Russia and Japan:

Sound Partnership or Silent Enmity?

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Introduction.

Russia and Japan – two superpowers, two major players in the global political game, two countries of great strength and influence. Was it always the case that silent enmity rather than sound partnership dominated the relationship between the two? Will two countries ever find a common basis for alliance so needed, but sometimes not so much wanted, in the countries facing the consequences of the myths and realities of Asian financial crisis – the contagion of the twentieth century.

Whether Japan will recover from its “economic sickness” remains a rhetoric question. Whether Russia with its natural resource base and “still-untapped reserves of ecologically clean natural gas [besides other natural resources] in East Siberia”¹ will be the moving force for Japan and for itself from the rock bottom of current financial and economic crisis is still a question to be answered by Russian and Japanese policymakers. So far, a number of steps toward Russo-Japanese rapprochement have been taken. Both countries are desperate in their attempts to experience the benefits of political accord that would imply stimulation of trade volumes and benefits from each country’s comparative advantage. As a result, one could notice a rapid materialization of often, although sometimes questionably effective, meetings between Russia’s and Japan’s heads of the governments.

In “unhealthy” world of economic uncertainty and financial instability, if based on intentions to build a long gone surface for the common play field for Russia and Japan, these actions are the only pertinent “cure” to be used right now. It may seem that nothing during meetings of Yeltsin and Hashimoto is ever “done right” because none of the questions are ever discussed beyond mere exchange of opinions. This illusion, however, disappears as soon as one
recalls the seventy years of more or less hostile political and diplomatic relations between two countries, and realizes that successful diplomacy often happens in small increments.

Despite the potential criticisms of this view, Russia and Japan did show historically that there exists a way (not necessarily a peaceful one) of dealing with challenges facing these countries in their relations. By showing mutual respect and high degree of flexibility, they are capable of cooperating effectively and reaching agreements that could be deemed beneficial for each country. Past cooperation has proven to effectively stimulate substantial growth and development of two superpowers. Despite the political and economic turmoil that Japan and Russia experience today (certainly Russia does to a bigger extent), sooner or later, the peace agreement, leading to increased economic cooperation, will be reached. Both countries will be able to get out of their current economic downturn, although the question of solving “Kuriles quarrel”\(^2\) will play a major role in hindering or helping future effective cooperation.

Long gone are the times when Russians thought of themselves as of people who possess financial and economic independence and stability. The Japanese, as a result of political and economical uncertainty in their country, started to question some of the long-lived dogmas about their own financial and economic wellness as well. It is doubtful that any country today can be confidently regarded as the one that is still guaranteed a prominent place in the global economic and financial arena. In the majority of countries worldwide, including Russia and Japan, while playing the game called Asian crisis, leaders and policymakers made stakes that have gone too high, especially now, when the nations’ economic health is at risk. Therefore, the only way out for Russia and Japan, which seems to be comparatively easy to plan and implement for both countries right now, is to find a compromise, thus creating an island, a secure place, in the midst of the global economic sea of uncertainty and insecurity.
History and Background

The first contacts between Russians and Japanese occurred in the late 17th century; in the mid-19th century, Russia, along with the United States, was one of the Western nations to press Japan to open its ports to foreign trade. Tradition holds that first official contact between Russia and Japan occurred in 1697 when Russian explorer Vladimir Atlasov met Dembei, a Japanese citizen whose ship cast ashore at Kamchatka peninsula. During 18th century, Russian explorers and merchants attempted to conduct trade with Japan. However, because of Japan’s policy of national seclusion, trade was to be conducted at Nagasaki only.

Catherine the Great, Alexander I, and Nicolas I tried to establish the official relations with Japan. These attempts were concluded by Russo-Japanese treaty of Amity signed in 1855. Russo-Japanese relations following the 1868 Meiji Restoration were generally amicable. At that time Russia and Japan competed – and occasionally cooperated – in their efforts to establish influence in northern Asia.

The Boxer rebellion of 1900 in China forced Russia deeper in Manchuria, later resulting in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Japanese launched a surprise attack on the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur in 1904. In May 1905 Japanese also sank Russian Baltic Fleet that sailed all the way around Africa. This event signified the end of Russo-Japanese War.

Russia became republic of Soviet Union following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union were influenced by many factors. The most often mentioned ones are foreign policies and ideology of the USSR, as well as pre-World War II both countries’ “competing colonial ambitions.” After 1945 Russo-Japanese relations were “locked in the confrontation between the Communist block and the West.” Tensions regarding former Japan’s territories occupied by Soviet Union appeared to be improving by the end of 1980, but
with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the establishment of the Russian Federation, 
Russo-Japanese relations entered a new era.  

