. Furthermore, high-technology weaponry was sold in an attempt to bring in hard currency to booster the economy. The booming economies of Asia quickly bought surplus weapons to solidify their militaries. As the Asian economy has fallen, countries with capable militaries are in economic and at times political turmoil. The de-stabilization of these countries could develop into war, whether civil or international. Japan, as the lead economy of the region, must keep a close watch on the Newly Industrialized Countries to prevent the outbreak of a localized conflict that could quickly spread to engulf the region.

The Japanese consider the Korean Peninsula the largest security threat. It has made several hostile actions against South Korea, as well as launching a test-missile over northern Japan in August 1998. With an impoverished population, strict control is kept with a large per-capita military. Moreover, the North Korean Navy is building coastal submarines at the rate of six per year. These submarines are a direct threat to South
Korea and to a lesser degree Japan. North Korea also is suspected of selling arms to
terrorist groups and developing nuclear arms. South Korea has responded by solving its
weapons procurement problems and building a new, modern class of frigates. Japan must
carefully monitor the volatile Korean Peninsula.

The most important partner in Japanese security is the United States of America. For over half a century, the United States has been vital to Japan’s international security. The US military is a stabilizing force in East Asia with its presence of 100,000 troops equipped with the most modern weaponry. Japan and the US have a unique relationship, which was recently reaffirmed. In September of 1997 the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation was released. The Guidelines upheld the history of US-Japanese cooperation and extended the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty. Under the 1960 agreement, the US only protected Japan; the new accord is more significant and allows for Japanese involvement with the US in regional actions vital to Japan’s security. The Guidelines will also be reevaluated every four years due to the volatility of the region.

The Maritime Self Defense Force: Powerful and Hi-tech

The Maritime Self-Defense Force is critical to Japanese security. Maritime trade is integral to the Japanese economy, and vulnerable to foreign aggression. The MSDF is tasked with maintaining the freedom of critical sea-lanes and defending the home islands. It is well suited for the task. Although the MSDF lacks power projection, due to constitutional restrictions, it is capable of fulfilling its mission. The essential components of the MSDF are its submarine force and AEGIS cruisers.
Japan has a modern submarine force capable of operating well in the waters surrounding the home islands. Conventional naval logic is that diesel-powered submarines are better suited for coastal operations and nuclear powered are ideal for the open ocean. Japan has embraced this and built a force of 16 diesel submarines. The primary advantages to diesel submarines are stealth and maneuverability. A diesel submarine can run for hours using its batteries as primary propulsion. This is extremely quiet and allows the submarine to maneuver aggressively tactically, despite the loss of speed.

The other primary benefit to a diesel submarine is its smaller size. The submarine’s short length allows it to comfortably go into the shallows. Nuclear submarines, with their larger size, have difficulty maneuvering and remaining quiet in the shallower waters. To further its submarine capability, Japan made operational in April 1998 the first of a new class. The Oyashio displaces 2,700 tons and has a length of 81.7 meters. While this may appear small when compared to the US Los Angeles class, which displaces 6,000 tons and is 109.7 meters long, the Oyashio is suited for the waters surrounding Japan.

Arguably, the most important class of ships in Japanese service is the Kongo. This class is a derivation of the US Arleigh Burke guided-missile destroyer class. The Kongo class is outfitted with the Aegis SPY-1D radar and tracking system. The Aegis system is the most advanced radar detection and tracking system in the world. It is able to track and target numerous targets and engage them with 56 SM-2 surface-to-air missiles. Moreover, the Kongo class has both Harpoon anti-ship missile and Tomahawk cruise missile capability.
For anti-submarine warfare, they are outfitted with bow, side, and towed sonar arrays. It has hangar space for one permanent helicopter capable of extended prosecution of submarine threats and a bow-mounted five-inch gun for ground support. The Kongo class is the centerpiece of the MSDF surface fleet. It is designed to be the command and control ship for a moderate size battle group. An example of the Kongo class’s capability: if one was stationed in the center of the South China Sea it could track targets as far away as either coast and prosecute with either its SM-2 SAM’s, Harpoon SSM’s, or its helicopter. The Kongo class covers all threat area’s, sub-surface, surface, and air.

