In the 1980s, as now, there were numerous Department of Defense (DOD) directives prescribing military responsibilities for supporting the news media. In addition to a detailed document governing the management and employment of the DOD National Media Pool (DNMP), the most important directive with regard to media planning was, and is, Planning Guidance-Public Affairs, issued by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).1 This publication is primarily directed to the commanders-in-chief of the major combatant commands (or "unified" commands, as they are commonly called), i.e., Atlantic Command, Central Command, European Command, Pacific Command, Southern Command, Space Command, Strategic Command, Special Operations Command, and Transportation Command. All of these commanders are officers of four-star rank, representing the four military services.
The introduction to the public-affairs directive sets its basic tone: "DOD policy is to make timely and accurate information available to the public, Congress, and the press and to provide the media access to cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and safety of U.S. forces."
The directive further emphasizes the need for the combatant commander and his/her staff to work closely with the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs and his/her staff in planning and executing the most effective public affairs effort possible in each military operation. It gives detailed instructions on providing support to the media in such areas as transportation, communications, billeting, messing, and emergency medical treatment and offers guidance in areas such as accreditation of reporters, reporting ground rules, and security review of news reports.
Legacy of Vietnam
With such detailed guidance on the conduct of news-media planning, why did past failures occur?
Research for this report indicates that, prior to the 1990s, the prevailing view among military personnel was that relations with the news media should be handled only by assigned public affairs personnel. Other service members became involved only when the public affairs officers requested that they do so. The unique nature of the Vietnam War accentuated this attitude on the part of commanders.
Vietnam consisted of widespread small-unit actions, conducted mostly during the daytime. Reporters were transported to and from the field by military aircraft, often accompanied by public affairs personnel. They were free to observe and report on the combat operations, which normally occurred in a limited geographic space. Because there was not a strong imperative for secrecy, reporters were able to file their copy without the censorship employed in prior conflicts; they were required only to abide by published ground rules. Combat actions in Vietnam were quite repetitive in nature, and over time military/news media interactions became highly stereotyped. Military commanders and personnel in the field scarcely took notice of reporters. To them, dealing with the news media was the purview of the public affairs personnel.
By the time of Grenada in 1983, there was an entire generation of military officers who did not think "public affairs." Most felt they had more to lose than to gain by interacting with the press. While the DOD and JCS directives required news media planning for military operations, commanders did not understand this to be an integral part of the overall planning. The attitude was that, if the media showed interest in covering an operation, the public affairs personnel could handle any arrangements required. Public affairs officers conducted their planning independently from the operators and were rarely familiar with details of the plan for military action.
Few military personnel outside the public affairs field were aware of the progressive growth in the size and diversity of the news media in the years after Vietnam. When Grenada appeared on the horizon, the military prepared for the operation as they had for past missions. Commanders considered only the operational aspects of the deployment, excluding public affairs personnel from the planning even more than was normally the case because of pre-invasion secrecy imposed by the White House.2
As the operation commenced and 600 reporters arrived on Barbados seeking to cover the impending conflict on Grenada, the operational commanders were caught unprepared. They had allowed themselves to get into a situation that even their public affairs officers could not salvage. Preoccupied with the demands of the operation, they reacted by denying reporters access to Grenada during the first two days of the conflict. They said it was simply "too hard" to make plans to accommodate 600 reporters in the heat of battle. Lack of planning, rather than an attempt to prevent news coverage of the conflict, caused the military's media failure in Grenada; their sin was one of omission rather than commission.
Although the news organizations-understandably-registered loud protests over their treatment in Grenada, the military's approach to media relations did not change as it should have. Attitudinal changes do not occur readily in organizations as large as the military. Also, Grenada was a relatively small operation, and only a fraction of the military was involved or aware of what occurred there.
A flawed solution
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey, did convene the Sidle Commission to review the Grenada debacle, an action which resulted in the establishment of the DOD National Media Pool [DNMP].3 Ironically, however, this proved to be counterproductive to improved public affairs planning by military commanders. Many in the military had the impression that the DNMP would smooth future relations with the press, obviating any need for military commanders to become more involved in the public affairs process than they had been before.
This flaw was exposed in the Panama operation in 1989, when the DNMP was deployed without involvement of those local military commanders whose support was necessary for reporters to operate in-country . As in Grenada, members of the press were only able to cover the later stages of the operation, after the critical phase of the conflict was over.