Did You Say Kuril Islands?  

According to the article that appeared in *Asiaweek*, the “Kuriles quarrel” goes back to the 
end of World War II, when the Soviet troops occupied the four islands north of Hokkaido, which 
had been Japan’s territory since 1875. Stalin had been promised them if he declared war against 
Japan. But the dispute’s most recent development dates back only to 1997 – to the meeting 
between prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Krasnoyarsk, 
Russia. Hashimoto had challenged the Russians to sign a peace treaty, formally ending World 
War II. The pact would also set a new boundary north of the Kurile island Etorofu by 2000. 
During the meeting the Japanese claimed that a compromise was finally reached. Russia would 
acknowledge sovereignty of the four islands while continuing to administer them. Also a formula 
would have to be found to share the rich fishery resources.  

In 1998, Yeltsin gave Obuchi a response to the Hashimoto’s earlier initiative. Some 
analysts expressed an idea that the only thing achieved by this response is it just “kept the 
negotiating process moving.” Nevertheless, Yeltsin confirmed his willingness to conclude a 
peace treaty by 2000, and therefore the Japanese had to “sweeten things by extending an $800-
million loan and providing extra assistance” to Russia.  

Some analysts, however, question the fact that two heads of governments were capable of 
implementing the agreement, even if they had come to one, because at the time of the meeting 
only “in his dreams, Boris Yeltsin believes he is president of Russia. Similarly, Ryutaro 
Hashimoto likes to imagine he is the actual leader of Japan.” The author goes on to say that just
because the two “fantasts” got together in 1998 near Tokyo, for a “weekend of mutual make-believe” does not automatically imply that any substantial questions were resolved.10

Yet another expert supports this claim by mentioning that the Russian president, “weakened physically and politically,” is not in any position to give any kind of political or territorial concessions – or magically make them pass in the Duma.11 How useful, then, are Japan’s talks with Yeltsin? It is not clear what Japanese policymakers expect from a person who “is still planning to visit Japan this summer despite postponing a trip to France to due ill-health.”12 There could be no next meeting with Yeltsin! And what we see as a response of Japanese officials:

A Japanese embassy official meanwhile told … that the Russian side had not informed Tokyo of any change of Yeltsin’s tentative plan to visit Japan, following his hospitalization on Sunday with a bleeding stomach ulcer.13

However, nobody disputes the fact that Yeltsin can win some time by his actions, while Russia, experiencing the harsh reality of economic difficulties, will be eager to welcome all the economic and financial aid it can get from Japan.

Although Yeltsin can continue to muse about huge investments in Russia in return for the four northern islands along with possibilities of signing the peace agreement, there is one thing that remains untouched during endless meetings and summits between Russian and Japanese leaders. First of all, large-scale investments will not be easily implemented, given the state of the investment environment in Russia. Second, Japanese companies capable of heavily investing in Russian economy (oil or gas exploration and fisheries development companies, for example), as well as Japan’s government itself, are close to bankruptcy because of the heavy consequences of the Asian financial and economic crisis. As for the question of territory dispute and concessions:

Mr. Hashimoto …. floated the idea of creating a borderline showing the islands as Japanese, as a step towards a peace treaty in 2000. “Interesting,” said Mr. Yeltsin enigmatically. In reality, neither man is likely to sign that document. Mr. Yeltsin’s
circulatory system may let him down before his term of office ends in 2000. Mr. Hashimoto’s end could come much sooner even before, say some, Japan’s upperhouse election in July …. There’s no harm in hoping.  

Whether the author of this statement is right in predicting what is going to happen to the countries’ leaders is not clear. It is up to Obuchi, though, to face the challenges of Russo-Japanese border dispute now.

Recent Developments and Possible Outcomes

It seems that with Obuchi’s arrival in the office, Japanese started to realize that, the eventual return of their lost territories would provide benefits as practical as they are symbolic. Moreover, because there exists a “gap between the two countries” in their beliefs about the exact meaning of the possible agreement, it will not be achieved without grotesque efforts on part of each country:

… most Russians believe a peace treaty and the territorial issue can be handled separately. Egor Semenovich Stroev, Speaker of the Russian Upper House, said: “For the first time in our history, we have been able to get away from the territorial dispute.” Says former vice-prime minister Aleksandr Nikolaevich Shokhin: “I do not think that Yeltsin’s declaration of our intent to sign a peace treaty by the year 2000 means we have agreed to return the four islands to Japan. The two issues can be considered separately, and I believe we will be able to continue talks about the territorial dispute after a peace treaty is signed.”

