%!PS-Adobe-3.0
%%Title: (Microsoft Word - InterRep Pri\311)
%%Creator: (Microsoft Word: LaserWriter 8 8.3.2)
%%CreationDate: (9:18 PM Saturday, December 16, 1995)
%%For: ()
%%Pages: 20
%%DocumentFonts: Times-Bold Times-Roman Times-Italic Helvetica
%%DocumentNeededFonts: Times-Bold Times-Roman Times-Italic Helvetica
%%DocumentSuppliedFonts:
%%DocumentData: Clean7Bit
%%PageOrder: Ascend
%%Orientation: Portrait
%%DocumentMedia: Default 612 792 0 () ()
%ADO_ImageableArea: 31 31 583 761
%%EndComments
userdict begin/dscInfo 5 dict dup begin
/Title(Microsoft Word - InterRep Pri\311)def
/Creator(Microsoft Word: LaserWriter 8 8.3.2)def
/CreationDate(9:18 PM Saturday, December 16, 1995)def
/For()def
/Pages 20 def
end def end
/md 161 dict def md begin/currentpacking where {pop /sc_oldpacking currentpacking def true setpacking}if
%%BeginFile: adobe_psp_basic
%%Copyright: Copyright 1990-1993 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All Rights Reserved.
/bd{bind def}bind def
/xdf{exch def}bd
/xs{exch store}bd
/ld{load def}bd
/Z{0 def}bd
/T/true
/F/false
/:L/lineto
/lw/setlinewidth
/:M/moveto
/rl/rlineto
/rm/rmoveto
/:C/curveto
/:T/translate
/:K/closepath
/:mf/makefont
/gS/gsave
/gR/grestore
/np/newpath
14{ld}repeat
/$m matrix def
/av 83 def
/por true def
/normland false def
/psb-nosave{}bd
/pse-nosave{}bd
/us Z
/psb{/us save store}bd
/pse{us restore}bd
/level2
/languagelevel where
{
pop languagelevel 2 ge
}{
false
}ifelse
def
/featurecleanup
{
stopped
cleartomark
countdictstack exch sub dup 0 gt
{
{end}repeat
}{
pop
}ifelse
}bd
/noload Z
/startnoload
{
{/noload save store}if
}bd
/endnoload
{
{noload restore}if
}bd
level2 startnoload
/setjob
{
statusdict/jobname 3 -1 roll put
}bd
/setcopies
{
userdict/#copies 3 -1 roll put
}bd
level2 endnoload level2 not startnoload
/setjob
{
1 dict begin/JobName xdf currentdict end setuserparams
}bd
/setcopies
{
1 dict begin/NumCopies xdf currentdict end setpagedevice
}bd
level2 not endnoload
/pm Z
/mT Z
/sD Z
/realshowpage Z
/initializepage
{
/pm save store mT concat
}bd
/endp
{
pm restore showpage
}def
/$c/DeviceRGB def
/rectclip where
{
pop/rC/rectclip ld
}{
/rC
{
np 4 2 roll
:M
1 index 0 rl
0 exch rl
neg 0 rl
:K
clip np
}bd
}ifelse
/rectfill where
{
pop/rF/rectfill ld
}{
/rF
{
gS
np
4 2 roll
:M
1 index 0 rl
0 exch rl
neg 0 rl
fill
gR
}bd
}ifelse
/rectstroke where
{
pop/rS/rectstroke ld
}{
/rS
{
gS
np
4 2 roll
:M
1 index 0 rl
0 exch rl
neg 0 rl
:K
stroke
gR
}bd
}ifelse
%%EndFile
%%BeginFile: adobe_psp_colorspace_level1
%%Copyright: Copyright 1991-1993 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All Rights Reserved.
/G/setgray ld
/:F1/setgray ld
/:F/setrgbcolor ld
/:F4/setcmykcolor where
{
pop
/setcmykcolor ld
}{
{
3
{
dup
3 -1 roll add
dup 1 gt{pop 1}if
1 exch sub
4 1 roll
}repeat
pop
setrgbcolor
}bd
}ifelse
/:Fx
{
counttomark
{0{G}0{:F}{:F4}}
exch get
exec
pop
}bd
/:rg{/DeviceRGB :ss}bd
/:sc{$cs :ss}bd
/:dc{/$cs xdf}bd
/:sgl{}def
/:dr{}bd
/:fCRD{pop}bd
/:ckcs{}bd
/:ss{/$c xdf}bd
/$cs Z
%%EndFile
%%BeginFile: adobe_psp_uniform_graphics
%%Copyright: Copyright 1990-1993 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All Rights Reserved.
/@a
{
np :M 0 rl :L 0 exch rl 0 rl :L fill
}bd
/@b
{
np :M 0 rl 0 exch rl :L 0 rl 0 exch rl fill
}bd
/arct where
{
pop
}{
/arct
{
arcto pop pop pop pop
}bd
}ifelse
/x1 Z
/x2 Z
/y1 Z
/y2 Z
/rad Z
/@q
{
/rad xs
/y2 xs
/x2 xs
/y1 xs
/x1 xs
np
x2 x1 add 2 div y1 :M
x2 y1 x2 y2 rad arct
x2 y2 x1 y2 rad arct
x1 y2 x1 y1 rad arct
x1 y1 x2 y1 rad arct
fill
}bd
/@s
{
/rad xs
/y2 xs
/x2 xs
/y1 xs
/x1 xs
np
x2 x1 add 2 div y1 :M
x2 y1 x2 y2 rad arct
x2 y2 x1 y2 rad arct
x1 y2 x1 y1 rad arct
x1 y1 x2 y1 rad arct
:K
stroke
}bd
/@i
{
np 0 360 arc fill
}bd
/@j
{
gS
np
:T
scale
0 0 .5 0 360 arc
fill
gR
}bd
/@e
{
np
0 360 arc
:K
stroke
}bd
/@f
{
np
$m currentmatrix
pop
:T
scale
0 0 .5 0 360 arc
:K
$m setmatrix
stroke
}bd
/@k
{
gS
np
:T
0 0 :M
0 0 5 2 roll
arc fill
gR
}bd
/@l
{
gS
np
:T
0 0 :M
scale
0 0 .5 5 -2 roll arc
fill
gR
}bd
/@m
{
np
arc
stroke
}bd
/@n
{
np
$m currentmatrix
pop
:T
scale
0 0 .5 5 -2 roll arc
$m setmatrix
stroke
}bd
%%EndFile
%%BeginFile: adobe_psp_basic_text
%%Copyright: Copyright 1990-1993 Adobe Systems Incorporated. All Rights Reserved.
/S/show ld
/A{
0.0 exch ashow
}bd
/R{
0.0 exch 32 exch widthshow
}bd
/W{
0.0 3 1 roll widthshow
}bd
/J{
0.0 32 4 2 roll 0.0 exch awidthshow
}bd
/V{
0.0 4 1 roll 0.0 exch awidthshow
}bd
/fcflg true def
/fc{
fcflg{
vmstatus exch sub 50000 lt{
(%%[ Warning: Running out of memory ]%%\r)print flush/fcflg false store
}if pop
}if
}bd
/$f[1 0 0 -1 0 0]def
/:ff{$f :mf}bd
/MacEncoding StandardEncoding 256 array copy def
MacEncoding 39/quotesingle put
MacEncoding 96/grave put
/Adieresis/Aring/Ccedilla/Eacute/Ntilde/Odieresis/Udieresis/aacute
/agrave/acircumflex/adieresis/atilde/aring/ccedilla/eacute/egrave
/ecircumflex/edieresis/iacute/igrave/icircumflex/idieresis/ntilde/oacute
/ograve/ocircumflex/odieresis/otilde/uacute/ugrave/ucircumflex/udieresis
/dagger/degree/cent/sterling/section/bullet/paragraph/germandbls
/registered/copyright/trademark/acute/dieresis/notequal/AE/Oslash
/infinity/plusminus/lessequal/greaterequal/yen/mu/partialdiff/summation
/product/pi/integral/ordfeminine/ordmasculine/Omega/ae/oslash
/questiondown/exclamdown/logicalnot/radical/florin/approxequal/Delta/guillemotleft
/guillemotright/ellipsis/space/Agrave/Atilde/Otilde/OE/oe
/endash/emdash/quotedblleft/quotedblright/quoteleft/quoteright/divide/lozenge
/ydieresis/Ydieresis/fraction/currency/guilsinglleft/guilsinglright/fi/fl
/daggerdbl/periodcentered/quotesinglbase/quotedblbase/perthousand
/Acircumflex/Ecircumflex/Aacute/Edieresis/Egrave/Iacute/Icircumflex/Idieresis/Igrave
/Oacute/Ocircumflex/apple/Ograve/Uacute/Ucircumflex/Ugrave/dotlessi/circumflex/tilde
/macron/breve/dotaccent/ring/cedilla/hungarumlaut/ogonek/caron
MacEncoding 128 128 getinterval astore pop
level2 startnoload
/copyfontdict
{
findfont dup length dict
begin
{
1 index/FID ne{def}{pop pop}ifelse
}forall
}bd
level2 endnoload level2 not startnoload
/copyfontdict
{
findfont dup length dict
copy
begin
}bd
level2 not endnoload
md/fontname known not{
/fontname/customfont def
}if
/Encoding Z
/:mre
{
copyfontdict
/Encoding MacEncoding def
fontname currentdict
end
definefont :ff def
}bd
/:bsr
{
copyfontdict
/Encoding Encoding 256 array copy def
Encoding dup
}bd
/pd{put dup}bd
/:esr
{
pop pop
fontname currentdict
end
definefont :ff def
}bd
/scf
{
scalefont def
}bd
/scf-non
{
$m scale :mf setfont
}bd
/ps Z
/fz{/ps xs}bd
/sf/setfont ld
/cF/currentfont ld
/mbf
{
/makeblendedfont where
{
pop
makeblendedfont
/ABlend exch definefont
}{
pop
}ifelse
def
}def
%%EndFile
/currentpacking where {pop sc_oldpacking setpacking}if end
%%EndProlog
%%BeginSetup
md begin
countdictstack[{
%%BeginFeature: *ManualFeed False
statusdict /manualfeed false put
%%EndFeature
}featurecleanup
countdictstack[{
%%BeginFeature: *InputSlot Cassette
%%EndFeature
}featurecleanup
countdictstack[{
%%BeginFeature: *PageRegion LetterSmall
lettersmall
%%EndFeature
}featurecleanup
()setjob
/mT[1 0 0 -1 31 761]def
/sD 16 dict def
300 level2{1 dict dup/WaitTimeout 4 -1 roll put setuserparams}{statusdict/waittimeout 3 -1 roll put}ifelse
%%IncludeFont: Times-Bold
%%IncludeFont: Times-Roman
%%IncludeFont: Times-Italic
%%IncludeFont: Helvetica
/f0_1/Times-Bold
:mre
/f0_32 f0_1 32 scf
/f0_18 f0_1 18 scf
/f0_12 f0_1 12 scf
/f1_1/Times-Roman
:mre
/f1_12 f1_1 12 scf
/f1_9 f1_1 9 scf
/f2_1/Times-Italic
:mre
/f2_12 f2_1 12 scf
/f3_1/Helvetica
:mre
/f3_12 f3_1 12 scf
/f3_10 f3_1 10 scf
/f3_9 f3_1 9 scf
/Courier findfont[10 0 0 -10 0 0]:mf setfont
%%EndSetup
%%Page: 1 1
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 1 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
61 272 :M
f0_32 sf
(Interaction and Representation)S
58 245 434 1 rF
58 247 434 1 rF
58 280 434 1 rF
58 282 434 1 rF
231 340 :M
f1_12 sf
(Mark H. Bickhard)S
59 580 :M
(Mark H. Bickhard)S
59 592 :M
(Department of Philosophy)S
59 604 :M
(15 University Drive)S
59 616 :M
(Lehigh University)S
59 628 :M
(Bethlehem, PA 18015)S
59 640 :M
(610-967-6770)S
59 652 :M
(mhb0@lehigh.edu)S
endp
%%Page: 2 2
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 2 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
61 68 :M
f0_32 sf
(Interaction and Representation)S
58 41 434 1 rF
58 43 434 1 rF
58 76 434 1 rF
58 78 434 1 rF
231 100 :M
f1_12 sf
(Mark H. Bickhard)S
254 112 :M
(Abstract)S
95 136 :M
(There is a form of representation that is naturally emergent in the organization of)S
59 148 :M
(interactive systems. )S
160 148 :M
f2_12 sf
(Interactive representation)S
285 148 :M
f1_12 sf
( has claims to be the fundamental form of)S
59 160 :M
(representation, from which all others are derivative.)S
95 184 :M
(In particular, it naturally satisfies a meta-epistemological criterion that is not)S
59 196 :M
(addressed by standard approaches in contemporary literature, and is arguably impossible)S
59 208 :M
(to satisfy within any version those standard approaches. Furthermore, the interactive)S
59 220 :M
(approach naturally avoids other multiple aporias that bedevil standard approaches.)S
95 244 :M
(Much effort has been devoted in recent literature to attempts to satisfy a critical)S
59 256 :M
(meta-epistemological criterion: representation must be capable of being in error. The)S
59 268 :M
(criterion that I will apply is a strengthening of this one: representation must be capable of)S
59 280 :M
(being in error in such a way that that condition of being in error is detectable by the agent)S
59 292 :M
(or system that is doing the representing \321 the meta-epistemological criterion of )S
f2_12 sf
(system)S
59 304 :M
(detectable error)S
137 304 :M
f1_12 sf
(, for short. Whatever the status may be of current attempts to satisfy the)S
59 316 :M
(criterion of error, the criterion of )S
f2_12 sf
(system detectable)S
f1_12 sf
( error is not even addressed.)S
95 340 :M
(The interactive approach to representation has strong affinities with the general)S
59 352 :M
(pragmatist approach and with the Heideggerian skill intentionality version of it. The)S
59 364 :M
(model that I will outline, however, will be my own approach to these shared pragmatist)S
59 376 :M
(insights.)S
95 400 :M
(The basic insight is that interactions can possess truth conditions without)S
59 412 :M
(explicitly representing those truth conditions, and that the course of an interaction can)S
59 424 :M
(detect failures of those truth conditions. This, I argue, is the fundamental form from)S
59 436 :M
(which all representation is derived.)S
endp
%%Page: 3 3
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 3 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
61 68 :M
f0_32 sf
(Interaction and Representation)S
58 41 434 1 rF
58 43 434 1 rF
58 76 434 1 rF
58 78 434 1 rF
231 88 :M
f1_12 sf
(Mark H. Bickhard)S
95 112 :M
(There is a form of representation that is naturally emergent in the organization of)S