Unfortunately, Japanese training operations are not realistic enough. The Japanese fleet stays too close to shore during training rotations. Superficially, this would seem in accordance with the MSDF’s mission of defense. However, if the fleet were needed to defend the home islands against attack it would not begin close to shore. A more realistic scenario is an engagement farther out to sea as the fleet attempts to defeat an enemy fleet before it could support any airborne assault or the enemy fleet could launch against Japanese territory. In any case, the MSDF would most likely be operating with the US Navy against a naval threat. For that mission it is also unprepared, as was demonstrated by an embarrassing incident May 28, 1996.

While training with the US Navy a Japanese destroyer accidentally downed a US A-6 Prowler aircraft. The Prowler was dragging a target when the destroyer’s Phalanx close-in weapons system engaged the aircraft. Luckily, both aviators were able to eject safely but the incident demonstrates a problem within the MSDF and perhaps the whole SDF. While it is equipped with the best equipment and the sailors are professional, the training is not realistic enough. The constitutional restrictions prohibit any offensive
capability, but they also inhibit training that would prove invaluable if Japan were pulled into a large-scale conflict against the Japanese islands.

A recent development may demonstrate a movement away from a strict interpretation of Clause 9. The Japanese Navy recently commissioned its first Landing-Ship (Dock)/Landing-Ship (Tank) (LSD/LST) and has begun construction of a second.\textsuperscript{11} This type of ship is designed for amphibious warfare. It is used to put troops ashore unfriendly territory through smaller amphibious troop carriers and is an offensively capable ship. The LSD/LST can also be converted easily to a flat-top vessel. This would give Japan the ability to launch combat helicopters and some aircraft off an enemy’s shore.

Although, one or two LSD/LST’s are not a strong weapon, they are indicative of the trend in Japan’s Defense Agency towards more lattoral capability. The lattoral is the ocean directly offshore and extends to approximately 100 miles inland. This is the area where amphibious operations occur and is the extent a maritime ground force, such as the US marines, can control with support from the fleet. Rumors of a possible Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft for the MSDF are another sign that the JDA is thinking more of power projection.

Under the current MSDF operational doctrine sea-lane protection is favored over convoy duty. As was seen in World War II, convoy protection is less costly in ships and is better suited for protection of merchant traffic, unless nearly absolute sea domination is assured. The validation for this mission statement is it supports the large MSDF fleet. In order to control large sea-lanes the Japanese Navy needs the Aegis destroyers as well as a
large, capable submarine fleet. However, against an increasingly powerful Chinese Navy the MSDF must also expand its force or adopt a more realistic doctrine.

Another example of the MSDF’s increasing international role is its participation in the Persian Gulf. After the war was over the Japanese sent over a flotilla of minesweepers for port security. Even this small demonstration resulted in public outcry. Regardless the MSDF minesweepers were used successfully and without incident by the Allies to maintain port security. Japan also contributed close to thirteen billion dollars to the Allied Coalition. This was met with some international disdain. The critics abroad claimed that Japan let the other countries pay the price in blood, then comes in after the action to pay a part of the bill. However, at home many citizens were unhappy with the situation, claiming it violated the Japanese constitution. It seems that Japan will face criticism regardless of its actions.

The Japanese Army:
Bark or Bite?

The Ground Self Defense Force is comprised of 148,000 soldiers with a further 46,000 in reserve. It is divided into five regional commands, with a total of twelve infantry divisions and one armored division. The GSDF can field 1,110 main battle tanks (MBT), 820 field artillery pieces, 730 armored vehicles, 130 anti-aircraft guns, and 90 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). While this may appear to be a large force, it is of moderate size. Of the 1,110 MBTs, many are older M-60s of limited capability on the modern battlefield. The important question is how large a ground force is needed to defend the home islands?
It is also a difficult question to answer. Assuming the SDF faced a modest opponent, with a decisive strategy, the MDSF and US forces stationed in the theater could be victorious. However, against a large, aggressive force such as China neither Japan nor the US could hope to win with the forces in East Asia. This type of conflict would almost certainly become expanded to include all US forces so again the tide would turn. The Japanese have considered this situation and wisely maintained their close alliance with the US. The JDA fully realizes that without US support and cooperation, Japan would be vulnerable.