“Cold pizza can be reheated,” is the response that Mr. Obuchi had when New York Times called him “cold pizza.” He seems to have used all the power and abilities to prove American journalists wrong. However, in terms of foreign relations with Russia, Obuchi still faces a harder task because, as senior foreign ministry official said, “We just can’t predict what’s going to happen in Moscow … regarding Yeltsin’s health problems and domestic political wrangling.”

Despite all the difficulties that both countries will face with the issue of border dispute, the common ground, and therefore a compromise, will be eventually found. The so called “2000” approach to the problem of Northern Territories is a “powerful concentrator of minds,” according
to one of the experts in the field. It can set up a completely new relationship between Japan and Russia. It is the best way to start a new millennium “by putting behind five decades of mistrust [and] to forge a fresh relationship.”

Russian Current Worries

One of the latest issues that was raised within the context of Russo-Japanese relationship was recently reflected in the statement by officials that Russia would regard the inclusion of Russian territories within the scope of the Japanese-U.S. defense agreement as inadmissible. This issue, if not timely faced, might raise a wider range of security-related questions leading to a slowdown of Russo-Japanese bilateral dynamics.

Russian Foreign Ministry announced its opinion on proposed amendments to the 1960 Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty, which explicitly states that “Japan would provide logistic support to U.S. military operations not only in the case of aggression against Japan but also in the event of emergency situations arising in unspecified areas adjacent to Japan.” The issues raised by Russian officials included Russia’s willingness to know “how far away these adjacent areas are, whether they include territories of third countries, Russia in particular, and in what way a given situation can be defined as emergency.”

Trade

Since 1987, interestingly enough, the volume of trade between Russia and Japan was constantly falling. One of the explanations commonly sited is the consequence of the Asian financial crisis in both countries, as well as tense diplomatic relationship persisting because of the Northern Territories dispute. This fact is illustrated in the next graph. However, a widely accepted fact that Japanese economic and trade interests have always been and most probably
will always be above any political misunderstandings makes interpretation of trade statistics a lot more complex.

The types of goods and products that are being exported from and imported to Japan by Russia follow the major trend of Japanese trade patterns with any other resource-rich developing country. Russia's main imports from Japan include general and precision machinery, light-industry goods, automobiles, telecommunication equipment as well as other technologically advanced and high value-added products.

Imports to Japan from Russia mostly include raw materials and natural resources, with a minor exception of steel products. Fish and sea products represent a major part of Russo-Japanese trade balance.

As a result of the great importance of “fishy” business to both countries, Japanese and Russian leaders concluded the round of negotiations aimed at
establishing a framework of the 12 nautical mile zone around the Northern Territories that would allow Japanese fishing vessels to operate safely in these waters.20

Another issue of importance is the comparison of trade dynamics Japan exhibits with Russia, and Central and Eastern Europe. As seen from the next figure, Japan’s exports from Central and Eastern Europe grew faster from 1997 until 1998, while imports from Japan to both regions decreased almost at the same rate. However, because of the difference in the volumes of trade, trade balance with Central and Eastern Europe decreased faster than that with Russia. This reasoning leads to the conclusion that the Japanese companies tend to be more eager to conduct trade with Central Europe and countries of former Soviet Union excluding Russia rather than with Russia itself.

A good illustration of the reasoning brought up in the previous paragraph is an issue that came up as a surprise in the news headlines this year. Four Japanese oil developers signed an agreement with the State Oil Corporation of the Azerbaijan Republic to jointly develop offshore oil fields in the Caspian Sea. The four – Japan Petroleum Exploration, Indonesia Petroleum, Itochu Corporation and Teikoku Oil Corporation – recently signed an agreement at a ceremony
in Baku. According to Japan Petroleum Exploration officials, exploration reserves in the contract area – an offshore field of 510 square meters – are estimated to be hundreds of millions of barrels. This is the first time for Japanese petroleum developers to conduct oil exploration in the Caspian Sea without an alliance with neither Russian nor international oil players. 

Because of the great need in Japan to diversify the sources of the crude oil and reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern oil, this move to establish commerce based relationship with a Former Soviet Union country made by Japanese exploration companies was welcomed at the official level.

**Investment**

Recently a rather amusing article appeared in *Fortune* magazine. The main topic of it is not Russia or Japan, although both are mentioned as a source of possible investment income. A “bear,” wrote the author has to put his money somewhere. A “bear” is a word customarily used in financial and investment markets to describe an investment broker who speculates, and, obviously enough, makes profits, on falling prices by selling futures and forward contracts.