59 124 :M
(interactive systems. )S
160 124 :M
f2_12 sf
(Interactive representation)S
285 124 :M
f1_12 sf
( has claims to be the fundamental form of)S
59 136 :M
(representation, from which all others are derivative.)S
95 160 :M
(In particular, it naturally satisfies a meta-epistemological criterion that is not)S
59 172 :M
(addressed by standard approaches in contemporary literature, and is arguably impossible)S
59 184 :M
(to satisfy within any version of those standard approaches. Furthermore, the interactive)S
59 196 :M
(approach naturally avoids other multiple aporias that bedevil standard approaches.)S
95 220 :M
(Much effort has been devoted in recent literature to attempts to satisfy a critical)S
59 232 :M
(meta-epistemological criterion: representation must be capable of being in error \(Dretske,)S
59 244 :M
(1981, 1988; Fodor, 1987, 1990a, 1990b; Hanson, 1990; Loewer & Rey, 1991; Millikan,)S
59 256 :M
(1984, 1993\). The criterion that I will apply is a strengthening of this one: representation)S
59 268 :M
(must be capable of being in error in such a way that that condition of being in error is)S
59 280 :M
(detectable by the agent or system that is doing the representing \321 the meta-)S
59 292 :M
(epistemological criterion of )S
195 292 :M
f2_12 sf
(system detectable error)S
308 292 :M
f1_12 sf
(, for short. Whatever the status may)S
59 304 :M
(be of current attempts to satisfy the criterion of the possibility of error, the criterion of)S
59 316 :M
f2_12 sf
(system detectable)S
f1_12 sf
( error is not even addressed.)S
95 340 :M
(The interactive approach to representation has strong affinities with the general)S
59 352 :M
(pragmatist approach \(Hoopes, 1991; Rosenthal, 1983; J. E. Smith, 1987\) and with the)S
59 364 :M
(Heideggerian skill intentionality version of it \(Heidegger, 1962; Dreyfus, 1967, 1982,)S
59 376 :M
(1991; Dreyfus & Haugeland, 1978; Guignon, 1983; Okrent, 1988\). The model that I will)S
59 388 :M
(outline, however, will be my own approach to these shared pragmatist insights.)S
95 412 :M
(The basic insight is that interactions can possess \321 can presuppose \321 truth)S
59 424 :M
(conditions without explicitly representing those truth conditions, and that the course of an)S
59 436 :M
(interaction can detect failures of those truth conditions. This, I argue, is the fundamental)S
59 448 :M
(form from which all representation is derived. That is:)S
95 466 :M
(\245 actions and interactions can involve presuppositions about the environment)S
104 478 :M
(in which those actions and interactions take place;)S
95 496 :M
(\245 those presuppositions can be false;)S
95 514 :M
(\245 the failure of an interaction is an indication that at least of one of those)S
104 526 :M
(presuppositions was in fact false; and)S
95 544 :M
(\245 such interaction failure is detectable in and by the interactive system itself.)S
59 562 :M
(The connection of these points to representation is that:)S
95 580 :M
(\245 only that which can be in error for the system can be \322not in error\323 for the)S
104 592 :M
(system;)S
95 610 :M
(\245 only that which can be \322not in error\323 for the system can be representational)S
104 622 :M
(for the system.)S
59 640 :M
(Representation must be capable of truth value, and something is representational only for)S
59 652 :M
(that for which it is capable of truth value. If we want representation for a system itself,)S
59 664 :M
(not derivative representation from the perspective of some observer or user or designer of)S
59 676 :M
(the system \321 if we want original representation, naturalized representation \321 then)S
endp
%%Page: 4 4
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 4 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
538 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(2)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
59 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(representation must be capable of truth value for the system itself. Interactive)S
59 62 :M
(representation )S
130 62 :M
f2_12 sf
(is)S
f1_12 sf
( capable of truth value for the interactive system itself.)S
95 80 :M
(There are additional relevances of the criterion of system detectable error to)S
59 92 :M
(representation. In particular, only if representational error is at least potentially)S
59 104 :M
f2_12 sf
(detectable)S
f1_12 sf
( by a system is it possible for system activity to be )S
353 104 :M
f2_12 sf
(guided)S
386 104 :M
f1_12 sf
( by such error. Error)S
59 116 :M
(guided system activity would include various kinds of goal directed or servomechanism)S
59 128 :M
(activity \321 )S
113 128 :M
f2_12 sf
(and)S
f1_12 sf
( it would include representational learning. Only with system detectable)S
59 140 :M
(representational error can, in the general case, representation be learned: any \322learning\323)S
59 152 :M
(that occurs without such possibility of error detection is pre-formed or pre-designed)S
59 164 :M
(\(Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\). One of the central arguments of the skeptics is the inability)S
59 176 :M
(to detect representational error \(Burnyeat, 1983; Clay & Lehrer, 1989; Rescher, 1980\) \321)S
59 190 :M
(any such representational check is a circular check of representations against themselves)S
484 187 :M
f1_9 sf
(1)S
59 202 :M
f1_12 sf
(\321 yet, if representational error is not detectable, then neither representational goal)S
59 214 :M
(directedness nor representational learning are possible, whether in animals or in)S
59 226 :M
(machines. System detectable error, thus, is a fundamental criterion for an acceptable)S
59 238 :M
(model of representation.)S
99 267 :M
f0_18 sf
(Contemporary Approaches to Representation)S
95 292 :M
f0_12 sf
(Covariational Approaches)S
230 292 :M
f1_12 sf
(. System detectable error is a criterion that can )S
459 292 :M
f2_12 sf
(not)S
f1_12 sf
( be)S
59 304 :M
(satisfied by standard approaches to representation in terms of informational covariances)S
59 316 :M
(\321 correspondences \321 between representing states and that which is to be represented)S
59 328 :M
(\(Dretske, 1981; Fodor, 1990b; Hanson, 1990\). In fact, one problem that emerges for)S
59 340 :M
(standard approaches is that of the possibility of representational error )S
f2_12 sf
(at all)S
f1_12 sf
(, setting aside)S
59 352 :M
(any issues of the )S
142 352 :M
f2_12 sf
(system detectability)S
f1_12 sf
( of representational error. If the representationally)S
59 364 :M
(constitutive correspondence exists, then the representation exists, and it is correct. If the)S
59 376 :M
(constitutive correspondence does not exist, however, then the representation does not)S
59 388 :M
(exist, and so it cannot be incorrect.)S
95 412 :M
(There are a number of proposals in the literature attempting to deal with this)S
59 424 :M
(narrower problem of the possibility of error. One is the asymmetric dependency proposal)S
59 436 :M
(\(Fodor, 1987, 1990a; Loewer & Rey, 1991\). The core intuition here is that the possibility)S
59 448 :M
(of mistaken representations is in some sense )S
275 448 :M
f2_12 sf
(dependent)S
f1_12 sf
( on the possibility of correct)S
59 460 :M
(representations; they are parasitic. Explicating that sense of parasitic-ness is the aim of)S
59 472 :M
(asymmetric dependency. If we consider a representation COW that is supposed to)S
59 484 :M
(represent cows, then the error problem shows up if COW is evoked in conditions of, say,)S
59 496 :M
(a horse on a dark night. We want to say that the horse induced evocation is in error. But)S
59 508 :M
(there )S
86 508 :M
f2_12 sf
(is)S
f1_12 sf
( a correspondence there, even with the horse, and, if we take it as constitutive of)S
59 520 :M
(representation at all, then what is to block the conclusion that COW actually represents)S
59 532 :M
(the disjunction \322cow )S
f2_12 sf
(or)S
172 532 :M
f1_12 sf
( horse on a dark night\323? This version of the error problem is)S
59 544 :M
(called the disjunction problem.)S
95 568 :M
(The asymmetric dependency proposal points out that if COW is a representation)S
59 580 :M
(of cows, then the possibility of any horse evocations of it will be dependent on the)S
59 592 :M
(possibility of cow evocations of it, and will be dependent in a non-reciprocated way.)S
59 604 :M
(That is, cows will evoke COW even if horses never do, but horses, even on dark nights,)S
59 616 :M
(will not evoke COW unless cows do. Evocations by cows, then, is privileged in that all)S
59 628 :M
(errorful evocations are dependent on them, but they are not reciprocally dependent on the)S
59 640 :M
(errorful evocations. The proposal is that such asymmetric dependence provides a)S
59 652 :M
(\(partial\) criterion for correct versus incorrect representation.)S
59 673 :M
( )S
59 670.48 -.48 .48 203.48 670 .48 59 670 @a
59 684 :M
f3_9 sf
(1)S
64 687 :M
f3_10 sf
( Or against other representations, which simply spreads the circularity out a little.)S
endp
%%Page: 5 5
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 5 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
538 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(3)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
95 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(I will not attend to details of asymmetric dependency and its vicissitudes \(e.g.,)S
59 62 :M
(Loewer & Rey, 1991\), nor to other approaches to the error problem, because, even if they)S
59 74 :M
(were agreed upon as succeeding in their aims, they at best establish a notion of error for)S
59 86 :M
(some observer of the scene \321 an observer that already has representational access to the)S
59 98 :M
(COW tokens, to cows in the environment, and to horses in the environment. It is only)S
59 110 :M
(some such observer that could evaluate asymmetric dependency, for example, to)S
59 122 :M
(determine whether some particular token of COW was in error or not in error \321 could)S
59 134 :M
(determine whether or not the COW token had been evoked in an asymmetrically)S
59 146 :M
(dependent manner. The system in which COW was evoked is not in such a position.)S
95 170 :M
(Asymmetric dependence, in its own terms, does not address the criterion of)S
59 182 :M
(system detectable error. Therefore, it does not address the problem of original)S
59 194 :M
(representation for the system itself. In fact, asymmetric dependence does not even)S
59 206 :M
(distinguish between representational error and functional error, and so it )S
409 206 :M
f2_12 sf
(can)S
f1_12 sf
( not address)S
59 218 :M
(system detectable representational error.)S
95 242 :M
(Two counterexamples help bring home these points: Consider a transmitter)S
59 254 :M
(molecule docking on a receptor in a cell surface and triggering internal activities in the)S
59 266 :M
(cell, internal functional activities that are the products of evolutionary adaptation. Here)S
59 278 :M