The final factor in determining the size of Japan’s SDF has a doctrine to maintain basic defensive capabilities while not forming a power vacuum. Japan has successfully, in part due to US aid, sustained an army small enough not to provoke its still distrustful neighbors, yet large enough as to not destabilize the region. This was, and continues to be, a difficult task. The factor that enabled Japan to do so was the US. Japan knew that the US ground forces stationed throughout Asia would come to its aid if necessary. Moreover, the US has a formidable sealift capability to move troops in during times of trouble.

Regardless, Japan began to alter the SDF and the GSDF in particular, with the end of the Cold War. Without one clearly visible threat, Japan had trouble validation its large GSDF budget. In response to the changing security situation, it cut back troop strength from 180,000 to the current level and increased it ready-reserve force. The GSDF has also made an effort to replace quantity with quality. It feels that with better-trained and equipped troops a smaller force could accomplish the same mission. This is the same doctrine adopted by China. To achieve a more highly trained force Japan has begun
training with the US Army in earnest. For only the second time in 50 years Japanese forces conducted live fire training in the continental United States. In 1995, the GSDF conducted exercises at the US Army’s Yakima Training Center.\footnote{15}

There has also been discussion in reorganizing the GSDF from twelve divisions and two brigades to eight divisions and six brigades. The reorganization would allow for a more centralized force. Moreover, if Japan detached a United Nations Peacekeeping Force it would be better able to respond to the potential gap in manpower. It is easier for one command to shift forces than to reposition forces between two autonomous commands. The potential alteration would also serve streamline the command and control structure. By reducing the ‘organizational pyramid’, communication efficiency is increased, up and down the chain of command.

The likelihood of Japan’s involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, via the GSDF has also increased. In the Persian Gulf War, Japan pledged money and detached a flotilla of minesweepers after the conclusion of the fighting. However, in 1993 Japan sent over a contingent of the GSDF to Cambodia as part of a UN mission. Although the majority was not combat troops, it showed Japan’s willingness to become more involved with UN efforts. The forces dispatched were involved in many aspects of the UN mission. Moreover, Japan contributed a significant portion of the $2.5 billion used for rehabilitation aid in Cambodia.\footnote{16}

Another recent problem for the GSDF has been in recruiting. During the recent force reductions, few soldiers were made redundant. Instead recruiting problems assured that there were fewer soldiers in the pipeline for service. The GSDF recruiting problem is largely cultural. As Japanese youth become more westernized, military service has
become disdained. Another issue is the cultural stigma against violence. This has lead to few young people choosing the military as a career path. One possible solution of the GSDF is improved public relations. It is important the SDF act more proactively about this issue because the Japanese people’s perception of the SDF will become more important in the years to come.

The Future of the Self-Defense Force

Japan’s defense budget has recently begun to decrease. This is the first decrease since the end of World War II. While Japan spends a small percentage of its gross domestic product, this still amounts to a large sum. Currently, Japan spends just under 1% of its GDP, which amounts to $43,626,000,000. The recent decrease is in response to the change in post-Cold War Asia as well as internal economic problems. No one threat validates a large budget. Therefore, Japan has begun a program of cutbacks in spending. The goal is to decrease the size of the SDF, at the same time increase readiness. This will be difficult, as the US military has learned.