The surprising thing is where [to put the money]: The old-time value investors … went way out on a limb by touting natural resource, Japanese, and even Russian stocks. … If prospects for Japan are questionable, the outlook for Russia is downright *apocalyptic*: hyperinflation, economic collapse, and the end of communism, says money manager Harvey Sawikin. But Sawikin believes this scenario will offer a brief buying opportunity – he didn’t predict when it would occur–before the country rebounds, enabling investors to walk away with ten times their money. Accordingly, his Firebird New Russia fund is already 50% invested. When the bottom comes, Sawikin figures he won’t be able to get in fast enough. Not with all the bears fighting for a spot.

If somebody is seriously trying to invest in a country because of the “bearish” expectations – chances are that country is in bad, very bad, economic and financial position. Of the two countries, Russia seems to be more affected by its current economic crisis. It is highly doubtful
that a country that effectively devalues its currency by about 34% in a matter of days would ever earn positive investment expectations and favorable credit ratings back.

Moreover since Russian banks are ready to default or go bankrupt at the first available circumstance, and since they are generally regarded as “checkbooks” for a new class of oligarchs, just a few Western businessmen would ever dare to invest in Russian economy. According to *Time* magazine, however, in order to avoid economic and political vacuum, West admits that fixing Russia remains a priority. However, because of the reasons mentioned above, no one from global economic community has any plans to put any money into Russia. “Any money you throw in now will go immediately into Swiss banks,” but West does hope eventually to bring Russia to the point “where aid will again be an option.”

Therefore it looks like any type of investment in cash stripped Russian economy, neither for Japan, nor for the rest of the world, is a viable option. It seems that everybody started to understand that Japan itself got in a very serious trouble now. Moody’s Investors Service “turned thumbs down” on Japan’s spending plans in November in Tokyo when it “stripped” the nation of its triple-A credit ratings for government debt and foreign-currency obligations. Noting that Japan’s stimulus spending of the 1990s has not led to a sustained recovery, the rating agency cited “significant deterioration” in the government’s fiscal position as a leading reason for the downgrade. Moody’s said its outlook for Japan remains negative. Therefore, the short-term investment outlook for Japan will remain negative … well, up until the time when Japan’s government shows some real steps towards stimulation of its economy.

The Issue of Primorskiy Kray

“I stopped at Vladivostok. About our Primoriye Region and our [Russian] east coast, with its fleet, its problems and its dreams of the Pacific I shall say but one thing: it’s all appalling poverty! Poverty, ignorance and paltriness, such as can drive one to despair. One honest man to ninety-nine thieves who desecrate the name of Russia.”
This is what a famous Russian writer had to say in 1890 about Primorskiy Kray. The images did not really change over time except that, as one author observes, Vladivostok, in short, is to modern-day Russia what Chicago was to the U.S. during the Roaring 20’s minus the economic prosperity.  

There is a lot to say about the problems of Primoriye… There is no need, however, to write about the continued crisis in the Russian Far Eastern economy and crisis in political scene that remains one of the most significant obstacles to greater Russian integration into East Asia. There is no need to mention Moscow’s “feud with authoritarian governor,” Evgeniy Nazdratenko, corruption, failed energy sources, and conflicts over the distribution of federal funds. What is worth writing about, though, is the way people live there:  

In isolated northern areas and on the various islands…, conditions have become life-threatening: supplies of heating oil and electricity have dwindled… A press report on conditions in … the Northern Kurile Islands describes long hours of darkness and cold. Primorskiy Kray suffered from arbitrary power outages, cutoffs of heat and hot water (and even cold water) throughout most of the year, … and endured a month-long garbage strike.  

Yet this is not the end of the story, a combination of bureaucracy, unreasonably high taxes, and corruption has “paralyzed economic activity.” Daily life here is a struggle:  

“It seems that Moscow did not release subsidies; the coal company has not been paid by the electric company, whose customers are broke,” mused Kolya, an engineer at the electric plant. Kolya is another honest citizen … who, in October, was paid his $110 monthly salary – for May. And Kolya is better off than some: on November 6, workers at the Progress helicopter plant went on strike because they hadn’t been paid in 17 months … “Oh, yes,” Alla said. “They never have hot water there; I know because my cousin who lives there always comes to take baths here. If the phone lines are not down, she checks first to see if the elevator in our apartment building works. She cannot make the seven flights up by stairs.” … And to think that Vladivostok means “he who dominates the East”!  