(we have an evocation of internal states that is in full covariational information)S
59 290 :M
(correspondence with external conditions \321 whatever conditions yielded the release of)S
59 302 :M
(the transmitter. But there is only a functional story to be told here, not a representational)S
59 314 :M
(story: the internal activities of the cell do not represent )S
f2_12 sf
(for the cell)S
376 314 :M
f1_12 sf
( any of those external)S
59 326 :M
(conditions that might in fact be being covariationally tracked.)S
95 350 :M
(Consider next a poison molecule that mimics that transmitter molecule. It docks)S
59 362 :M
(on the receptor and triggers internal activity. Furthermore, the poison molecule\325s ability)S
59 374 :M
(to trigger that activity is dependent upon the ability of the transmitter molecule being able)S
59 386 :M
(to trigger that activity, and that dependence is asymmetric. But there is still only a)S
59 398 :M
(functional story to be told here.)S
95 422 :M
(There are a host of additional problems for standard informational or)S
59 434 :M
(covariational approaches to representation: too many correspondences; wide and narrow)S
59 446 :M
(content; how could representation be emergent, either in evolution or cosmology; and so)S
59 458 :M
(on. Elsewhere I argue that they are all red herrings: they exist only because of the)S
59 470 :M
(attempt to render representation in terms of correspondences \(Bickhard, 1991b, 1993;)S
59 482 :M
(Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\).)S
95 500 :M
f0_12 sf
(Functional Approaches to Representation)S
309 500 :M
f1_12 sf
(. The same general failure to address)S
59 512 :M
(system detectable representational error holds for rival proposals \(Dretske, 1988; Loewer)S
59 524 :M
(& Rey, 1991; Millikan, 1984, 1993\). In these models, X is supposed to represent Y if it)S
59 536 :M
(is the function of X \321 or of X\325s \321 to represent Y, or Y\325s, and )S
f2_12 sf
(function)S
f1_12 sf
(, in turn, is)S
59 548 :M
(modeled in terms of the learning and evolutionary histories of X\325s and the types of)S
59 560 :M
(systems in which they occur. In these cases, the required assessments for the)S
59 572 :M
(determination of error are of, among other things, various learning and evolutionary)S
59 584 :M
(histories of the systems and their purported representations, rather than of asymmetric)S
59 596 :M
(dependencies or the lack thereof. But those assessments of histories too are not possible)S
59 608 :M
(for a system itself. Does a frog \321 could a frog \321 know anything at all about the)S
59 620 :M
(evolutionary history of its internal representations of flies? Could a frog compare such a)S
59 632 :M
(history of frog-fly representations with a current evocation of a fly representation by a)S
59 644 :M
(pebble to determine that the current evocation is in error? Insofar as representational)S
59 656 :M
(error, and thus representation, is dependent on such comparisons, then these models)S
59 668 :M
(similarly yield the conclusion that representation is not possible for a system itself.)S
endp
%%Page: 6 6
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 6 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
538 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(4)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
95 50 :M
f0_12 sf
(System Detectable Error is Not Possible in Contemporary Approaches to)S
59 62 :M
(Representation)S
137 62 :M
f1_12 sf
(. No system, animal or machine, can compare what an occurrent internal)S
59 74 :M
(correspondence representation is )S
f2_12 sf
(supposed)S
264 74 :M
f1_12 sf
( to be representing with what it is )S
f2_12 sf
(actually)S
59 86 :M
f1_12 sf
(representing to determine if it is in error. No system, animal or machine, can assess the)S
59 98 :M
(asymmetric dependency, or lack thereof, of an occurrent representation to determine)S
59 110 :M
(whether or not it is in error. No system, animal or machine, can compare its own learning)S
59 122 :M
(or evolutionary history to an occurrent representation to determine whether or not the)S
59 134 :M
(occurrent representation is in error.)S
95 152 :M
(The required assessments and comparisons are question begging in that they)S
59 164 :M
(require the system to compare what the \322representation\323 is occurrently )S
401 164 :M
f2_12 sf
(actually)S
59 176 :M
f1_12 sf
(\322representing\323 with what it is )S
f2_12 sf
(supposed)S
248 176 :M
f1_12 sf
( to be representing \321 whether in terms of)S
59 188 :M
(dependencies or histories \321 in order to detect error. But determining what is being)S
59 200 :M
(occurrently )S
117 200 :M
f2_12 sf
(actually)S
156 200 :M
f1_12 sf
( represented is precisely the problem to be addressed: if there is no)S
59 212 :M
(possibility of determining what is actually being represented independently of the)S
59 224 :M
(relevant dependencies and histories, then there is no possibility of engaging in the)S
59 236 :M
(required comparisons with those dependencies and histories \(setting aside the impossible)S
59 248 :M
(requirement for the system to have considerable knowledge of such dependencies and)S
59 260 :M
(histories, even for frog representations\). If it is not possible for the system, animal or)S
59 272 :M
(machine, to engage in those comparisons, then there is no possibility of the system)S
59 284 :M
(detecting error. In such models, therefore, there is no possibility of original)S
59 296 :M
(representation \321 representation for the system itself.)S
95 314 :M
(These requirements in such models for representations that are independent of \321)S
59 326 :M
(external to \321 the system being modeled are obscured by the models being framed within)S
59 338 :M
(the perspective of an external observer on both the system and its environment. In such a)S
59 350 :M
(case that observer )S
148 350 :M
f2_12 sf
(does)S
170 350 :M
f1_12 sf
( have such an independent epistemic perspective on the occurrent)S
59 362 :M
(representations of the system )S
202 362 :M
f2_12 sf
(and)S
f1_12 sf
( on what in the environment is actually being)S
59 374 :M
(represented. Such an external observer could, at least in principle, assess and compare)S
59 386 :M
(occurrent representations with dependencies and histories. But no system can be in a)S
59 398 :M
(position of being such an external observer on itself. Interactive representation does not)S
59 410 :M
(require such external perspectives; interactive representation does permit system)S
59 422 :M
(detectable representational error.)S
150 451 :M
f0_18 sf
(Interactive System Organization)S
95 476 :M
f1_12 sf
(An interactive system must in general have some way of indicating the)S
59 488 :M
f2_12 sf
(possibilities)S
f1_12 sf
( of various interactions that is distinct from initiating )S
f2_12 sf
(engagement)S
430 488 :M
f1_12 sf
( in those)S
59 500 :M
(interactions. This is so because there will in general be more than one possible)S
59 512 :M
(interaction available in a particular environment, and that availability must be indicated)S
59 524 :M
(so that a selection can be made of which interaction to initiate. A frog that sees a nearby)S
59 536 :M
(fly, for example, has available the possibility of flicking its tongue and eating, but if it)S
59 548 :M
(also sees the shadow of a hawk, it is likely to avail itself of the possibility of jumping into)S
59 560 :M
(the water instead. Human beings have available at any moment myriads of possible)S
59 572 :M
(interactions.)S
95 596 :M
(The selection of which interaction to engage in should, in general, occur in terms)S
59 608 :M
(of anticipated outcomes of the indicated interactions. So the system must, in addition to)S
59 620 :M
(indications of interaction )S
182 620 :M
f2_12 sf
(potentialities)S
245 620 :M
f1_12 sf
(, have indications of anticipated or anticipatable)S
59 632 :M
(interaction )S
f2_12 sf
(outcomes)S
f1_12 sf
(.)S
95 656 :M
(I will be modeling representation in terms of these two forms of indication \321)S
59 668 :M
(indications of interactive potentialities and indications of consequent outcomes of those)S
59 680 :M
(interactions. If either one of these forms of indication must be realized in a manner that)S
endp
%%Page: 7 7
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 7 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
538 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(5)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
59 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(requires representation, then the approach being explored is doomed to circularity \321 to)S
59 62 :M
(representation being modeled in terms of representation. The proximate task, then, is to)S
59 74 :M
(model how these two forms of indication could occur in a strictly functional manner,)S
59 86 :M
(without presupposing the representationality that is being modeled.)S
131 115 :M
f0_18 sf
(Indications of Interactive Potentiality)S
95 140 :M
f1_12 sf
(What must be indicated are the potentialities of interaction types, not the details of)S
59 152 :M
(interaction tokens. The types can be specified as tightly as needed by the system, but the)S
59 164 :M
(details may be both irrelevant and dependent on as yet undetected characteristics of the)S
59 176 :M
(environment. Interaction types are easily specified by the functional or control structure)S
59 188 :M
(organizations that would engage in those interactions, should the system select them.)S
59 200 :M
(Interaction types, then, can be indicated by indicating subsystem organizations, like)S
59 212 :M
(subroutines or servomechanisms.)S
95 236 :M
(How, then, can system components be indicated? The simple answer is with a)S
59 248 :M
(pointer. A collection of pointers in a privileged location that point to subsystems will)S
59 260 :M
(suffice to indicate the interactions that would be engaged in by those subsystems as)S
59 272 :M
(currently available. This is not the only way to model this function of indication, but it)S
59 284 :M
(suffices for current purposes: all I need is some way to model such indication that does)S
59 296 :M
(not commit a representational circularity.)S
95 320 :M
(With regard to the function of selecting an interaction \(type\) to engage in, we can)S
59 332 :M
(simply presuppose that the selection always takes place within the set of possibilities)S
59 344 :M
(being pointed to. This is a simple functional restriction, and poses no circularity)S
59 356 :M
(problems. There remains the problem of how interaction outcomes can be indicated)S
59 368 :M
(without representational circularity, which I will address immediately below, and the)S
59 380 :M
(interesting question of how the pointers to possibilities \321 the indications of interactive)S
59 392 :M
(potentialities \321 get set up and updated over time in the first place. That question I will)S
59 404 :M
(defer till later in the paper.)S
136 433 :M