Subsequently, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Pete Williams requested Fred Hoffman, former Associated Press Pentagon correspondent, to analyze the news media aspects of the Panama conflict and provide recommendations for corrective actions.4 In addition, General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent a message to the major military commanders, stressing the importance of planning and support for news media coverage of military operations. It read, in part:
Commanders are reminded that the media aspects of military operations
are important ... and warrant your personal attention. ... Media coverage
and pool support requirements must be planned simultaneously with operational
plans and should address all aspects of operational activity, including
direct combat, medical, prisoner-of-war, refugee, equipment repair, refueling
and rearming, civic action, and stabilization activities. Public Affairs
annexes should receive command attention when formulating and reviewing
all such plans.
This directive helped greatly to change attitudes within the military and to convince commanders that public affairs planning was an important part of overall operational planning, not just the responsibility of public affairs officers. [See Appendix III, pp. 193-195.]
When Iraq unleashed its sneak attack on Kuwait in August 1990, no one in the American military or media had given prior thought to covering the type of war that was to evolve there. However, in the six-month period prior to the commencement of hostilities, the Pentagon, military and press had worked together to develop plans that would make the Persian Gulf coverage the most comprehensive wartime news coverage in history.
Nevertheless, there were lingering attitude problems within elements of the military which prevented the Gulf War coverage from being as good as it should have been. Once again, news-organization leaders voiced strong criticism of the military's treatment of the media. Subsequently, the representatives of these organizations and the Pentagon worked together to develop the DOD Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations, which were published in April 1992. [See Appendix IV, p. 197.] This document simply highlighted concepts and procedures which had been in other DOD documents for many years, but in so doing it emphasized to military commanders the importance of their personal involvement in planning for news coverage of combat operations.
Lessons learned
Judging from conflict/crisis operations since Desert Storm, the military has finally learned its lesson with regard to news-media planning. The level of military/press cooperation in Somalia and Haiti was unprecedented. In planning prior to the invasion of Haiti, for instance, the Pentagon worked with news organizations to structure a component of independent-coverage reporters who were positioned for entry into the country immediately after the DNMP.
It is noteworthy that there were few, if any, complaints from the news media about their treatment by the military in Somalia or Haiti. Interviews for this report with senior military commanders indicate that they were personally involved in the media planning for these operations. For example, Gen. J.H.Binford Peay, U.S. Army, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command, was interviewed at the time his command was planning for extraction of United Nations forces from Somalia, an event which occurred in March 1995. General Peay confirmed during his interview that he was intimately involved in the public affairs planning for this operation.5
Interviews with both military and media representatives indicate two primary areas in which military/news media planning and cooperation can be further improved. First, Pentagon/military personnel must have reasonable advance notice of the number of reporters who will cover an operation in order to plan effectively for news media support. Second, it is crucial to establish the optimal number of reporters who will cover any given conflict or crisis. In Desert Storm, the number of news personnel in the theater was far in excess of what could be accommodated in the combat units, creating a major problem. This led to establishment of the combat pool system.
In applying lessons from past wars to the coverage of future conflicts, it is particularly important to understand the nature of modern warfare. U.S. armed forces today fight a closely coordinated sea-air-land battle employing high-speed "maneuver warfare." In ground war, for example, troops are transported in rapidly moving tanks and armored personnel carriers and helicopters traveling at 150 mph or more. Furthermore, over the years the military has developed the capability to fight effectively at night. No foreign military possesses a similar night-fighting capability, so American forces will fully exploit this advantage in combat. Future U.S. military operations will normally commence at night and continue around the clock.
The only realistic way for the news media to cover modern warfare is for reporters to be positioned in and travel with military units, preferably as soon as the action starts. It will be impossible to achieve comprehensive, effective coverage of future combat with reporters striking out on their own, trying to cover battles such as those in Desert Storm, ranging over vast distances in rugged terrain at night and in bad weather.
Reporters moving randomly on the battlefield in locations unknown to both friendly and enemy forces are at great risk of getting lost, killed or captured. In addition, such situations jeopardize the effectiveness of U.S. forces by increasing the already high level of complexity and confusion in combat. Mistaking American reporters for the enemy-or mistaking the enemy for American reporters-obviously could have tragic consequences.
These considerations, as well as the others here noted, lead the authors of this report to propose an "independent coverage tier concept"-fully described in Chapter 9 [pp. 57-62]-which will improve the ability of the news media to plan effectively for coverage of future wars.
Endnotes
1. Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (Joint Pub 5-03.2), Annex F. Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). March 1992.
2. Lawrence Eagleburger, telephone conversation with Frank Aukofer, May 22, 1995.
3. Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle, USA (Ret.), Final Report of the CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel, August 23, 1984.
4. Fred S. Hoffman, Review of Panama Pool Deployment, December 1989, report, March 1990.
5. Gen. J.H.Binford Peay III, interview by authors,
Tampa, Fla., January 23, 1995.
Copyright 1995 The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center return to JOUR/IR 246 Week Three