What kind of legal investment opportunities in the region one can talk about, if neither standard living conditions are satisfied, nor does the ruling of law take precedence over everything else?
Security Issues

With disintegration of the Soviet Union into fifteen independent states, a substantial Russian withdrawal from East Asia has occurred. More complex multi-polar political relations substituted super-power dominated bi-polarity in the region. Many observers note that Russia is no longer capable of projecting any substantial force in the Asia-Pacific region. Military forces that are stationed there are largely ineffective. Although it may appear that Pacific Asian countries now have a new neighbor to deal with, it seems that for Russia, ideological and political constraints of the past are long gone. Nevertheless, it would not be advisable for any country to discard the Russian potential. Because the old, the Soviet way of thinking is yet to disappear from the minds and worldviews of Russian people, Russia’s “location, nuclear capability, resources, manpower and defense potential”\textsuperscript{30} are definitely still worth paying a lot of attention to in dealing with it. In terms of Russo-Japanese relations, uneasy tensions with Tokyo could be contrasted with Russia’s booming trade and economic ties with China. Chinese investors outnumber other foreign investors in the Russian Far East and China ranks as the top Russian military industrial complex’s foreign client.\textsuperscript{31} Therefore, it seems that security balance between Japan and Russia is extremely fragile at this point of time. Who knows what future holds for these countries?

Ukraine and Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Other Newly Independent States

In 1993 Ukraine possessed about 1,500 nuclear warheads and 176 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles on its territory, “the third largest number in the world which surpasses the combined total numbers possessed by the United Kingdom, France and China.” According to report produced by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan and other countries continued to persuade Ukraine, recognizing that it is vital to international peace and security that Ukraine be
“integrated into the international framework for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation” by way of its “ratification of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state.”

The Japan’s Prime Minister’s speech to the Japan Committee for Economic Development mentioned countries of former Soviet Union by emphasizing the importance of the Silk Road region in “Eurasian diplomacy.” Given this importance, Japan worked to develop bilateral ties with the Newly Independent States, including providing support for political and economic reform efforts in these countries. As a result, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister was invited to Japan for talks with his Japanese counterpart.

In terms of ties with Central Asian countries, dialogue was deepened through, for example, a mission dispatched under the leadership of House of Representatives member Keizo Obuchi and a visit by Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency Taro Aso. A seminar on a comprehensive strategy for Central Asia was held in Tokyo, with eminent persons invited from five Central Asian countries and countries outside the region, and with participants “engaging in a frank exchange of views on the future of the Central Asian region.”

Future of Japan-Russia Relations and Conclusion

Looking at recent Russia-Japanese relationship in retrospective could implies a lot about the future of it. According to experts in the field, in terms of relations between Japan and Russia, the Tokyo Declaration, which was signed during the visit of Boris Yeltsin to Japan, has been a “cornerstone for bilateral relations.” It is clear that Japan’s basic policy regarding diplomatic relations with Russia is to make every possible effort to resolve the Northern Territories issue. Yet another goal set by Japan’s leaders is to conclude a peace treaty and fully normalize relations between Japan and Russia.
There exists a clear tendency in the actions conducted by both countries’ policymakers to put forward the three principles of trust, mutual benefit and a long-term perspective with regard to foreign policy toward each other. Moreover, the leaders of these countries mainly agreed on the importance of consistently developing bilateral economic relations, and drafted the so called Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan, with the basic philosophy of balanced open-economy development, market economy transition and promotion of cooperation. In terms of Asia-Pacific cooperation, Japan announced its support of Russia’s accession to APEC, which led to subsequent approval of Russia’s accession. The leaders also agreed to further political dialogue by holding the Japan-Russia Foreign Ministers’ Regular Consultations. The future of the Russo-Japanese relations seems to be bright and fruitful for both countries. However the issue of border dispute is still constraining the bilateral dynamics…

Once upon a time used to be two countries – Russia and Japan – two superpowers, two major players in the global political game, two states of great strength and influence. They bordered in the place where the sun was the first to greet the Earth. One of these countries had nuclear weapons, armies, and a huge number of very poor and hungry people. Another one was extremely technologically advanced and used to be extremely militaristic, but once it has lost the war, it agreed to spend no more than one percent of its GDP on military spending. There used to be four islands where there used to live people who pretty much did not know anything, not even a small fact, about two great countries – Russia and Japan – nor did they care. However, every day they were the first to see the sun as it greeted the Earth. And there used to be two countries. Once upon a time…
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8. “Kuriles Quarrel”
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21. “4 Japanese Firms to Ink Accord to Tap Caspian Oil,”
22. Armour, p.1
23. Ramo, p. 38-39

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25. Anton Chekhov, letter to a friend, 1890, as appeared in Husarska, p. 14

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