f0_18 sf
(Indications of Interaction Outcomes)S
95 458 :M
f1_12 sf
(If the interaction outcomes to be indicated are external outcomes, then they must)S
59 470 :M
(be represented, and the fatal circularity is upon us. If those outcomes are strictly internal,)S
59 482 :M
(however, this circularity does not necessarily occur. In particular, if the indicated)S
59 494 :M
(outcomes are themselves possible internal functional states of the interactive system,)S
59 506 :M
(then:)S
95 524 :M
(1\) those states can be pointed to as possibilities without being represented,)S
95 542 :M
(2\) those states can be associated with the interaction types that might yield)S
104 554 :M
(them, again via pointers and without representation,)S
95 572 :M
(3\) interaction types can be functionally selected on the basis of the indicated)S
104 584 :M
(internal outcomes, without representation being required,)S
95 602 :M
(4\) the error or lack of error of such an outcome indication is constituted by the)S
104 614 :M
(system either entering that internal functional state or not entering it, and)S
95 632 :M
(5\) in either case, that is a functional fact in the system, available to influence)S
104 644 :M
(further processing in the system, without anything being represented.)S
59 662 :M
(There is no representational circularity in any of these functional relationships.)S
endp
%%Page: 8 8
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 8 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
538 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(6)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
152 55 :M
f0_18 sf
(Presupposition and Implicitness)S
95 80 :M
f1_12 sf
(An indication that some interaction type is currently possible and that it will yield)S
59 92 :M
(one of some indicated set of possible internal outcomes is an indication that may hold or)S
59 104 :M
(may fail. In order for it to hold, the environment must possess some set of properties of)S
59 116 :M
(response to the interaction subsystem that will support the course of the overall)S
59 128 :M
(interaction achieving the indicated internal outcome.)S
95 152 :M
(There is nothing in the indication per se that explicitly represents what those)S
59 164 :M
(environmental interactive properties are. They are the truth conditions of the indication,)S
59 176 :M
(but they are not explicitly represented truth conditions. Instead, they are functional)S
59 188 :M
(presuppositions of the interaction-outcome indications. In that sense, they are )S
437 188 :M
f2_12 sf
(implicitly)S
59 200 :M
f1_12 sf
(represented, rather than explicitly.)S
95 224 :M
(This presuppositional implicitness is the basic form of interactive representation.)S
59 236 :M
(It constitutes a kind of skill intentionality or praxeological intentionality. It is quite)S
59 248 :M
(different from the standard explicit representations of symbols in a symbol manipulation)S
59 260 :M
(system.)S
104 289 :M
f0_18 sf
(The Adequacy of Interactive Representation)S
95 314 :M
f1_12 sf
(Interactive implicit representation is different enough from standard conceptions)S
59 326 :M
(of representations that it poses a host of questions about the adequacy of interactive)S
59 338 :M
(representation. Even if the basic interactive model is accepted as an explication of some)S
59 350 :M
(form of representation, how could it possibly handle ... and there follows a rather long)S
59 362 :M
(list: Physical objects? Abstractions, such as electron or number? Perception? Imagery?)S
59 374 :M
(Memory for events? Language? And so on.)S
95 398 :M
f0_12 sf
(Objects)S
f1_12 sf
(. I cannot tackle that programmatic set of questions here \(Bickhard, 1980,)S
59 410 :M
(1987, 1991, 1992a, 1992c, 1993; Bickhard & Campbell, 1992; Bickhard & Richie, 1983;)S
59 422 :M
(Campbell & Bickhard, 1986, 1992\), but I will adumbrate approaches to two of the)S
59 434 :M
(questions in order to show that there are such approaches. Objects first. If some internal)S
59 446 :M
(outcome to an interaction were to be obtained, that functional state may, in turn, indicate)S
59 458 :M
(the possibility of still further interactions, with their own potential outcomes. Indications)S
59 470 :M
(of interactions and outcomes, in other words, can branch and iterate. In branching and)S
59 482 :M
(iterating, there emerges the possibility of nets of conditional indications, and, in)S
59 494 :M
(particular, subnets that close on themselves. This would be the case if some class of)S
59 506 :M
(potential interactions and outcomes all indicate the collective possibility of the entire)S
59 518 :M
(class \321 the indications are closed within such a class.)S
95 542 :M
(Furthermore, such a closed organization of indications may itself remain invariant)S
59 554 :M
(as a structure of interaction possibilities under various interactions. For example, a toy)S
59 566 :M
(block offers many interaction possibilities to a child, ranging from visual scans, to)S
59 578 :M
(manipulations, to throwings, to droppings, to chewings, and so on. Further, any one of)S
59 590 :M
(these indicates the availability of all the rest \321 it is closed under the indicated)S
59 602 :M
(interactions. And still further, the entire structure of possibilities remains invariant under)S
59 614 :M
(many kinds of interactions, such as manipulations, locomotions of the child, storing in the)S
59 626 :M
(toy box, and so on. It does not remain invariant, however, under burning, crushing, and)S
59 638 :M
(so on.)S
95 662 :M
(The basic proposal is that object representation in its most primitive form is just)S
59 674 :M
(such invariances of closed subnets of interactive indications. This is, clearly, a basically)S
59 686 :M
(Piagetian notion of object representation \(Piaget, 1954\). Piaget, in fact, participates in)S
endp
%%Page: 9 9
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 9 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
538 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(7)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
59 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(the general pragmatic approach \(Piaget, 1971, 1977\) \321 the descent is roughly Peirce to)S
59 62 :M
(James to Baldwin to Piaget. I will not elaborate on this proposal nor defend it further; my)S
59 74 :M
(basic point is made, that object representation does not present an aporia to a pragmatic)S
59 86 :M
(approach to representation.)S
95 110 :M
f0_12 sf
(Numbers)S
f1_12 sf
(. What about abstractions, such as number? This is the second prima)S
59 122 :M
(facie problem that I will address. The core insight here is to note that the properties of)S
59 134 :M
(the interactive systems themselves are more abstract than the environments which those)S
59 146 :M
(systems interact with. One property of an interaction type, for example, may be to iterate)S
59 158 :M
(some subsystem, perhaps till some internal criterion is met. If that iteration occurs, say,)S
59 170 :M
(three times, then the ordinal three is a property of the interaction that is not necessarily a)S
59 182 :M
(property of whatever is being interacted with.)S
95 206 :M
(If there is a second level interactive system that can interact with the first level)S
59 218 :M
(system organization, then that second level system could represent such properties as the)S
59 230 :M
(three-ness of some iteration organization in the first level architecture. Any such second)S
59 242 :M
(level system, in turn, will have properties that might be represented from a third level)S
59 254 :M
(system, and so on. Here we have resources for abstractions that are unbounded \321 an)S
59 266 :M
(unbounded hierarchy of levels of potential interactive system.)S
95 290 :M
(Again, there are many secondary questions that immediately arise: How many)S
59 302 :M
(such levels might we find in human beings? How could an organism ascend such levels?)S
59 314 :M
(And so on. Again, I will not pursue them here. I will note, however, that this approach)S
59 326 :M
(to abstraction is not ad hoc: it converges with a model of developmental stages with its)S
59 338 :M
(own empirical and logical support \(Bickhard, 1992b, 1992d; Campbell & Bickhard,)S
59 350 :M
(1986\). This too is generally Piagetian, though with stronger differences from Piaget than)S
59 362 :M
(in the case of the model of object representations \(Bickhard, 1988; Bickhard & Campbell,)S
59 374 :M
(1989\).)S
95 398 :M
(These models of object and abstraction representations require much)S
59 410 :M
(development. Here, however, I only want to block the superficial appearance of)S
59 422 :M
(immediate aporia. The claim that interactive representation might be adequate to all)S
59 434 :M
(forms of representation is at least still viable. For more detailed developments of the)S
59 446 :M
(model, see, for example, regarding perception, Bickhard \(1992a, 1992c; Bickhard &)S
59 458 :M
(Richie, 1983\), rationality, Bickhard \(1991a, 1992a, in preparation-b; Hooker, 1995\),)S
59 470 :M
(language, Bickhard \(1980, 1987, 1992a, 1992c, 1995, in preparation; Bickhard &)S
59 482 :M
(Campbell, 1992; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; Campbell & Bickhard, 1992\), contemporary)S
59 494 :M
(artificial intelligence and cognitive science, Bickhard & Terveen \(1995\), development,)S
59 506 :M
(Bickhard \(1980b, 1988, 1991b, 1992a, 1992b, 1992d; Bickhard & Campbell, 1989, in)S
59 518 :M
(preparation; Bickhard & Christopher, 1994; Campbell & Bickhard, 1986\), personality,)S
59 530 :M
(Bickhard \(1989; Bickhard & Christopher, 1994\), and the nature of persons more broadly,)S
59 542 :M
(Bickhard \(1980b, 1992a, 1992b, in preparation\).)S
237 571 :M
f0_18 sf
(Functions)S
95 596 :M
f1_12 sf
(I have modeled representation in functional terms. Representational error)S
59 608 :M
(emerges as a particular kind of functional error, and, therefore, representation emerges as)S
59 620 :M
(a particular kind of function \321 the function of indicating possibilities of further)S
59 632 :M
(interactive process. I claim that this model of representation has many virtues, among)S
59 644 :M
(which is the possibility of system detectable error, and, therefore, of system error guided)S
59 656 :M
(processes such as goal-directedness and learning. The notion of function, however, poses)S
59 668 :M
(its own problems.)S
endp
%%Page: 10 10
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 10 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
538 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(8)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
95 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(Function, and, therefore, the distinction between function and dysfunction, is)S
59 62 :M
(commonly modeled in terms of various learning and evolutionary histories \(Dretske,)S
59 74 :M
(1988; Millikan, 1984, 1993\). If function were dependent on such histories, then the)S