It is easy to let the budget slide too low, resulting in a decrease in capability. Unfortunately, the budget to readiness curve is not linear but exponential. The military and Japanese security could be severely impaired if the budget is decreased too far. Japan must make small decreases in the budget and allow the effects to become visible. A rapid decrease, without maintaining the necessary effectiveness, could result in the power vacuum Japan and the US were able to avoid for 50 years. Another of the SDF’s goals for the near future is to increase mobility.
Through reorganization of the GSDF and an increase in the sealift and lattoral capability of the MSDF, the JDA wishes to make the Japanese military regional. Mobility is one of the most important aspects of any modern military. Japan, due to constitutional restrictions and public opinion, has not developed this quality. The acquisition of mobility would enable the SDF to participate more fully in UN operations. It would also allow Japan to protect national security more competently. Any threat to the Japan must be reacted to swiftly due to the scale of the theater. However, increased mobility could well heighten tensions among Japan’s neighbors.

China and Russia are wary of a powerful and mobile Japanese SDF. Both countries have long standing animosities with Japan dating back to World War II. Russia and Japan are still in contention over the Northern Territories. Japan feels that the island chain is Japanese territory. Russia, currently occupying the islands, disagrees. Moreover, Russia feels that a powerful Japanese military would alter the balance of power in Asia. China agrees that Japan should not increase its military. One reason is the history of Japanese war atrocities committed against the Chinese during World War II. The Japanese soldiers were extremely brutal and Japan has been phenomenally slow in apologizing or making reparations to its victims. Another reason is the Republic of China. China feels that Taiwan is a rogue province. It plans to reacquire power there regardless of international feelings. Therefore, it fears that a more powerful Japanese military could interfere with this process. Finally, China is asserting its international power and does not wish to compete for supremacy in Asia.

Another consideration in Japanese policy to increase readiness, become more internationally involved, and increase mobility is the US. The current security agreement
between the US and Japan calls for close cooperation in defense of territorial Japan. It also calls for increased participation by Japan in US military actions within the theater. This would most be in the form of support, both operational and logistical. While the US has not publicly stated it opposes a more powerful SDF, within the administration these are some misgivings. This is primarily due to Japan’s historical legacy and fears of altering the security dynamics in Asia. However, a stronger SDF would meet with some praise. It would allow a further decrease in the US defense budget and a redistribution of US forces.

A Dangerous Road Ahead

Japan faces several obstacles if it makes an effort to modernize and diversify the MSDF and GSDF. Perhaps the largest obstacle is internal. Much of the Japanese public has a severe aversion to a capable and mobile SDF. Many Japanese are dedicated pacifists and believe that the constitution should be strictly interpreted. Due to World War II experiences, they believe Japan should not leave the moral high ground and become physically involved in military actions. Some Japanese, particularly the Okinawans, are also unhappy about the continued American presence. Japan’s political leadership must educate the public if it wishes to expand the SDF. The Japanese population should be taught the necessity of Japan’s increased role in Asian and international affairs. It must also be educated about the integral nature of UN peacekeeping missions to an increase in Japanese international prestige.

Another group that must be appeased is the other Asian countries. Many harbor deep suspicions about a rejuvenated SDF due to ethnic tensions or historical animosity.
These countries must be assured that Japan has no imperial ambitions and simply wishes the continued stability and prosperity of the region. If Japan fails to do this, it will anger and potentially alienate many of the important countries in Asia. Japan can ill afford to do this, especially with the current economic downturn and the increased activity in the region by China.

Assuming Japan is able to win support at home for a more offensively capable SDF it will face another difficult task. This is to increase effectiveness and mobility with a smaller force. The common post-Cold War mistake is to downsize militaries too far and quickly, so readiness is severely affected. Japan is in an extremely volatile region. The fluidity of Asian international affairs means that Japan could be caught with a less capable military by a crisis. Although the US can be counted on for aid, Japan should be wary as it downsizes its force and increases offensive capability.

Regardless, of the potential dangers, Japan should develop its SDF into a more capable force. It should also make every effort to develop the MSDF and GSDF into forces capable of participating in UN missions while also protecting Japanese interests throughout Asia. As the 21st Century approaches, Japan should become more involved in Asian security. It is undoubtedly a superpower economically; it is past time that Japan assumes at least part of the security responsibilities inherent to that role.
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