CONFORMITY & DISSENT
Effective group functioning requires both stability and the capacity for change - the former supported by conformity to collective norms and the latter, at least in part, by dissent. A substantial amount of our research investigates the psychological processes underlying conformity and dissent within groups. Recent studies have found that strongly identified group members are vigilant to group-related problems and are willing to express dissent when they believe that doing so will benefit the group (Packer, 2009; Packer & Chasteen, 2010). Ongoing research is further testing the Normative Conflict Model of Dissent (Packer, 2008), identifying additional predictors (e.g., personality traits; Packer, 2010), moderators (e.g., construal-level, self-regulation and efficacy) and mediators (e.g., cost/benefit assessments) of these processes.

INTERGROUP RELATIONS
We also conduct research on intergroup biases: the pervasive tendency for members to preferentially attend to, evaluate and reward their own groups. In particular, these studies investigate how shifts in identity - as people leave and/or join groups - affect attitudes, stereotyping and projected well-being (e.g., Packer & Chasteen, 2006; Remedios, Chasteen & Packer, 2010; Packer, Chasteen & Kang, 2011). Recent research conducted with Jay Van Bavel (New York University) and William Cunningham (The Ohio State University) employs methods from cognitive neuroscience to reveal the neural processes underlying the rapid formation of ingroup preferences. Using fMRI and EEG, these studies suggest that the most minimal of associations with a novel group lead to heightened activity in emotional and visual brain regions to fellow members, and that these neural signals predict evaluative biases (e.g., Van Bavel, Packer & Cunningham, 2008; Van Bavel, Packer & Cunningham, in press).

IDENTITY AND EVALUATIVE PROCESSES
Related research also investigates basic evaluative processes - with particular attention to the diversity of concerns that people can bring to bear when they judge actions (e.g., Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer & Van Bavel, 2007; Packer, Kesek & Cunningham, 2011). Very recent research is contrasting moral versus pragmatic forms of evaluation and their implications for decision-making in a variety of contexts - including social dilemmas and elections. Behavioral and neuroimaging studies reveal that judging the same action from a pragmatic versus a moral perspective engages different processes and can result in different evaluations. However, even if the same evaluation is reached, the effects of how it was reached appear to linger and differentially influence behavior.