59 86 :M
(interactive model of representation would require assessment of such histories, and)S
59 98 :M
(comparisons with those histories, in order to determine function and dysfunction, and,)S
59 110 :M
(therefore, to determine representational error and lack of error \321 as do Dretske\325s and)S
59 122 :M
(Millikan\325s models of representation, and for similar reasons. This would violate the)S
59 134 :M
(criterion of system detectable error.)S
95 158 :M
(In order to satisfy the criterion of system detectable )S
f2_12 sf
(representational)S
f1_12 sf
( error, then,)S
59 170 :M
(the interactive model of representation requires a model of function that satisfies the)S
59 182 :M
(criterion of system detectable )S
204 182 :M
f2_12 sf
(functional)S
253 182 :M
f1_12 sf
( error. Intrinsic dependence of function on)S
59 194 :M
(history violates this criterion.)S
95 218 :M
(The issues regarding function are complex, and the literature on function is)S
59 230 :M
(extensive. I will not attempt here an exhaustive treatment of function and its embedding)S
59 242 :M
(in the current literature. Instead, I will outline a framework for the modeling of function)S
59 254 :M
(that is plausible, and that clearly satisfies the criterion of system detectability of error. In)S
59 266 :M
(particular, I will outline an approach to function that is not historical, though it does have)S
59 278 :M
(important and strong connections to issues of history \(Christensen, 1995, forthcoming;)S
59 290 :M
(Bickhard, 1993; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; Hooker & Christensen, in preparation\).)S
95 314 :M
(The central criterion for a model of function is to distinguish between function)S
59 326 :M
(and dysfunction in a way that is strictly natural, not dependent on any external)S
59 338 :M
(ascriptions. Functions are consequences \(Wimsatt, 1972\), so some basis must be)S
59 350 :M
(modeled for distinguishing consequences that are functional from those that are not, and)S
59 362 :M
(for asymmetrically distinguishing between the successful yielding of those consequences)S
59 374 :M
(and the failure to yield those consequences.)S
95 398 :M
(The paradigm domain for intuitions about functions is the biological domain. We)S
59 410 :M
(want to be able to explain the sense in which hearts and kidneys and so on typically serve)S
59 422 :M
(functions. The intuition, of course, is that they contribute to the continuation of the life)S
59 434 :M
(of the organism, or of the species. It has proven remarkably difficult, however, to)S
59 446 :M
(explicate these paradigm cases \(Bechtel, 1986; Bigelow & Pargetter, 1987; Block, 1980,)S
59 458 :M
(1980b; Boorse, 1976; Cummins, 1975; Neander, 1991; Wimsatt, 1972, 1976; Wright,)S
59 470 :M
(1973\). Current approaches present models of function that are dependent on the)S
59 482 :M
(evolutionary and learning histories of the systems involved, but this would make the)S
59 494 :M
(differentiation between serving a function and failing to serve that function a matter of)S
59 506 :M
(comparison between current process and past history \321 a comparison that systems, in)S
59 518 :M
(general, are not in a position to make. Such models of function, therefore, at best)S
59 530 :M
(explicate the ascription of function by an external observer of the organism and its)S
59 542 :M
(species. This does not suffice as a naturalistic model of function. Nevertheless, the)S
59 554 :M
(intuition of functions being consequences that contribute to the survival of the system can)S
59 566 :M
(be maintained without adverting to history.)S
95 590 :M
(Consider a process that is far from thermodynamic equilibrium, such as a flame.)S
59 602 :M
(The continued existence of such a process is dependent on continuous interchange with)S
59 614 :M
(the environment. The flame is intrinsically an open system: if it is cut off from the)S
59 626 :M
(environment, the interchange, and, therefore, the process, ceases. This constitutes a)S
59 638 :M
(fundamental difference with some other processes \321 the dance of nucleons and electrons)S
59 650 :M
(that constitutes a water molecule, for example \321 which continue in existence even if)S
59 662 :M
(isolated from their environments.)S
endp
%%Page: 11 11
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 11 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
538 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(9)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
95 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(Some open systems \321 for example, a chemical bath with continuous flows of)S
59 62 :M
(active agents into the bath \321 are completely dependent on the external persistence of)S
59 74 :M
(necessary environmental conditions and processes for the continued persistence of the)S
59 86 :M
(open system itself. In the example of the chemical bath, something must maintain the)S
59 98 :M
(inflows of chemical agents. Other open systems, such as a flame, generate properties and)S
59 110 :M
(processes inherent to the open system process that contribute to the maintenance of the)S
59 122 :M
(open system process itself. In the case of the flame, the combustion process generates)S
59 134 :M
(heat, which contributes to the maintenance of the necessary condition of above)S
59 146 :M
(combustion threshold temperature for the flame to continue. In a normal atmosphere and)S
59 158 :M
(gravitational field, this also contributes to convection, and thereby to the maintenance of)S
59 170 :M
(the presence of oxygen \321 another condition necessary for the maintenance of the flame.)S
95 194 :M
(Whether or not the flame process continues is a natural phenomenon with natural)S
59 206 :M
(consequences. Neither the continuation of the flame, or lack thereof, nor any of its)S
59 218 :M
(consequences are dependent on any observer assessment or ascription. Similarly, the)S
59 230 :M
(contributions that the flame makes to its own continued existence \321 or the failure to)S
59 242 :M
(make those contributions \321 are natural phenomena with natural consequences.)S
95 266 :M
(The intuition of \322function\323 that I propose is that system processes, or)S
59 278 :M
(subprocesses, serve a function relative to an open system insofar as they contribute to the)S
59 290 :M
(continued existence of that open system. This is an occurrent notion of function that is)S
59 302 :M
(not dependent on any history. A lion that just popped into existence, then, would on this)S
59 314 :M
(view have a heart that serves a function \(cf. Millikan, 1984\).)S
95 338 :M
(This intuition provides only a minimum outline of an approach to modeling)S
59 350 :M
(function: a distinction between consequences that are functional and those that are not,)S
59 362 :M
(and an asymmetric distinction between serving a function and failing to do so. I am)S
59 374 :M
(leaving many central issues unaddressed here.)S
95 398 :M
(Perhaps most important among them is the distinction between \322serving a)S
59 410 :M
(function\323 and \322having a function\323. A particular kidney may have a function even if it)S
59 422 :M
(does not and never did serve that function. The property of having a function is one that)S
59 434 :M
(a particular subsystem bears in virtue of its membership of some class of similar)S
59 446 :M
(subsystems which, as a class, inherit that property. The move from \322serving a function\323)S
59 458 :M
(to \322having a function\323 requires moving from the singular case to the typical case, with)S
59 470 :M
(many issues along the way. These are explored a little further elsewhere \(Bickhard,)S
59 482 :M
(1993, in preparation\).)S
95 506 :M
(In current approaches, \322having a function\323 is taken as the primary notion to)S
59 518 :M
(model, with \322serving a function\323 or failing to do so on the part of a singular subsystem)S
59 530 :M
(being derivative. The property of having a function, in turn, is modeled in terms of the)S
59 542 :M
(learning and evolutionary history of the type of element or subsystem involved. It is this)S
59 554 :M
(focus on the history of types as primary that renders these models non-natural \321 history)S
59 566 :M
(cannot have naturalistic current consequences except in terms of current processes. By)S
59 578 :M
(reversing the order of relationship between \322serving a function\323 and \322having a function\323)S
59 590 :M
(\321 by making the occurrent notion of \322serving a function\323 primary \321 I intend to rescue)S
59 602 :M
(the notion of function from being merely ascriptive on the part of some observer who can)S
59 614 :M
(assess such histories.)S
95 638 :M
(More broadly, I assume that functions )S
281 638 :M
f2_12 sf
(can)S
f1_12 sf
( be naturalized, whether or not in the)S
59 650 :M
(manner in which I have outlined. The model of interactive representation, then, is a)S
59 662 :M
(natural model insofar as the functional notions of pointers and so on \321 and their many)S
59 674 :M
(architecturally different functional alternatives \(Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\) \321 are)S
59 686 :M
(natural. That cannot be, however, by virtue of their histories, on pain of non-naturalism.)S
endp
%%Page: 12 12
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 12 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
532 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(10)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
59 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(The dependence of open systems on the persistence of far-from-equilibrium conditions)S
59 62 :M
(necessary for the continued existence of open systems provides a framework for making)S
59 74 :M
(the necessary distinctions.)S
182 103 :M
f0_18 sf
(Avoiding Other Aporias)S
95 128 :M
f0_12 sf
(The Disjunction Problem)S
f1_12 sf
(. I have organized this presentation of the interactive)S
59 140 :M
(model of representation around the criterion of system detectable error, and argued that)S
59 152 :M
(alternative modeling approaches do not even address this criterion. Insofar as interactive)S
59 164 :M
(representation does make sense of system detectable error, then it certainly accounts for)S
59 176 :M
(representational error per se. In particular, the disjunction problem does not arise for)S
59 188 :M
(interactive representation. The disjunction problem is a red herring produced solely by)S
59 200 :M
(attempting to account for representation as correspondence. Similarly, other)S
59 212 :M
(problematics to be found regarding standard approaches to understanding representation)S
59 224 :M
(also do not arise for the interactive model.)S
95 248 :M
f0_12 sf
(Too Many Correspondences)S
240 248 :M
f1_12 sf
(. Another serious problem for correspondence)S
59 260 :M
(approaches to representation is that there are far too many correspondences in the)S
59 272 :M
(universe \321 every instance of every lawful relation, for example, is also an instance of a)S
59 284 :M
(correspondence \321 and most of them, at least, are not representational at all.)S
59 296 :M
(Furthermore, even if attention is restricted to correspondences with mental states, and)S
59 308 :M
(even to causally induced such correspondences, we still have that any mental element in)S
59 320 :M
(correspondence with a table in front of an organism\325s eyes will also be in correspondence)S
59 332 :M
(with retinal chemical activities, light patterns, interactions between light and electrons in)S
59 344 :M
(the surface of the table, the presence of the table at that position yesterday, the movement)S
59 356 :M
(of the table to that position whenever that occurred, the manufacture of the table, the)S
59 368 :M
(production of the raw materials for the table, the creation of the raw materials for the)S
59 380 :M
(table in an ancient supernova, and so on all the way back to the Big Bang. There are still)S
59 392 :M
(too many correspondences \(Coffa, 1991\). How is the organism, or machine, supposed to)S
59 404 :M
(determine which of these correspondences is supposed to be the representational one? A)S
59 416 :M
(common answer is in terms of some sort of further functioning of the system that is)S
59 428 :M
(\322appropriate\323 to one privileged such correspondence \(Bogdan, 1988a, 1988b, 1989; B. C.)S
59 440 :M
(Smith, 1985, 1987\). But even this move could at best pick out one among a host of)S
59 452 :M
(alternative representational contents, one for each other end of the myriad of)S
59 464 :M
(correspodences, and so it presupposes the existence of prior representations for the other)S
59 476 :M
(end of the correspondences. This is circular.)S
95 500 :M
(Again, the problem of too many correspondences is a product solely of attempting)S
59 512 :M
(to model representation in terms of correspondences. The problem simply does not arise)S
59 524 :M
(for interactive representation. The implicit definition of an interactive property specifies)S
59 536 :M
(that property. Elements or events in correspondence do not specify what they are in)S
59 548 :M
(correspondence with, but, again, such representational specification is precisely the)S
59 560 :M
(problem of representation to be addressed.)S
95 584 :M
f0_12 sf
(Wide and Narrow Contents)S
237 584 :M
f1_12 sf
(. If the content of a \(correspondence\) representation)S
59 596 :M
(is whatever is on the other end of the correspondence, then Twin Earth arguments show)S
59 608 :M
(that conditions internal to an epistemic system cannot uniquely specify that external, or)S
59 620 :M
(wide, content. It is always possible that all internal conditions would be the same, but the)S
59 632 :M
(environment different such that the correspondences were with something different)S
59 644 :M
(\(Fodor, 1987, 1990a; Loewer & Rey, 1991\). This produces problems for notions that)S
59 656 :M
(representational content ought to be functionally or causally efficacious in the mental)S
59 668 :M
(processes of the organisms and systems involved. Such efficaciousness seems blocked if)S
59 680 :M
(the content is external, not internal, and can never be uniquely specified internally.)S
endp
%%Page: 13 13
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 13 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
532 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(11)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
95 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(Something internal is necessary to play a role in at least partially specifying the)S
59 62 :M
(external or wide content \321 commonly dubbed narrow content \321 and it is therefore)S
59 74 :M
(available for influencing internal processes of the system. But narrow content cannot do)S
59 86 :M
(what is needed because it does not specify uniquely what it might be in correspondence)S
59 98 :M
(with. There is, in fact, no model available for how narrow content could specify anything)S
59 110 :M
(at all about what its wide content might be in a way that could be functionally)S
59 122 :M
(efficacious.)S
95 146 :M
(For a third time, this problem never arises for interactive representation. The)S
59 158 :M
(content of an interative representation is implicit in the organization of the interactive)S
59 170 :M
(system. It is internal, and is thus available for influencing internal processing. There is)S
59 182 :M
(no mystery about the functional efficacy of representational content in this model.)S
95 206 :M
(An interactive representation does not specify uniquely what it is a representation)S
59 218 :M
(of, but, for interactive representation, this is part of its strength, not a weakness of the)S
59 230 :M
(model. Interactive representation is emergent in implicit definitions and differentiations,)S
59 242 :M
(and on indicated relationships between them. Interactive representation is not built up)S
59 254 :M
(out of particulars such as sense data, but is a process of differentiating the environment in)S
59 266 :M
(ways that are relevant to further interactive possibilities for the system. Differentiations)S
59 278 :M
(are intrinsically open and underspecify what they differentiate.)S
95 302 :M
f0_12 sf
(Emergence)S
f1_12 sf
(. One of the many scandals of encoding notions of representation is)S
59 314 :M
(that there is no account of original representational content. Encodings can be defined in)S
59 326 :M
(terms of other representations, including other encodings, but foundational encodings)S
59 338 :M
(cannot be defined within the constraints of a strict encoding modeling approach. There is)S
59 350 :M
(no way to model the nature or origin of the representational contents that would make)S
59 362 :M
(foundational encodings into encodings at all.)S
95 386 :M
(A partial recognition of this is to posit that all grounding encodings must be)S
59 398 :M
(innate, since we cannot account for their learning or development \(Bickhard, 1991b,)S
59 410 :M
(1993; Fodor, 1975, 1981\). But, if the problem is that encodingism cannot account for the)S
59 422 :M
(origin of grounding encoding representational contents at all, as a logical matter, then)S
59 434 :M
(evolution cannot generate representational content either. In fact, unless this logical)S
59 446 :M
(aporia of the impossibility of emergence of representational content is somehow)S
59 458 :M
(dissolved, it is impossible for representation to have emerged at any time and in any way)S
59 470 :M
(since the Big Bang. Since it is fairly clear that no representations existed at the moment)S
59 482 :M
(of the Big Bang, it follows that representation is not possible at all. If something cannot)S
59 494 :M
(come into existence, then it cannot exist. This is a clear reductio \321 something has to be)S
59 506 :M
(wrong.)S
95 530 :M
(I claim that what is wrong is the assumption that representation is a species of)S
59 542 :M
(correspondence. Correspondence does not announce what it is in correspondence with,)S
59 554 :M
(and no restrictions to sub-classes of correspondences \(e.g., correspondences that are)S
59 566 :M
(causally induced, that are followed by particular functional processes, and so on\) can)S
59 578 :M
(solve that problem. Correspondence models make the emergence of representation)S
59 590 :M
(impossible. Interactive representation, on the other hand, emerges with complete)S
59 602 :M
(naturalism out of certain sorts of functional organizations. There is no mystery of)S
59 614 :M
(representational origin in this model.)S
95 638 :M
(Furthermore, for any system, biological or otherwise, of sufficient complexity that)S
59 650 :M
(selections of further interactions cannot be simply triggered by current inputs, but must)S
59 662 :M
(be made on the basis of anticipations of the further consequences of those interactions,)S
59 674 :M
(interactive representation serves a clear function. So, not only is the )S
f2_12 sf
(possibility)S
f1_12 sf
( of the)S
59 686 :M
(emergence of interactive representation clear, so also is the explanation for the )S
f2_12 sf
(actual)S
endp
%%Page: 14 14
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 14 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
532 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(12)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
59 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(emergence of interactive representation in living beings, and in machines \(Bickhard &)S
59 62 :M
(Terveen, 1995\).)S
158 91 :M
f0_18 sf
(What about Input Encodings?)S
95 116 :M
f1_12 sf
(It would seem that the pervasive conception of representation as encodings of)S
59 128 :M
(inputs, such as sensory encodings \(Carlson, 1986\), could not be completely wrong: how)S
59 140 :M
(could it succeed empirically as well as it does? In other words, how does the interactive)S
59 152 :M
(approach save the empirical results that are normally taken as supportive of the standard)S
59 164 :M
(conceptions of representations?)S
95 188 :M
(The answer to this question brings us back to the earlier question of how)S
59 200 :M
(indications of interactive potentialities are set up. Sensory \322encodings\323 are)S
59 212 :M
(correspondences that occur between internal states, such as firing rates on particular)S
59 224 :M
(axons, and external conditions, such as visual or auditory inputs. Classes of such input)S
59 236 :M
(patterns may be differentiated by neural processing of various sorts, such as might)S
59 248 :M
(differentiate conditions in which there is a fly present from conditions in which there is)S
59 260 :M
(not a fly present. The results of such processing, in turn, create correspondences with)S
59 272 :M
(flies.)S
95 296 :M
(So far, so good. But at this point, the standard interpretation is that those internal)S
59 308 :M
(conditions somehow )S
161 308 :M
f2_12 sf
(represent)S
f1_12 sf
( that fly to the frog, and we enter into the myriad aporetic)S
59 320 :M
(red herrings. The factual correspondences are interpreted as representational, encoding,)S
59 332 :M
(correspondences \(Coffa, 1991; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981; Hanson, 1990; Pylyshyn, 1984\).)S
59 344 :M
(In contrast, all that the interactive model needs is that those conditions that are in fact in)S
59 356 :M
(correspondence with fly conditions set up pointers indicating the potentiality of tongue-)S
59 368 :M
(flicking-and-eating. Indications of interactive potentialities need to be sensitive to)S
59 380 :M
(environmental conditions, but that sensitivity need only be a factual sensitivity, such as)S
59 392 :M
(informational or functional sensitivity \321 precisely what we actually find \321 not a)S
59 404 :M
(representational sensitivity. What are normally taken as )S
332 404 :M
f2_12 sf
(being)S
359 404 :M
f1_12 sf
( representations are in the)S
59 416 :M
(interactive model taken as constituting the functional conditions under which)S
59 428 :M
(representational indications are set up. And, correspondingly, what is represented is not)S
59 440 :M
(the other ends of the correspondences, not the detections or differentiations from)S
59 452 :M
(processing inputs, but the interactive potentialities that might follow from those)S
59 464 :M
(functional detections. The frog represents potentialities for tongue-flicking-and-eating,)S
59 476 :M
(not flies.)S
217 505 :M
f0_18 sf
(Connectionism)S
95 530 :M
f1_12 sf
(To this point, I have not mentioned connectionism. How does it fare with respect)S
59 542 :M
(to these issues? A net is trained to detect instances of classes of input patterns \(Bickhard)S
59 554 :M
(& Terveen, 1995; Churchland, 1989; Clark, 1989, 1993; Horgan & Tienson, 1988;)S
59 566 :M
(McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986; Rumelhart, 1989; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986;)S
59 578 :M
(Smolensky, 1986, 1988; Waltz & Feldman, 1988\). A net performs the sorts of functions)S
59 590 :M
(of detection or differentiation based on inputs that we find in the sensory systems \(the full)S
59 602 :M
(sensory case, however, can be more complicated than a typical net: Bickhard & Richie,)S
59 614 :M
(1983\). In classical approaches, such detection is presumed to occur via transducers:)S
59 626 :M
(transducers encode input categories, and make those encodings available for further)S
59 638 :M
(processing \(Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981; see Bickhard & Richie, 1983, for a critique\). In)S
59 650 :M
(both the neural net and the classical case, however, what actually occurs is a)S
59 662 :M
(differentiation of instances of classes of input patterns, and, in both cases, such)S
59 674 :M
(differentiations are construed as being representations. Transducers are evolved or)S
59 686 :M
(engineered, while connectionist nets can be trained, but what they end up doing is the)S
endp
%%Page: 15 15
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 15 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
532 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(13)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
59 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(same sort of task, and is subject to the same sort of misinterpretation as constituting)S
59 62 :M
(representation. Neither transducers nor nets, however, are capable of system detectable)S
59 74 :M
(error concerning what they take to be on the other end of their input correspondences \321)S
59 86 :M
(neither one takes )S
f2_12 sf
(anything)S
185 86 :M
f1_12 sf
( to be on the other end of its inputs. Connectionism, in other)S
59 98 :M
(words, does not address this basic problematic of representation )S
369 98 :M
f2_12 sf
(for the system)S
436 98 :M
f1_12 sf
( either.)S
95 122 :M
(The interactive model, in contrast, needs exactly such differentiators \321 whether)S
59 134 :M
(transducers or nets or hybrids or whatever \321 in order to set up its interactive indications)S
59 146 :M
(successfully. Transducers and nets are functional for the setting up of representations,)S
59 158 :M
(but they are not representations per se \321 not for the system itself.)S
232 187 :M
f0_18 sf
(Conclusion)S
95 212 :M
f1_12 sf
(System detectable error is a meta-epistemological criterion that current)S
59 224 :M
(informational approaches to representation fail. Interactive representation naturally)S
59 236 :M
(satisfies this criterion, as well as that of error per se, of the possibility of emergence, and)S
59 248 :M
(other such criteria \(Bickhard, 1993; Bickhard & Terveen, 1995\). Further, interactive)S
59 260 :M
(representation manifests the possibility of being able to account for other prima facie)S
59 272 :M
(problematic forms of representation, such as of objects and numbers, and, therefore,)S
59 284 :M
(shows a programmatic possibility of being the fundamental form of all representation.)S
endp
%%Page: 16 16
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 16 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
532 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(14)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
233 67 :M
f0_18 sf
(References)S
59 92 :M
f1_12 sf
(Bechtel, W. \(1986\). Teleological functional analyses and the hierarchical organization)S
95 104 :M
(of nature. In N. Rescher \(Ed.\) )S
250 104 :M
f2_12 sf
(Current Issues in Teleology)S
383 104 :M
f1_12 sf
(. Landham, MD:)S
95 116 :M
(University Press of America, 26-48.)S
59 140 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1980\). )S
f2_12 sf
(Cognition, Convention, and Communication)S
397 140 :M
f1_12 sf
(. New York:)S
95 152 :M
(Praeger.)S
59 176 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1980b\). A Model of Developmental and Psychological Processes.)S
95 188 :M
f2_12 sf
(Genetic Psychology Monographs, 102)S
279 188 :M
f1_12 sf
(, 61-116.)S
59 212 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1987\). The Social Nature of the Functional Nature of Language. In)S
95 224 :M
(M. Hickmann \(Ed.\) )S
192 224 :M
f2_12 sf
(Social and Functional Approaches to Language and Thought)S
95 236 :M
f1_12 sf
(\(pp. 39-65\). New York: Academic.)S
59 260 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1988\). Piaget on Variation and Selection Models: Structuralism,)S
95 272 :M
(Logical Necessity, and Interactivism )S
277 272 :M
f2_12 sf
(Human Development, 31)S
397 272 :M
f1_12 sf
(, 274-312.)S
59 296 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1989\). The Nature of Psychopathology. In L. Simek-Downing \(Ed.\))S
95 308 :M
f2_12 sf
(International Psychotherapy: Theories, Research, and Cross-Cultural)S
95 320 :M
(Implications)S
155 320 :M
f1_12 sf
(. \(115-140\). New York: Praeger.)S
59 344 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1991a\). A Pre-Logical Model of Rationality. In L. Steffe \(Ed.\))S
95 356 :M
f2_12 sf
(Epistemological Foundations of Mathematical Experience)S
376 356 :M
f1_12 sf
( New York: Springer-)S
95 368 :M
(Verlag, 68-77.)S
59 392 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1991b\). The Import of Fodor's Anticonstructivist Arguments. In L.)S
95 404 :M
(Steffe \(Ed.\) )S
157 404 :M
f2_12 sf
(Epistemological Foundations of Mathematical Experience)S
438 404 :M
f1_12 sf
(. New)S
95 416 :M
(York: Springer-Verlag, 14-25.)S
59 440 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1992a\). How Does the Environment Affect the Person? In L. T.)S
95 452 :M
(Winegar, J. Valsiner \(Eds.\) )S
232 452 :M
f2_12 sf
(Children's Development within Social Contexts:)S
95 464 :M
(Metatheory and Theory. )S
f1_12 sf
( Erlbaum, 63-92.)S
59 488 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1992b\). Scaffolding and Self Scaffolding: Central Aspects of)S
95 500 :M
(Development. In L. T. Winegar, J. Valsiner \(Eds.\) )S
345 500 :M
f2_12 sf
(Children's Development)S
95 512 :M
(within Social Contexts: Research and Methodology. )S
348 512 :M
f1_12 sf
( Erlbaum, 33-52.)S
59 536 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1992c\). Levels of Representationality. )S
340 536 :M
f2_12 sf
(Conference on The Science of)S
95 548 :M
(Cognition)S
f1_12 sf
(. Santa Fe, New Mexico, June 15-18.)S
59 572 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1992d\). Commentary on the Age 4 Transition. )S
379 572 :M
f2_12 sf
(Human Development)S
481 572 :M
f1_12 sf
(,)S
95 584 :M
(182-192.)S
59 608 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1993\). Representational Content in Humans and Machines. )S
f2_12 sf
(Journal of)S
95 620 :M
(Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence)S
345 620 :M
f1_12 sf
(, )S
f2_12 sf
(5)S
f1_12 sf
(, 285-333.)S
59 644 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(1995\). Intrinsic Constraints on Language: Grammar and)S
95 656 :M
(Hermeneutics. )S
171 656 :M
f2_12 sf
(Journal of Pragmatics, 23)S
297 656 :M
f1_12 sf
(, 541-554.)S
endp
%%Page: 17 17
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 17 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
532 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(15)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
59 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(Bickhard, M. H. \(in preparation\). )S
f2_12 sf
(The Whole Person: Toward a Naturalism of Persons)S
480 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(.)S
95 62 :M
(Harvard.)S
59 86 :M
(Bickhard, M. H. \(in preparation-b\). Critical Principles: On the Negative Side of)S
95 98 :M
(Rationality. In Herfel, W., Hooker, C. A. \(Eds.\) )S
336 98 :M
f2_12 sf
(Beyond Ruling Reason: Non-)S
95 110 :M
(formal Approaches to Rationality.)S
59 134 :M
f1_12 sf
(Bickhard, M. H., Campbell, R. L. \(1989\). Interactivism and Genetic Epistemology.)S
95 146 :M
f2_12 sf
(Archives de Psychologie, 57)S
231 146 :M
f1_12 sf
(\(221\), 99-121.)S
59 170 :M
(Bickhard, M. H., Campbell, R. L. \(1992\). Some Foundational Questions Concerning)S
95 182 :M
(Language Studies: With a Focus on Categorial Grammars and Model Theoretic)S
95 194 :M
(Possible Worlds Semantics. )S
232 194 :M
f2_12 sf
(Journal of Pragmatics, 17\(5/6\),)S
f1_12 sf
( 401-433.)S
59 218 :M
(Bickhard, M. H., Campbell, R. L. \(in preparation\). Topologies of Learning and)S
95 230 :M
(Development.)S
59 254 :M
(Bickhard, M. H., Christopher, J. C. \(1994\). The Influence of Early Experience on)S
95 266 :M
(Personality Development. )S
226 266 :M
f2_12 sf
(New Ideas in Psychology)S
347 266 :M
f1_12 sf
(, )S
f2_12 sf
(12)S
f1_12 sf
(\(3\), 229-252.)S
59 290 :M
(Bickhard, M. H., Richie, D. M. \(1983\). )S
256 290 :M
f2_12 sf
(On the Nature of Representation: A Case Study)S
95 302 :M
(of James J. Gibson's Theory of Perception)S
299 302 :M
f1_12 sf
(. New York: Praeger.)S
59 326 :M
(Bickhard, M. H., Terveen, L. \(1995\). )S
246 326 :M
f2_12 sf
(Foundational Issues in Artificial Intelligence and)S
95 338 :M
(Cognitive Science \321 Impasse and Solution)S
f1_12 sf
(. Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific.)S
59 362 :M
(Bigelow, J., Pargetter, R. \(1987\). Functions. )S
283 362 :M
f2_12 sf
(Journal of Philosophy, 84)S
408 362 :M
f1_12 sf
(, 181-196.)S
59 386 :M
(Block, N. \(1980\). Introduction: What is functionalism? In N. Block \(Ed.\), )S
428 386 :M
f2_12 sf
(Readings in)S
95 398 :M
(philosophy and psychology)S
226 398 :M
f1_12 sf
( \(Vol. I\). \(171-184\). Cambridge: Harvard.)S
59 422 :M
(Block, N. \(1980b\). Troubles with functionalism. In N. Block \(Ed.\) )S
396 422 :M
f2_12 sf
(Readings in)S
95 434 :M
(philosophy and psychology)S
226 434 :M
f1_12 sf
( \(Vol. I\). \(285-305\). Cambridge: Harvard.)S
59 458 :M
(Bogdan, R. \(1988a\). Information and Semantic Cognition: An Ontological Account.)S
95 470 :M
f2_12 sf
(Mind and Language, 3)S
f1_12 sf
(\(2\), 81-122.)S
59 494 :M
(Bogdan, R. \(1988b\). Mental Attitudes and Common Sense Psychology. )S
f2_12 sf
(Nous, 22)S
457 494 :M
f1_12 sf
(\(3\),)S
95 506 :M
(369-398.)S
59 530 :M
(Bogdan, R. \(1989\). What do we need concepts for? )S
f2_12 sf
(Mind and Language, 4)S
f1_12 sf
(\(1,2\), 17-23.)S
59 554 :M
(Boorse, C. \(1976\). Wright on Functions. )S
f2_12 sf
(Philosophical Review, 85)S
f1_12 sf
(, 70-86.)S
59 578 :M
(Burnyeat, M. \(1983\). )S
170 578 :M
f2_12 sf
(The Skeptical Tradition)S
f1_12 sf
(. Berkeley: University of California Press.)S
59 602 :M
(Campbell, R. L., Bickhard, M. H. \(1986\). )S
f2_12 sf
(Knowing Levels and Developmental Stages)S
475 602 :M
f1_12 sf
(.)S
95 614 :M
(Basel: Karger.)S
59 638 :M
(Campbell, R. L., Bickhard, M. H. \(1992\). Clearing the Ground: Foundational Questions)S
95 650 :M
(Once Again. )S
159 650 :M
f2_12 sf
(Journal of Pragmatics)S
267 650 :M
f1_12 sf
(,)S
f2_12 sf
( 17\(5/6\),)S
f1_12 sf
( 557-602.)S
59 674 :M
(Carlson, N. R. \(1986\). )S
175 674 :M
f2_12 sf
(Physiology of Behavior)S
288 674 :M
f1_12 sf
(. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.)S
endp
%%Page: 18 18
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 18 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
532 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(16)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
59 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(Christensen, W. \(1995\). From Descriptive to Normative Functionality. Australasian)S
95 62 :M
(Association of Philosophy Conference, **)S
59 86 :M
(Christensen, W. \(forthcoming\). A Complex Systems Theory of Teleology. )S
f2_12 sf
(Biology and)S
95 98 :M
(Philosophy)S
149 98 :M
f1_12 sf
(.)S
59 122 :M
(Churchland, P. M. \(1989\). )S
f2_12 sf
(A Neurocomputational Perspective)S
363 122 :M
f1_12 sf
(. MIT.)S
59 146 :M
(Clark, A. \(1989\). )S
f2_12 sf
(Microcognition)S
225 146 :M
f1_12 sf
(. MIT.)S
59 170 :M
(Clark, A. \(1993\). )S
f2_12 sf
(Associative Engines)S
f1_12 sf
(. MIT.)S
59 194 :M
(Clay, M., Lehrer, K. \(1989\). )S
204 194 :M
f2_12 sf
(Knowledge and Skepticism)S
f1_12 sf
(. Westview.)S
59 218 :M
(Coffa, J. A. \(1991\). )S
162 218 :M
f2_12 sf
(The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap)S
f1_12 sf
(. Cambridge.)S
59 242 :M
(Cummins, R. \(1975\). Functional Analysis. )S
275 242 :M
f2_12 sf
(Journal of Philosophy, 72)S
400 242 :M
f1_12 sf
(, 741-764.)S
59 266 :M
(Dretske, F. I. \(1981\). )S
169 266 :M
f2_12 sf
(Knowledge and the Flow of Information)S
362 266 :M
f1_12 sf
(. Cambridge, MA: MIT.)S
59 290 :M
(Dretske, F. I. \(1988\). )S
169 290 :M
f2_12 sf
(Explaining Behavior)S
269 290 :M
f1_12 sf
(. MIT.)S
59 314 :M
(Dreyfus, H. L. \(1967\). Why Computers Must Have Bodies in order to be Intelligent.)S
95 326 :M
f2_12 sf
(Review of Metaphysics, 21)S
223 326 :M
f1_12 sf
(, 13-32.)S
59 350 :M
(Dreyfus, H. L. \(1982\). Introduction. In H. L. Dreyfus \(Ed.\) )S
360 350 :M
f2_12 sf
(Husserl: Intentionality &)S
95 362 :M
(Cognitive Science)S
f1_12 sf
(. \(1-27\). MIT.)S
59 386 :M
(Dreyfus, H. L. \(1991\). )S
176 386 :M
f2_12 sf
(Being-in-the-World)S
270 386 :M
f1_12 sf
(. MIT.)S
59 410 :M
(Dreyfus, H. L., Haugeland, J. \(1978\). Husserl and Heidegger: Philosophy's Last Stand.)S
95 422 :M
(In M. Murray \(Ed.\) )S
197 422 :M
f2_12 sf
(Heidegger & Modern Philosophy)S
358 422 :M
f1_12 sf
( \(222-238\). Yale)S
95 434 :M
(University Press.)S
59 458 :M
(Fodor, J. A. \(1975\). )S
163 458 :M
f2_12 sf
(The Language of Thought)S
f1_12 sf
(. New York: Crowell.)S
59 482 :M
(Fodor, J. A. \(1981\). The present status of the innateness controversy. In J. Fodor,)S
95 494 :M
f2_12 sf
(RePresentations)S
174 494 :M
f1_12 sf
( . Cambridge: MIT Press \(pp. 257-316\).)S
59 518 :M
(Fodor, J. A. \(1987\). )S
163 518 :M
f2_12 sf
(Psychosemantics)S
245 518 :M
f1_12 sf
(. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.)S
59 542 :M
(Fodor, J. A. \(1990a\). )S
f2_12 sf
(A Theory of Content and Other Essays)S
f1_12 sf
(. MIT.)S
59 566 :M
(Fodor, J. A. \(1990b\). Information and Representation. In P. P. Hanson \(Ed.\))S
95 578 :M
f2_12 sf
(Information, Language, and Cognition)S
f1_12 sf
(. \(175-190\). University of British)S
95 590 :M
(Columbia Press.)S
59 614 :M
(Fodor, J. A., Pylyshyn, Z. \(1981\). How direct is visual perception?: Some reflections on)S
95 626 :M
(Gibson's ecological approach. )S
245 626 :M
f2_12 sf
(Cognition)S
f1_12 sf
(, )S
f2_12 sf
(9)S
f1_12 sf
(, 139-196.)S
59 650 :M
(Guignon, C. B. \(1983\). )S
179 650 :M
f2_12 sf
(Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge)S
382 650 :M
f1_12 sf
(. Indianapolis:)S
95 662 :M
(Hackett.)S
endp
%%Page: 19 19
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 19 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
532 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(17)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
59 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(Hanson, P. P. \(1990\). )S
171 50 :M
f2_12 sf
(Information, Language, and Cognition)S
f1_12 sf
(. University of British)S
95 62 :M
(Columbia Press.)S
59 86 :M
(Heidegger, M. \(1962\). )S
176 86 :M
f2_12 sf
(Being and Time)S
252 86 :M
f1_12 sf
(. New York: Harper & Row.)S
59 110 :M
(Hooker, C. A. \(1995\). )S
174 110 :M
f2_12 sf
(Reason, Regulation, and Realism: Towards a Regulatory Systems)S
95 122 :M
(Theory of Reason and Evolutionary Epistemology)S
335 122 :M
f1_12 sf
(. SUNY.)S
59 146 :M
(Hooker, C. A., Christensen, W. \(in preparation\). Very Simple Minds.)S
59 170 :M
(Hoopes, J. \(1991\). )S
f2_12 sf
(Peirce on Signs)S
f1_12 sf
(. Chapel Hill.)S
59 194 :M
(Horgan, T., Tienson, J. \(1988\). Settling into a New Paradigm. The Spindel Conference)S
95 206 :M
(1987: Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. )S
344 206 :M
f2_12 sf
(The Southern Journal of)S
95 218 :M
(Philosophy, XXVI)S
181 218 :M
f1_12 sf
(\(supplement\), 97-114.)S
59 242 :M
(Loewer, B., Rey, G. \(1991\). )S
203 242 :M
f2_12 sf
(Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his critics)S
f1_12 sf
(. Blackwell.)S
59 266 :M
(McClelland, J. L., Rumelhart, D. E. \(1986\). )S
f2_12 sf
(Parallel Distributed Processing:)S
95 278 :M
(Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition: Vol. 2 Psychological and)S
95 290 :M
(Biological Models)S
f1_12 sf
(. Cambridge: MIT.)S
59 314 :M
(Millikan, R. G. \(1984\). )S
179 314 :M
f2_12 sf
(Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories)S
437 314 :M
f1_12 sf
(. MIT.)S
59 338 :M
(Millikan, R. G. \(1993\). )S
179 338 :M
f2_12 sf
(White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice)S
432 338 :M
f1_12 sf
(. MIT.)S
59 362 :M
(Neander, K. \(1991\). Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense.)S
95 374 :M
f2_12 sf
(Philosophy of Science, 58)S
219 374 :M
f1_12 sf
(\(2\), 168-184.)S
59 398 :M
(Okrent, M. \(1988\). )S
159 398 :M
f2_12 sf
(Heidegger\325s Pragmatism)S
280 398 :M
f1_12 sf
(. Cornell.)S
59 422 :M
(Piaget, J. \(1954\). )S
150 422 :M
f2_12 sf
(The Construction of Reality in the Child)S
343 422 :M
f1_12 sf
(. New York: Basic.)S
59 446 :M
(Piaget, J. \(1971\). )S
150 446 :M
f2_12 sf
(Biology and Knowledge)S
f1_12 sf
(. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.)S
59 470 :M
(Piaget, J. \(1977\). The Role of Action in the Development of Thinking. In W. F.)S
95 482 :M
(Overton, J. M. Gallagher \(Eds.\) )S
250 482 :M
f2_12 sf
(Knowledge and Development: Vol. 1)S
427 482 :M
f1_12 sf
(. New York:)S
95 494 :M
(Plenum.)S
59 518 :M
(Pylyshyn, Z. \(1984\). )S
167 518 :M
f2_12 sf
(Computation and Cognition)S
302 518 :M
f1_12 sf
(. MIT.)S
59 542 :M
(Rescher, N. \(1980\). )S
f2_12 sf
(Scepticism)S
f1_12 sf
(. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.)S
59 566 :M
(Rosenthal, S. B. \(1983\). Meaning as Habit: Some Systematic Implications of Peirce's)S
95 578 :M
(Pragmatism. In E. Freeman \(Ed.\) )S
263 578 :M
f2_12 sf
(The Relevance of Charles Peirce)S
421 578 :M
f1_12 sf
(. Monist,)S
95 590 :M
(312-327.)S
59 614 :M
(Rumelhart, D. E. \(1989\). The Architecture of Mind: A Connectionist Approach. In M.)S
95 626 :M
(I. Posner \(Ed.\) )S
174 626 :M
f2_12 sf
(Foundations of Cognitive Science)S
f1_12 sf
(. MIT, 133-160.)S
59 650 :M
(Rumelhart, D. E., McClelland, J. L. \(1986\). )S
f2_12 sf
(Parallel Distributed Processing. Vol. 1:)S
95 662 :M
(Foundations)S
156 662 :M
f1_12 sf
(. MIT.)S
endp
%%Page: 20 20
%%BeginPageSetup
initializepage
(; page: 20 of 20)setjob
%%EndPageSetup
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
516 5 29 13 rC
532 15 :M
f3_12 sf
(18)S
gR
gS 0 0 552 730 rC
59 50 :M
f1_12 sf
(Smith, B. C. \(1985\). Prologue to "Reflections and Semantics in a Procedural Language")S
95 62 :M
(In R. J. Brachman, H. J. Levesque \(Eds.\) )S
f2_12 sf
(Readings in Knowledge Representation)S
487 62 :M
f1_12 sf
(.)S
95 74 :M
(\(31-40\). Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.)S
59 98 :M
(Smith, B. C. \(1987\). )S
166 98 :M
f2_12 sf
(The Correspondence Continuum)S
323 98 :M
f1_12 sf
(. Stanford, CA: Center for the)S
95 110 :M
(Study of Language and Information, CSLI-87-71.)S
59 134 :M
(Smith, J. E. \(1987\). The Reconception of Experience in Peirce, James, and Dewey. In)S
95 146 :M
(R. S. Corrington, C. Hausman, T. M. Seebohm \(Eds.\) )S
f2_12 sf
(Pragmatism Considers)S
95 158 :M
(Phenomenology)S
f1_12 sf
(. \(73-91\). Washington, D.C.: University Press.)S
59 182 :M
(Smolensky, P. \(1986\). Information Processing in Dynamical Systems: Foundations of)S
95 194 :M
(Harmony Theory. In Rumelhart, D. E., McClelland, J. L. \(Eds.\) )S
f2_12 sf
(Parallel)S
95 206 :M
(Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. Vol. 1:)S
95 218 :M
(Foundations)S
156 218 :M
f1_12 sf
(. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 194-281.)S
59 242 :M
(Smolensky, P. \(1988\). On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism. )S
f2_12 sf
(Behavioral and)S
95 254 :M
(Brain Sciences, 11)S
185 254 :M
f1_12 sf
(, 1-74.)S
59 278 :M
(Waltz, D., Feldman, J. A. \(1988\). Connectionist Models and Their Implications. In D.)S
95 290 :M
(Waltz, J. A. Feldman \(Eds.\) )S
238 290 :M
f2_12 sf
(Connectionist Models and Their Implications)S
456 290 :M
f1_12 sf
(.)S
95 302 :M
(Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1-12.)S
59 326 :M
(Wimsatt, W. C. \(1972\). Teleology and the Logical Structure of Function Statements.)S
95 338 :M
f2_12 sf
(Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 3)S
341 338 :M
f1_12 sf
(, 1-80.)S
59 362 :M
(Wimsatt, W. C. \(1976\). Reductive Explanation: A functional account. In R. S. Cohen,)S
95 374 :M
(C. A. Hooker, A. C. Michalos, J. Van Evra \(Eds.\) )S
f2_12 sf
(PSA-1974. Boston Studies in)S
95 386 :M
(the Philosophy of Science)S
219 386 :M
f1_12 sf
(. \(Vol. 32, pp. 671-710\). Dordrecht: Reidel.)S
59 410 :M
(Wright, L. \(1973\). Functions. )S
213 410 :M
f2_12 sf
(Philosophical Review, 82)S
f1_12 sf
(, 139-168.)S
endp
%%Trailer
end
%%EOF